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Abstract:		This	thesis	aims	to	solve	a	contradiction	that	is	generated	by	claims	of	Socrates’	in	Plato’s	Theaetetus	that	I	refer	to	as	the	“puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom”.	In	the	Theaetetus,	Socrates	claims	to	practice	the	art	(technē)	(Theaet	149a4,	a7	150b6,	c1,	151a)	of	midwifery,	which,	I	argue	at	the	opening	of	the	first	chapter,	implies	he	possesses	knowledge	(epistēmē).	This	claim	entails	a	contradiction	when	viewed	in	conjunction	with	Socrates’	claims	that,	firstly,	wisdom	(sophia)	is	the	same	as	epistēmē	(Theaet	145d-e)	and,	secondly,	that	he	lacks	any	sophia	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2).	Once	I	have	shown	this	I	consider	two	potential	solutions	that	have	been	offered	to	this	puzzle	in	the	recent	literature	on	the	Theaetetus.	Finding	these	solutions	unsatisfactory,	in	the	next	chapter	I	consider	the	possibility	that	solutions	that	have	been	offered	to	a	puzzle	found	in	Plato’s	early	dialogues	might	help	to	solve	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.	By	exposing	the	similarities	between	the	puzzles	found	in	the	early	dialogues	and	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	I	seek	to	justify	the	interpretive	strategy	of	using	solutions	to	the	former	to	help	solve	the	latter.	I	then	explain	and	rebut	a	potential	objection	to	adopting	this	procedure.	This	being	so	I	go	on	to	pursue	the	strategy	of	applying	solutions	offered	to	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues	to	the	puzzle	from	the	Theaetetus;	I	argue	that	the	solutions	on	offer	are	for	the	most	part	unsatisfactory.	In	the	final	chapter	I	turn	to	offering	my	own	proposal	for	how	to	solve	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.	I	argue	that	Socrates	should	not	be	understood	as	possessing	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	midwifery.	I	propose	that	instead,	God	possesses	the	insights	necessary	for	practicing	mental	obstetrics	and	that	Socrates	collaborates	with	God	in	delivering	and	assessing	the	beliefs	of	Socrates’	interlocutors.			
Impact	Statement:		This	thesis	recommends	reassessing	Socrates’	philosophical	methodology	in	the	Theaetetus	as	being	conducted	from	the	starting	point	of	possessing	no	knowledge.												
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Introduction:		This	thesis	aims	to	find	a	solution	to	a	puzzle	that	arises	during	the	opening	of	Plato’s	Theaetetus	(Theaet	149a-151d)	in	the	midst	of	a	passage	that	Myles	Burnyeat	has	called	‘deservedly	one	of	the	most	famous	Plato	ever	wrote’.1	This	puzzle	appears	as	a	result	of	the	fact	that	Plato	portrays	Socrates	as	claiming,	on	the	one	hand,	that	he	practices	the	art	(technē)	of	intellectual	midwifery	(Theaet	
	149a4,	a7	150b6,	c1,	151a,	c)	whilst	on	the	other,	that,	as	part	of	his	practice	of	that	art,	he	lacks	all	wisdom	(sophia)	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	150d1-2).	What	will	become	apparent	(in	section	1.3)	is	that	we	have	compelling	reasons	to	think	that	these	claims	imply	contrary	conclusions	concerning	Socrates’	epistemic	state	in	the	dialogue.	This	contradiction	I	refer	to	as	“the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom”.			 The	first	chapter	opens	by	explicating	the	features	of	the	general	notion	of	a	technē	found	in	the	Platonic	corpus.	These	aspects	of	a	
technē	are	then	used	to	explain	the	structure	of	Socrates’	art	of	intellectual	midwifery	in	the	Theaetetus	(Theaet	149a4,	a7	150b6,	c1,	151a,	c).	Elucidating	these	central	features	of	Socrates’	technē	helps	both	to	account	for	the	way	in	which	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	emerges	(in	sections	1.3	and	2.1)	and,	in	the	third	chapter,	the	way	in	which	I	argue	the	puzzle	can	be	solved.	In	the	last	section	of	the	opening	chapter	(section	1.4)	I	present	and	offer	grounds	for	rejecting	two	recent	solutions	that	have	been	offered	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.		 The	next	chapter	explains	how	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	and	an	epistemic	puzzle	from	Plato’s	early	dialogues	are	the	same.	These	similarities	imply	that	solutions	that	have	been	offered	to	the	former	puzzle	may	help	solve	the	latter.	This	exegesis	aims	to	justify	undertaking	the	interpretive	approach	of	using	solutions	offered	to	the	former	puzzle	to	solve	the	latter.	Indicating	a	potential	objection	to	this	exegetical	procedure,	I	rebut	this	challenge	by	endorsing	David	Sedley’s																																																									1	Burnyeat,	Miles,	The	Theaetetus	of	Plato	(with	a	translation	of	Plato’s	
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interpretation	of	Socrates’	character	in	the	Theaetetus:	that	Socrates	‘was,	so	to	speak,	the	midwife	of	Platonism’.2	Finally	I	proceed	to	assessing	the	possibility	that	each	of	three	solutions	that	have	been	offered	to	the	epistemic	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues	may	help	to	solve	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.	On	the	whole	I	offer	reasons	for	dismissing	this	possibility.		 In	the	last	chapter	I	explain	my	own	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.	From	a	close	analysis	of	Theaet	150c	I	argue	that	Socrates	is	best	understood	as	not	possessing	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	midwifery	and	suggest	that	rather,	God	does.	I	indicate	some	pieces	of	evidence	from	the	Theaetetus	that	point	towards	the	conclusion	that	God	and	Socrates	collaborate	in	the	practice	of	midwifery.	Lastly	I	offer	some	thoughts	regarding	what	may	have	motivated	Plato	to	attribute	the	origins	of	Socrates’	philosophical	practice	to	a	divinity.		Following	the	last	chapter	I	offer	some	closing	remarks	regarding	the	consequences	my	interpretation	has	for	our	perception	of	Socratic	methodology	and	indicate	some	further	lines	of	investigation	that	my	interpretation	recommends.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																									2	Sedley,	David,	The	Midwife	of	Platonism,	Oxford	Clarendon,	2004,	p.8			
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Chapter	1:	
	
1.1:	The	General	Notion	of	a	Technē:		The	first	aspect	of	the	“general	notion”	of	a	technē	that	I	wish	to	draw	attention	to	is	that	each	technē	has	a	unique	function	(ergon).3	This	can	be	seen	from	Socrates’	claim	in	the	Republic	that	‘every	craft	[technē]	differ[s]	from	every	other	in	having	a	different	function	[ergon]’	(Rep	345e-346a).4	This	is	also	a	claim	that	is	present	in	the	Ion	where	it	is	agreed	that	‘to	each	profession	[technē]	a	god	has	granted	the	ability	to	know	a	certain	function	[ergon]’	(Ion	357c).5	Here	the	reference	to	a	‘certain’	function	again	indicates	the	idea	that	each	technē	has	a	unique	
ergon,	a	point	that	is	then	confirmed	a	little	further	on	when	Socrates	says	that	‘when	I	find	that	the	knowledge	[involved	in	one	case]	deals	with	different	subjects	from	the	knowledge	involved	[in	another	case],	then	I	claim	that	one	is	a	different	profession	[technē]	from	another’	(Ion	357d-e).	The	‘subject’	of	the	knowledge	here	is	presumably	the	
ergon	of	each	technē,	for	as	we	saw,	this	is	the	‘knowledge’	that	a	‘god	has	granted’	to	each	practitioner	of	a	technē	(Ion	357c).	Hence,	Socrates’	claim	here	is	that	when	the	subject	of	the	knowledge	involved	in	a	
technē	(viz.	the	ergon)	is	different,	the	technē	is	different,	thus	echoing	the	doctrine	in	the	Republic	(Rep	345e-356a)	that	each	technē	has	a	unique	ergon.		Following	the	claim	in	the	Republic	that	all	technai	are	differentiated	by	their	performing	a	unique	function,	Socrates	and	Thrasymachus	concur	that	‘each	craft	[technē]	brings	its	own	peculiar	benefit’	(Rep	346c)	such	that	‘even	if	someone	who	is	a	ship’s	captain	becomes	healthy	because	sailing	is	advantageous	to	health,	you																																																									3	“ergon”	may	also	be	translated	“goal”,	“product”,	“output”	or	“result”.	4	All	quotations	from	the	Republic	are	from	the	translation	by	G.M.A	Grube	and	C.D.C	Reeve	(rev.)	in	Plato:	Complete	Works,	Hackett,	1997,	pp.971-1224	5	All	quotations	from	the	Ion	are	from	the	translation	by	Paul	Woodruff	in	Plato:	Complete	Works,	Hackett,	1997,	pp.937-950	
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wouldn’t	for	that	reason	call	his	craft	[technē]	medicine’	(Rep	346b).	There	are	therefore	two	points	being	made	here.	Firstly,	each	technē	produces	some	beneficial	result	(a	‘peculiar	benefit’)	(Rep	346c)	and,	secondly,	this	beneficial	result,	like	the	ergon	of	each	technē,	is	unique	to	each	technē.	This	point	is	then	carried	forward	and	Thrasymachus	and	Socrates	eventually	agree	that	even	if	all	craftspeople	earn	money	from	the	performance	of	their	crafts	(i.e.	all	crafts	realise	the	same	end	
qua	earning	money),	the	collection	of	payment	for	the	practice	of	their	
technē	is	really	the	performance	of	an	ancillary	technē	altogether	(Rep	346c);	reinforcing	the	point	that	the	result	realised	by	each	technē	is	unique	to	it.	There	exist	further	specific	examples	of	the	idea	both	that	
technai	realise	some	beneficial	result	and	that	that	result	is	unique	to	each	technē.	In	the	Euthydemus,	for	instance,	Socrates	identifies	‘nourishment	from	the	earth’	(Euthd	292a)	as	the	unique	result	of	farming	(Euthd	292a)	and	‘health’	(Euthd	291e)	as	the	unique	benefit	conferred	by	medicine	(Euthd	291e).6	In	the	Gorgias	the	characters	agree	that	‘weaving,	for	example,	is	concerned	with	the	production	of	clothes’	(Grg	449d)	and	‘music	is	concerned	with	the	composition	of	tunes’	(Grg	449d).7	These	instances	thus	confirm	the	idea	that	each	
technē	is	understood	to	produce	a	unique	result.	Later	on	in	the	Gorgias,	during	a	passage	that	I	shall	be	returning	to	later,	the	genuine	technai	of	medicine,	gymnastics,	justice	and	legislation	(Grg	464b-c)	are	distinguished	from	the	empeiriai	that	mimic	them	(Grg	464c-d)	on	the	basis	that	the	former	‘always	provide	care,	in	the	one	case	for	the	body,	in	the	other	for	the	soul’	(Grg	464c)	whereas	the	latter	take	‘no	thought	at	all	of	whatever’s	best’	(Grg	464d).	Lastly,	in	the	Charmides	the	result	of	medicine	(health)	is	said	to	‘confer’	(Charm	165c)	‘no	small	benefit’	(Charm	165d)	while	in	the	Euthydemus	Socrates	claims	that	‘it	[the	
																																																								6	All	quotations	from	the	Euthydemus	are	from	the	translation	of	Rosamond	Kent	Sprague	in	Plato:	Complete	Works,	Hackett,	1997,	pp.708-746	7	All	quotations	from	the	Gorgias	are	from	the	translation	of	Donald	J	Zeyl	in	Plato:	Complete	Works,	Hackett,	1997,	pp.791-870	
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kingly	technē]	must	provide	us	with	something	good’	(Euthd	292a).8	These	examples	thus	show	that	the	unique	result	of	each	technē	is	understood	to	be	beneficial.		So	far	then,	the	general	notion	of	a	technē	as	I	have	presented	it	consists	in	the	idea	that	each	technē	serves	some	unique	ergon	and	that	it	produces	a	specific	beneficial	result.	Here	a	question	might	naturally	arise,	namely,	what	exactly	is	the	ergon	of	each	technē?	The	answer	to	this	question,	I	would	like	to	suggest,	is	that	the	unique	ergon	of	each	of	the	technai	is	to	realise	the	unique	beneficial	result	that	is	associated	with	it.9	Some	evidence	for	this	interpretation	can	be	found	in	the	same	passage	from	which	I	have	been	quoting	thus	far	in	the	Republic.	In	that	passage	Socrates	claims	that	‘wage-earning	gives	us	wages,	for	this	is	its	function	[ergon]’	(Rep	346a).	Hence,	the	actual	realisation	of	the	beneficial	result	of	the	wage-earning	technē	(what	it	‘gives’	us,	its	‘peculiar	benefit’)	(Rep	346c)	is	identified	with	its	ergon.	The	same	claim	also	appears	in	the	Euthyphro	where	Euthyphro	replies	affirmatively	to	the	question:	‘could	you	tell	me	to	the	achievement	of	what	goal	[ergon]	service	to	doctors	tends?	Is	it	not,	do	you	think,	to	achieving	health?’	(Euthphr	13d).10	Supposing	the	identification	of	achieving	the	unique	beneficial	result	of	a	technē	with	its	unique	ergon	also	explains	nicely	why,	in	the	passage	from	the	Republic,	health	is	the	specific	result	of	medicine	(Rep	346a)	but	not	of	sailing	(Rep	346b);	it	is	because	the	unique	and	specific	function	(ergon)	of	medicine	is	to	produce	health	whereas	this	is	not	the	case	in	naval	navigation.	Hence,	the	unique	ergon	of	each	technē,	I	submit,	is	to	produce	a	unique	beneficial	result.11																																																										8	All	quotations	from	the	Charmides	are	from	the	translation	of	Rosamond	Kent	Sprague	published	in	Plato:	Complete	Works,	Hackett,	1997,	pp.639-664	9	“is”	in	the	sense	of	“is	identical	with”;	the	relation	that	is	most	commonly	expressed	in	first	order	logic	with	the	symbol	“=”	10	All	quotations	from	the	Euthyphro	are	from	the	translation	of	G.M.A	Grube	published	in	Plato:	Complete	Works,	Hackett,	1997,	pp.1-17	11	This	is	what	the	ergon	is.	Performing	the	ergon	is	therefore	producing	the	unique	beneficial	result.	
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The	last	and	most	significant	aspect	of	the	general	notion	of	a	
technē	that	I	wish	to	draw	attention	to	is	that	a	technē	is	knowledge	(epistēmē)	in	some	sense.12	There	are	a	good	number	of	passages	in	Plato’s	works	in	which	this	claim	is	maintained.	For	instance,	in	the	
Charmides	the	technē	of	medicine	is	said	to	be	epistēmē	a	couple	of	times	(Charm	165c,	171a).	In	the	opening	of	the	Gorgias	also,	Socrates	tells	the	eponymous	character,	on	the	assumption	(later	agued	against	starting	at	Grg	462c)	that	oratory	is	a	technē	(Grg	449a)	to	‘answer	that	way	about	oratory...About	which	of	the	things	there	are,	is	it	knowledge?	[epistēmē]’	(Grg	449d).	For	Socrates’	request	to	make	sense	here,	the	assumption	that	he	must	be	making	is	that	a	technē	is	
epistēmē.	Further,	as	we	saw	when	discussing	the	ergon	of	each	technē	in	the	Ion,	knowledge	(epistēmē)	was	said	to	be	involved	in	the	practice	of	a	technē	(Ion	537c-e).	What	is	more,	the	context	of	the	claim	makes	it	plain	that	in	this	passage	Socrates	is	assuming	that	a	technē	is	
epistēmē.13	Finally,	in	the	Theaetetus	Socrates	asks	Theaetetus:	‘When	you	talk	about	shoemaking,	you	mean	just	knowledge	[epistēmē]	of	the	making	of	shoes’	(Theaet	146d)	and	that	‘When	you	talk	about	carpentering,	you	mean	simply	the	knowledge	[epistēmē]	of	the	making	of	wooden	objects’	(Theaet	146d)	to	which	Theaetetus	replies	affirmatively.14	This	therefore	confirms	the	interpretation	that	a	technē	is	epistēmē	quite	straightforwardly.	It	will	now	help	to	investigate	the	question	of	what	this	epistēmē	consists	in.		
																																																								12	Minimally,	a	technē	should	be	taken	to	count	as	a	type	of	knowledge	(epistēmē).	I	do	not	wish	to	necessarily	endorse	the	stronger	claim	that	the	terms	technē	and	epistēmē	can	be	conceptually	identified	or	that	the	use	of	these	terms	can	be	taken	to	be	co-extensional,	although	there	is	room	for	this	kind	of	interpretation.	See	Benson,	Hugh	H.	Socratic	
Wisdom,	Oxford	University	Press,	2000,	pp.	10-11	for	a	well-reasoned	defense	of	when	one	is	justified	in	maintaining	this	stronger	view.	13	Socrates	seems	to	be	using	technē	and	epistēmē	interchangeably	in	this	passage.	14	All	quotations	from	the	Theaetetus	are	from	the	translation	of	M.	J.	Levett	and	Myles	Burnyeat	(rev.)	in	Plato:	The	Complete	Works,	Hackett,	1997,	pp.157-235	
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A	good	place	to	start	looking	for	an	answer	to	this	question	is	the	passage	from	the	Ion	where	Socrates	says	that	‘to	each	profession	[technē]	a	god	has	granted	the	knowledge	of	a	certain	function	[ergon]’	(Ion	537c).	So	the	knowledge	is	‘of’	the	ergon	of	the	technē.	But	this	
epistēmē	can	only	plausibly	be	understood	as	knowledge	not	just	of	what	the	ergon	of	each	technē	is	but	knowledge	of	how	to	perform	the	particular	ergon.	For,	if	the	point	is	that	knowledge	is	involved	in	the	practice	of	a	technē	(as	seems	to	be	suggested	from	the	quotes	in	the	last	paragraph,	especially	at	Theaet	146c-d),	then	it	cannot	be	that,	say,	the	cobbler	simply	knows	that	their	function	is	to	produce	shoes.	For	anyone,	cobbler	or	not,	can	say	what	the	function	of	shoe	making	is.	Rather,	I	suggest,	the	epistēmē	involved	in	the	practice	of	a	technē	is	best	understood	as	knowledge	of	how	to	perform	the	ergon	(viz.	realise	the	unique	beneficial	result)	associated	with	it.		To	see	that	this	view	has	some	plausibility	one	needs	to	look	again	at	a	passage	from	the	Ion	where	Socrates	requests	that	Ion	‘Take	these	fingers:	I	know	that	there	are	five	of	them,	and	you	know	the	same	thing…suppose	I	asked	you	whether	it’s	the	same	profession	–	arithmetic	–	that	teaches	you	and	me	the	same	things’	(Ion	537e)	(emphasis	added).	The	implication	of	this	statement	is	that	mastery	of	arithmetic	(a	technē)	teaches	us	or	gives	us	(at	least)	knowledge	concerning	how	to	count	(viz.	how	to	determine	quantity).	As	we	saw,	knowledge	of	the	ergon	of	a	technē	is	involved	with	possessing	any	
technē	(Ion	537c).	We	also	know,	from	the	Gorgias	(Grg	453e)	that	the	
ergon	of	arithmetic	is	the	production	of	persuasion	regarding	quantity.	The	fact	that	possessing	skill	with	arithmetic	teaches	one	to	be	able	(at	a	minimum)	to	determine	quantity	(Ion	537e)	dovetails	nicely	with	the	knowledge	‘of’	(Ion	537c)	the	ergon	that	consists	in	the	production	of	such	persuasion.	I	would	thus	like	to	argue	that	the	knowledge	that	teaches	those	competent	in	arithmetic	what	a	determinate	quantity	consists	of	must	be	the	same	knowledge	as	the	knowledge	‘of’	this	thing:	the	knowledge	of	the	ergon	is	knowledge	of	how	to	produce	the	
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beneficial	result	of	arithmetic	(at	a	minimum,	persuasion	regarding	quantity):	that	is	what	it	‘teaches’	(Ion	537e)	us.	I	would	also	like	to	argue	that	the	view	that	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	a	technē	is	knowledge	of	how	to	perform	the	
ergon	of	that	technē	is	supported	by	a	careful	interpretation	of	a	celebrated	passage	from	the	Gorgias	(Grg	464b-466a).	In	this	passage	Socrates	engages	in	a	lengthy	reflection	to	argue	for	the	claim,	contra	Polus,	that	oratory	is	an	empeiria	(a	‘knack’)	(Grg	462c)	rather	than	a	
technē.	In	this	passage	Socrates	is	seen	to	distinguish	the	practices	of	‘flattery’	that	(Grg	463b)	achieve	their	aim	of	‘gratification’	(Grg	462c)	only	through	the	ability	of	those	who	practice	them	to	use	empeiriai	(Grg	462c),	from	the	technai	by	claiming	that	the	latter	practices	involve	possessing	knowledge	(epistēmē)	(Grg	464c)	while	the	former	do	not.	In	this	passage	Socrates	first	enumerates	two	‘subjects’	(Grg	464b);	one	that	involves	care	of	the	soul	called	‘politics’	at	Grg	464b	and	one	that	involves	care	of	the	body	and	which	remains	nameless	(Grg	464b).	These	two	subjects	are	then	said	to	come	in	two	further	parts,	each	of	which	is	a	technē	(Grg	464b-c),	giving	us	four	technai	altogether.	These	four	technai	(gymnastics,	medicine,	legislation	and	justice)	(Grg	464b-c)	are	then	distinguished	from	the	empiric	practices	that	mimic	them:		‘Flattery	[practices	involving	empeiria	-	Grg	463b]	takes	notice	of	them	[the	four	technai]	and	I	won’t	say	by	knowing	but	by	guessing	–	divides	itself	into	four,	masks	itself	with	each	of	the	parts,	and	then	pretends	to	be	the	characters	of	the	masks’	(Grg	464c-d)		Thus	the	claim	that	Socrates	is	arguing	for	here	is	that	the	four	technai	involve	knowing	(possessing	epistēmē)	when	they	are	practiced	whilst	each	of	the	empeiriai	that	copies	them	operate	merely	by	‘guessing’	(Grg	464c).	Now,	the	epistēmē	involved	in	the	practice	of	these	technē,	one	might	suppose	on	the	basis	of	this	passage,	can	be	understood	as	being	capable	of	articulation	in	an	‘account’	(Grg	465a),	another	feature	that	
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distinguishes	the	technai	from	empeiria	(Grg	465a).	Why	should	one	understand	this	to	be	the	case?		The	account	a	practitioner	of	a	technē	can	give,	we	are	told,	comprises	of	‘the	real	nature	of	the	things	it	[the	technē]	applies’	(Grg	465a,	501a)	that	is,	it	is	of	‘the	cause	[aītion]	of	the	things	it	does’	(Grg	465a,	501a).15	Now,	on	the	basis	of	what	I	have	said	previously,	I	would	like	here	to	suggest	that	what	a	technē	does	is	realise	its	unique	beneficial	result	(viz.	“doing”	a	technē	involves	performing	its	unique	
ergon).	What	is	articulated	in	the	account,	on	this	reading,	therefore,	is	the	cause	or	explanation	of	the	performance	of	the	ergon	of	the	technē.	Here,	then,	I	suggest,	it	is	plausible	to	interpret	this	‘cause’	(Grg	465a,	501a)	as	knowledge	of	how	to	perform	the	ergon	of	the	technē.	One	such	reason	for	doing	so	is	that	knowledge	of	how	to	do	x,	in	this	case	how	to	perform	the	ergon	of	a	technē,	is	a	sufficient	explanation	of	one’s	doing	x	where	x	=	any	action.	Using	this	principle	to	explain	what	the	content	of	the	‘account’		(Grg	465a)	practitioners	of	technai	can	give	consists	in	entails	that	practitioners	of	technai	can	offer	an	account	of	the	epistēmē	of	how	to	perform	the	unique	ergon	of	their	technē.	Supposing	the	interpretation	I	am	proposing	to	be	correct	can	usefully	illuminate	this	passage	from	the	Gorgias	by	being	able	to	offer	a	philosophically	plausible	way	of	understanding	the	account	that	practitioners	of	technai	are	able	to	give,	shedding	further	light	on	what	distinguishes	such	practices	from	the	empeiriai	(Grg	465a).		An	articulation	of	the	central	aspects	of	the	general	notion	of	a	
technē	should	now	be	possible.	What	I	would	like	to	claim	is	that,	in	general,	practicing	a	technē	turns	out	to	involve	the	fulfilment	of	a	unique	ergon	that	is	the	realisation	of	a	unique	beneficial	result	and	is	a	process	that	is	explained	by	the	practitioner’s	epistēmē	of	how	to	perform	the	ergon.	With	this	general	notion	in	mind	one	is	now	ready	to	apply	this	concept	to	the	Socratic	technē	in	the	Theaetetus.		
																																																									15	The	term	“aītion”	here	may	also	be	translated	“explanation”.	
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1.2:	The	Socratic	Technē	in	the	Theaetetus:		
	The	passage	from	the	Theaetetus	that	is	the	primary	focus	of	this	thesis	runs	from	Theaet	149a-151d	and	contains	six	occasions	on	which	Socrates	claims	to	practice	the	technē	of	midwifery	(Theaet	149a4,	a7,	150b6,	c1,	151a9,	c).16	I	shall	now	seek	to	explain	the	features	of	Socrates’	technē	using	the	general	notion	just	articulated.		Usefully	Plato	has	Socrates	explicitly	identify	what	the	ergon	of	his	intellectual	midwifery	consists	in	when	he	says:		‘the	work	of	the	[ordinary]	midwives	is	a	highly	important	one;	but	it	is	not	so	important	as	my	own	performance.	And	for	this	reason,	that	there	is	not	in	midwifery	the	further	complication	that	the	patients	are	sometimes	delivered	of	phantoms	and	sometimes	of	realities,	and	that	the	two	are	hard	to	distinguish.	If	they	were,	then	the	midwife’s	greatest	
function	[ergon]	would	be	to	distinguish	the	true	from	the	false	offspring’	(Theaet	150a-b)	(emphasis	added)			The	italicised	section	of	the	above	quote	makes	it	clear	that	if	people	
could	be	delivered	of	‘true’	(Theaet	150b)	and	‘false’	(Theaet	150b)	‘offspring’	(Theaet	150b)	then,	a	‘midwife’s	greatest	function	[ergon]’	(Theaet	150b)	would	be	to	determine	which	of	the	offspring	fall	into	which	category	(Theaet	150b).	We	need	now	to	notice	two	things.	Firstly,	Socrates	uses	the	same	term	for	function	(ergon)	that	he	used	in	all	of	the	texts	in	section	1.1	where	the	various	connotations	of	this	term	were	explained	in	connection	with	the	general	notion	of	a	technē.																																																									16	Socrates’	claims	to	practice	a	technē:	‘I	practice	the	same	art	[technē]	myself	[as	his	mother	does]’	(Theaet	149a4);	‘it	is	a	secret	that	I	have	this	art	[technē]’	(Theaet	149a7);	‘My	art	[technē]	of	midwifery	is	just	like	theirs	[ordinary	midwive’s]	in	most	respects’	(Theaet	150b6);	‘the	most	important	thing	about	my	art	[technē]	is	the	ability	to	apply	all	possible	tests	to	the	offspring’	(Theaet	150c1);	‘this	pain	[labour	pain]	my	art	[technē]	is	able	to	bring	on,	and	also	to	allay’	(Theaet	151a9);	I	want	you	[Theaetetus]	to	come	to	me	as	to	one	who	is	both	the	son	of	a	midwife	and	himself	skilled	in	the	art	[technē]’	(Theaet	151c).	
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This	therefore	provides	some	good	textual	evidence	to	link	what	Socrates	is	saying	here	about	the	technē	of	midwifery	to	that	general	notion.	Secondly,	Socrates	implies	on	a	couple	of	occasions,	proceeding	the	claims	at	Theaet	150a-b	that,	in	the	case	of	his	own	mental	midwifery,	someone	can	be	delivered	of	either	a	‘phantom,	that	is,	an	error,	or	a	fertile	truth’	(Theaet	150c)	or,	as	he	also	says,	something	‘really	fertile	or	a	mere	wind-egg’	(Theaet	151e).	This	indicates	that	the	practice	of	midwifery	that	Socrates	partakes	in	is	a	kind	of	midwifery,	where,	as	he	puts	it	at	Theaet	150a-b	‘the	patients	are	sometimes	delivered	of	phantoms	and	sometimes	of	realities,	and	that	the	two	are	hard	to	distinguish’	(Theaet	150a-b)	thus	implying	that	‘the	greatest	function	[ergon]	of	[his]	midwifery’	(Theaet	150b)	is	‘to	distinguish	the	true	from	the	false	offspring’	(Theaet	150b).	Hence,	we	should	conclude	that	(at	least	the	greatest)	function	of	Socrates’	midwifery	is	to	determine	the	veracity	of	his	interlocutor’s	brain-children.	Granted	that	this	is	the	ergon	of	Socrates’	midwifery,	what	beneficial	result	does	performing	the	ergon	realise?	If	the	unique	ergon	of	the	Socratic	technē	is	to	‘see	whether	what	he	have	here	[Theaetetus’	intellectual	offspring]	is	really	fertile	or	a	mere	wind-egg’	(Theaet	151e),	it	seems	that	what	is	realised	by	performing	the	ergon	must	be	some	kind	of	judgement	about	whether	the	first-born	is	a	true	or	false	belief.17	This	I	would	argue	must	be	the	case	because	forming	a	judgment	as	to	which	offspring	are	false,	which	true,	is	minimally	what	is	required	for	one	to	‘distinguish’	(Theaet	150b)	the	offspring	on	that	basis.	Hence,	for	that	reason,	one	should	conclude	that	the	result	of	the	technē	of	midwifery	is	the	formation	of	a	judgement	regarding	an	interlocutor’s	belief.	There	is	some	evidence	later	in	the	Theaetetus	that	supports	this	view	and	which	can	also	explain	in	what	sense	the	formation	of	the	salient	kind	of	judgement	is																																																									17	The	offspring	must	be	beliefs	because	they	can	be	distinguished	as	true	or	false	by	performing	the	ergon	of	midwifery	on	them	(Theaet	150c)	and	Theaetetus	and	Socrates	agree	that	knowledge	is	‘infallible’	(Theaet	152c).	Thus,	if	Theaetetus’	offspring	were	knowledge,	they	could	not	be	subjected	to	the	testing	involved	in	practicing	the	ergon.	
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beneficial.	If	one	looks	forward	in	the	text,	the	result	of	the	testing	of	Theaetetus’	firstborn	that	is	reached	between	Theaet	186e-187a	is	declared	to	be	‘the	clearest	possible	proof	that	knowledge	is	something	different	from	perception’	(Theaet	186e).	This	Socrates	then	characterises	as	having	‘made	a	little	progress’	(Theaet	187a),	for	he	and	Theaetetus	have	discovered	‘what	knowledge	is	not’	(Theaet	187a).	Firstly,	this	corresponds	to	the	idea	that	the	result	of	the	Socratic	technē	is	a	judgement	concerning	the	veracity	of	Theaetetus’	beliefs.	For,	in	this	case,	Theaetetus’	first	born	has,	through	a	lengthy	process	of	examination	(almost	thirty	Stephanus’	pages	worth)	been	judged	false.	The	fact	that	Socrates	calls	this	judgement	‘progress’	(Theaet	187a)	corresponds	to	the	idea	that	this	result	of	midwifery	is	beneficial.	The	result	is	advantageous	presumably	because	it	represents	a	development;	an	elimination	of	candidate	answers	to	the	dialogue’s	central	question	(Theaet	145e-146a)	because	Socrates	and	his	young	protégé	have	found	out	‘what	knowledge	is	not’	(Theaet	187a).		We	are	now	in	a	position	to	see	what	epistēmē	Socrates	possesses	as	part	of	the	practice	of	his	technē.	The	answer	is	that	if	the	knowledge	associated	with	the	practice	of	each	technē	is	epistēmē	of	how	to	achieve	the	particular	result	that	each	technē	realises	(viz.	knowledge	of	how	to	perform	the	ergon),	as	we	saw	in	section	1.1,	then	Socrates’	practice	of	the	technē	of	intellectual	midwifery	must	be	
epistēmē	of	how	to	produce	a	judgement	regarding	the	truth	or	falsity	of	his	interlocutor’s	beliefs.	Once	again,	this	seems	to	correspond	well	with	a	claim	that	Socrates	makes	later	in	the	dialogue.	At	Theaet	161b	Socrates	claims	that	‘All	I	know,	such	as	it	is,	is	how	to	take	an	argument	from	someone	else	–	someone	who	is	wise	–	and	give	it	a	fair	reception’	(Theaet	161b).18	If	giving	a	belief	a	‘fair	reception’	(Theaet	161b)																																																									18	Although	what	Socrates	claims	possession	of	here	does	appear	to	be	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	midwifery,	his	qualification	in	the	sense	in	which	he	will	apparently	lay	claim	to	this	knowledge	(it	is	all	he	knows	‘such	as	it	is’)	(Theaet	161b)	should	lead	us	to	conclude	that	he	only	apparently	lays	claim	to	such	knowledge	in	this	passage	(at	least	in	the	absence	of	an	explanation	as	to	the	sense	in	which	he	means	
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corresponds	to	producing	a	judgement	as	to	that	belief’s	veracity,	then	the	epistēmē	Socrates	appears	to	admit	he	has	possession	of	in	this	passage	would	correspond	exactly	to	the	epistēmē	that	I	am	suggesting	comprises	Socrates’	technē	of	midwifery.			Therefore,	the	Socratic	technē	of	midwifery	ends	up	being	a	practice,	the	function	of	which	is	to	form	a	judgment	concerning	the	truth	or	falsity	of	Socrates’	interlocutor’s	beliefs	and	which	consists	in	knowledge	of	how	to	form	that	judgment.	Now,	as	I	have	said,	this	full	articulation	of	the	features	of	Socratic	midwifery	will	only	be	seen	to	play	a	major	argumentative	role	in	the	final	chapter	of	this	thesis.	There	I	shall	draw	upon	the	model	of	Socratic	midwifery	I	have	presented	above	and	use	the	features	of	it	that	I	have	identified	as	the	foundations	of	a	number	of	arguments	that	I	shall	advance	when	presenting	my	own	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.	For	now	the	most	significant	feature	of	Socratic	midwifery	to	bear	in	mind	is	that	Socrates’	technē,	like	all	others,	consists	in	epistēmē.			
1.3:	The	Puzzle	of	Socratic	Wisdom:		Before	one	can	see	how	this	puzzle	arises,	one	must	first	make	a	few	observations	regarding	the	text	of	the	Theaetetus.	At	Theaet	145d-e,	just	before	Socrates	outlines	the	features	of	the	Maieutic	Method,	he	and	Theaetetus	have	the	following	conversation:		S:	‘What	makes	men	wise,	I	take	it,	is	wisdom	[sophia]?	T:	Yes.	S:	And	is	this	in	any	way	different	from	knowledge	[epistēmē]?	T:	What?	S:	Wisdom	[sophia].	Isn’t	it	the	things	which	they	know	that	men	are	wise	about?	T:	Well,	yes.																																																																																																																																														to	qualify	this	claim).	Nonetheless,	Socrates’	comment	here	is	clearly	quite	suggestive.		
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S:	So	knowledge	[epistēmē]	and	wisdom	[sophia]	will	be	the	same	thing?	T:	Yes.19		(Theaet	145d-e)		The	conclusion	of	this	passage	is	clear	enough.	The	Greek	terms	
epistēmē	(for	the	most	part	and	so	far	in	my	thesis	translated	“knowledge”)	and	sophia	(almost	always	translated	“wisdom”)	are	to	be	understood	as	co-referential,	as	equivalent	terms.	Next,	it	is	important	to	notice	that	as	part	of	Socrates’	practice	of	his	technē	(i.e.:	‘one	thing	that	I	have	in	common	with	ordinary	midwives’)	(Theaet	150c)	is	that	he	is	‘barren’	(Theaet	150c4),	in	Socrates’	case,	‘of	wisdom	[sophia]’	(Theaet	150c4).	This	point	is	then	reiterated	a	couple	more	times.	For	example	Socrates	proclaims	that	there	is	‘no	wisdom	[sophia]	in	me’	(Theaet	150c6)	and	that	he	‘cannot	claim	as	the	child	of	my	own	soul	any	discovery	worthy	of	the	name	of	wisdom	[sophia]’	(Theaet	150d1-2).	Finally,	some	would	claim	also	that	Socrates	says	‘I	am	not	in	any	sense	a	wise	[sophia]	man’	(Theaet	150d1).20	If	we	combine	this	with	the	claim	that	Socrates	and	Theaetetus	agree	to	at	Theaet	145e,	that	
epistēmē	and	sophia	are	equivalent	terms,	then	the	logical	consequence	is	that	when	Socrates	(incontestably)	claims	to	have	no	sophia	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2),	this	implies	that	he	also	has	no	epistēmē.																																																										19	Σ:	σοϕία	δέ	γ'οἶμαι	σοϕοὶ	οἱ	σοϕοί.					Θ:	ναί					Σ:	τοῡτο	δὲ	μῶν	διαϕέρει	τι	ἐπιστήμης;					Θ:	τὸ	ποῑον;					Σ:	ἡ	σοϕία.	ἢ	οὐχ	ἅπερ	ἐπιστήμονες	ταῡτα	καὶ	σοϕοί;					Θ:	τί	μήν;					Σ:	ταὐτὸν	ἄρα	ἐπιστήμη	καὶ	σοϕία;					Θ:	ναί	20	That	this	last	quote	should	be	taken	to	express	a	wholesale	disavowal	of	wisdom	is	contentious.	The	Greek	text	has	Socrates	claiming	to	be	‘οὐ	πάνυ	τι	σοϕός’	which	Levett	translates	(as	I	quote	above)	‘not	in	any	sense	a	wise	man’	(Theaet	150d1)	although	the	phrase	‘οὐ	πάνυ	τι	σοϕός’	may	express	a	claim	that	is	less	extreme	viz.	“not	entirely	wise”.	I	return	to	discussion	of	this	line	in	section	1.4	where	it	is	of	more	direct	relevance.	I	quote	the	line	here	only	to	indicate	that	some	endorse	translating	the	claim	in	this	way.		
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	 This	is	how	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	arises.	As	was	seen	in	section	1.2,	Socrates,	in	practicing	his	technē	should	be	taken	to	know	how	to	produce	a	judgement	as	to	the	truth	or	falsity	of	his	interlocutor’s	beliefs.	The	“knowledge”	(knowledge	of	how	to	form	the	salient	kind	of	judgment)	that	Socrates	needed	to	possess	(along	with	all	other	craftspeople	as	was	concluded	in	section	1.1)	was	epistēmē.	We	are	therefore	faced	with	a	puzzle:	Socrates	on	the	one	hand	claims	implicitly	to	possess	epistēmē	of	how	to	test	the	veracity	of	his	interlocutors’	beliefs,	yet,	as	part	of	that	same	practice,	to	lack	any	
sophia	and	hence,	epistēmē	(Theaet	145e).	There	is	thus	a	clear	contradiction	generated	by	the	inferences	from	Socrates’	claims	here.	From	his	claims	to	practice	a	technē	we	inferred	that	Socrates	possesses	
epistēmē	(for	a	technē	consists	in	epistēmē	as	we	saw	in	sections	1.1	and	1.2).	And	from	his	claims	that	he	has	no	sophia	we	just	inferred	that	he	has	no	epistēmē.	The	contradiction	generated	by	these	inferences	is	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.			
	
1.4:	Sedley’s	and	Giannopoulou’s	Solutions:	
	David	Sedley	and	Zina	Giannopoulou	in	their	recent	books	on	the	
Theaetetus	both	suggest	that	there	is	some	textual	evidence	at	Theaet	150d1	that	could	dissolve	the	contradiction	if	the	line	is	correctly	translated	and	interpreted.21	Both	of	these	commentators	concur	that	
Theaet	150d1	provides	textual	evidence	for	attributing	some	wisdom	to	Socrates	and	that,	furthermore,	there	are	good	reasons	for	supposing	that	this	wisdom	consists	in	the	knowledge	involved	in	the	practice	of	his	midwifery.22		Here	is	Socrates’	claim	at	Theaet	150d1	in	context:		
																																																								21	Sedley,	The	Midwife	of	Platonism,	p.31;	Giannopoulou,	Zina,	Plato’s	
Theaetetus	as	a	Second	Apology,	Oxford	University	Press,	2013,	p.43	22	Sedley,	The	Midwife	of	Platonism,	p.31;	Giannopoulou,	Zina,	Plato’s	
Theaetetus	as	a	Second	Apology,	p.43	
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‘The	common	reproach	against	me	is	that	I	am	always	asking	questions	of	other	people	but	never	express	my	own	views	about	anything,	because	there	is	no	wisdom	in	me;	and	that	is	true	enough.	And	the	reason	of	it	is	that	God	compels	me	to	attend	to	the	travail	of	others	but	has	forbidden	me	to	procreate.	So	that	I	am	not	in	any	sense	a	wise	[οὐ	πάνυ	τι	σοϕός]	man;	I	cannot	claim	as	the	child	of	my	own	soul	any	discovery	worthy	of	the	name	of	wisdom.	But	with	those	who	associate	with	me	it	is	different’.23	(Theaet	150c-d)	trans.	M.J.	Levett	and	Myles	Burnyeat	(rev.)		Now,	contra	Levett’s	translation	above,	Sedley	argues	that	the	correct	translation	of	the	text	at	150d1	is	‘not	entirely	wise’	(Theaet	150d1)	and	not,	as	‘usually	translated’	‘not	at	all	wise’.	This	translation	Sedley	defends	in	a	paper	that	he	has	written	on	the	subject	of	the	
Theaetetus.24	However,	before	we	look	at	Sedley’s	reasons	for	preferring	this	translation	of	Theaet	150d1,	it	is	worth	pausing	briefly	to	see	how	translating	and	interpreting	Theaet	150d1	in	the	way	Sedley	argues	it	should	be	might	solve	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.		 The	reason	why	taking	the	meaning	of	the	text	at	150d1	(‘οὐ	πάνυ	τι’)	to	be	‘not	entirely’	would	solve	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	is	that	it	indicates,	minimally,	that	Socrates	‘does	possess	the	rudiments	of	wisdom’.25	For,	if	one	is	not	entirely	wise,	then	this	suggests	that	one	has	some	elementary	wisdom	or	knowledge.	Add	to	this	the	interpretive	claim	that	Sedley	argues	for,	that	‘there	is	good	reason	to	interpret	these	rudiments	as	consisting	in	the	insights	that	enable	him	[Socrates]	to	practice	midwifery	itself’,	and	one	can	argue	that	Theaet																																																									23	‘καί	ὅπερ	ἤδη	πολλοί	μοι	ὠνείδισαν,	ὡς	τοὺς	μὲν	ἄλλοςἐρωτῶ,	αὐτὸς	δὲ	ο	ὐδὲν	ἀποϕαίνομαι	περὶ	οὐδενὸς	διὰ	τὸ	μηδὲν	ἔχειν	σοϕόν,	ἀληθὲςὀνειδίζουσιν.	τὸ	δὲ	αἴτιον	τούτου	τόδε:	μαιεύεσθαί	με	ὁ	θεὸς	ἀναγκάζει,	γεννᾱν	δὲ	ἀπεκώλυσεν.	εἰμὶ	δὴ	οῧν	αὐτὸς	μὲν	οὐ	πάνυ	τι	σοϕός,	οὐδέ	τί	μοι	ἔστιν	ωὕρηματοιοῡτον	γεγονὸς	της	ἐμης	ψυχης	ἔκγονον	οἱ	δ'ἐμοὶσυγγιγνόμενοι	τὸ	μὲν	πρῶτον’	(Theaet	150c-d).	24	Sedley,	David,	“Three	Platonist	Interpretations	of	the	Theaetetus”	In	Gill,	Christopher	&	McCabe,	M.	M.	(eds.),	Form	and	Argument	in	Late	
Plato.	Oxford	University	Press.	pp.79-103,	1996,	p.98	25	Sedley,	David,	The	Midwife	of	Platonism,	p.31	
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150d1	provides	some	direct	textual	evidence	that	suggests	that	Socrates	does	possess	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	midwifery.26	This	would	dissolve	the	contradiction	by	allowing	that	when	Socrates	disavows	wisdom	entirely	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2),	he	should	not	be	taken	to	disavow	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	midwifery	because	Theaet	150d1	would	act	so	as	to	qualify	the	total	disavowals	by	indicating	his	possession	of	knowledge	pertinent	to	practicing	midwifery.	What	reasons	are	there,	in	Sedley’s	view,	for	interpreting	Theaet	150d1	(granted	his	preferred	translation	of	the	line)	in	this	way?		The	first	is	that	because	Socrates	‘is	making	a	whole	series	of	assertions	about	his	midwifery’	in	this	passage	one	might	be	inclined	to	infer	that	whatever	items	of	knowledge	are	here	implicitly	claimed	to	be	involved	in	the	practice	of	midwifery	must	be	possessed	by	Socrates,	Sedley	argues.27	Theaet	150d1	would	thus	stand	as	a	confirmation	of	this	point.	The	point	would	be	reinforced,	Sedley	notes,	by	the	fact	that	Socrates	here	claims	that	his	midwifery	is	a	technē	(Theaet	149a4,	a7	150b6,	c1,	151a).28	Secondly,	Sedley	argues,	and	as	we	have	already	seen,	there	is	some	textual	evidence	later	in	the	Theaetetus	that	could	be	taken	to	support	the	claim	that	Socrates	does	possess	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	midwifery:		‘all	I	know,	such	as	it	is,	is	how	to	take	an	argument	from	someone	else	–	someone	who	is	wise	–	and	give	it	a	fair	reception’	(Theaet	161b)		Hence,	Sedley	concludes,	Theaet	161b	makes	it	‘virtually	explicit’	that	Socrates’	‘expertise	of	midwifery	constitutes	the	sole	exception	to	his	disavowal	of	knowledge’	in	the	Theaetetus.29	For,	the	knowledge	Socrates	seems	to	describe	having	at	Theaet	161b	(‘all’	he	knows)	(Theaet	161b)	arguably	corresponds	to	the	knowledge	one	might																																																									26	Ibid	27	Ibid	28	Ibid	29	Ibid,	p.32	
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suppose	is	involved	in	the	practice	of	midwifery	(viz.	knowledge	of	how	to	take	arguments	from	others	and	test	them).	Indeed,	in	section	1.2,	I	argued	that,	given	the	application	of	the	general	notion	of	a	technē	to	Socratic	midwifery,	one	might	be	warranted	in	making	this	inference	from	the	text	at	Theaet	161b.	If	one	does	so	any	knowledge	or	wisdom	that	Socrates	admits	to	having	must	correspond	to	the	only	knowledge	that	he	apparently	admits	to	possessing	(Theaet	161b)	viz.	knowledge	of	midwifery.	If	Theaet	150d1	can	be	translated	in	a	way	that	suggests	that	Socrates	is	attributing	himself	with	wisdom	and	hence	knowledge	(from	his	comments	at	Theaet	145d-e)	then	one	must	conclude	that	this	is	the	same	knowledge	he	apparently	admits	to	having	at	Theaet	161b.		Having	seen	the	valuable	payoff	to	translating	Theaet	150d1,	interpreting	the	wisdom	there	referred	to	as	consisting	in	the	knowledge	required	for	Socrates	to	practice	the	technē	of	midwifery	and	Sedey’s	reasons	for	doing	so,	let	us	turn	our	attention	to	another	question.30	Namely	the	question	of	why,	in	Sedley’s	view,	one	should	translate	‘οὐ	πάνυ	τι’	as	‘not	entirely’	at	Theaet	150d1.		Sedley	offers	one	principal	reason	to	suppose	this	translation	is	the	correct	one.	This	is	that	Cratylus	386a5-c8,	Lysis	204d4,	and	
Euthydemus	286e9	‘put	it	beyond	doubt’	that	“not	entirely”	is	the	sense	of	‘οὐ	πάνυ	τι’.31	That	is,	these	passages	present	us	with	an	unambiguous	precedent	in	the	Platonic	corpus,	Sedley	thinks,	for	translating	the	sense	of	‘οὐ	πάνυ	τι’	as	‘not	entirely’.	Let	us	then	look	at	
																																																								30	The	reasons,	discussed	above,	that	Sedley	offers	for	interpreting	Socrates’	claim	at	Theaet	151d	as	an	admission	that	he	possesses	knowledge	could	obviously	also	be	taken	to	support	interpreting	Socrates’	character	as	possessing	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	midwifery	on	their	own.	These	reasons	I	return	to	later,	when	discussing	Zina	Giannopoulou’s	solution.	This	is	because	Giannopoulou	endorses	the	reasons	Sedley	offers	herself	(Plato’s	Theaetetus	as	a	
Second	Apology,	p.47	fn.76)	and	at	the	present	moment,	a	lengthy	digression	is	required	to	explain	Sedley’s	grounds	for	translating	Theaet	150d1	in	the	way	he	argues	it	should	be.	31	Sedley,	David,	“Three	Platonist	Interpretations	of	the	Theaetetus”,	p.98,	fn.43	
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the	context	of	these	passages	to	see	if	they	confirm	Sedley’s	contention.32			Σ:	ἢ	ἒχειν	δοκεῑ	σοι	αὐτἀ	αὑτῶν	τινα	βεβαιὁτητα	τῆς	οὐσίας;			Έ:	ἤδη	ποτὲ	ἒγωγε,	ὦ	Σὡκρατες,	ἀπορῶν	και	ἐνταῡθα	ἐξηνέχθην	εἰς	ἅπερ	Πρωταγὁρας	λέγει:	οὐ	πἁνυ	τι	μέντοι	μοι	δοκεῑ	οὕτως	ἔχειν		Σ:	τί	δέ:	ἐς	τὁδε	ἤδη	ἐξηνέχθης,	ὥστε	μὴ	πάνυ	σοι		(Crat	386a5-9)			At	Cratylus	386a5	Hermogenes’	claim	that	contains	the	disputed	phrase	is	‘I’ve	been	driven	to	take	refuge	in	Protagoras’	doctrine,	even	though	I	don’t	believe	it	at	all’	(Crat	386a)	(trans.	C.D.C	Reeve).33	One	thing	that	does	appear	to	be	the	case	here	is	that	Reeve’s	translation	(‘I	don’t	believe	it	at	all)	(Crat	386a),	contra	Sedley,	does	not	fit	poorly	with	the	context.	In	this	passage	Hermogenes	is	claiming	to	be	‘puzzled’	(Crat	386a)	by	how	objects	can	be	given	different	names	by	different	people	or	in	different	languages.	This	causes	Hermogenes	to	tell	Socrates	that	he	has	‘taken	refuge	in	Protagoras’	doctrine’	(Crat	386a)	presumably	so	as	to	furnish	himself	with	some	kind	of	explanation	of	how	such	differences	in	language	are	possible.	But	Hermogenes’	claim	to	dialectically	endorse	Protagoras’	homo	mensura	doctrine	doesn’t	settle	the	issue	of	whether,	in	fact,	he	doesn’t	entirely	believe	it	(as	Sedley	supposes)	or	whether	he	doesn’t	believe	it	at	all	(as	Reeve	translates	the	claim).	The	strength	of	Hermogenes’	actual	commitment	to	Protagoras’	doctrine	is	unclear	because	the	important	point	is	that	he,	in	fact,	doesn’t	believe	it.	The	extent	to	which	he	endorses	it	non-dialectically	therefore	cannot	be	settled	by	appeal	to	the	context	of	the																																																									32	Ibid	33	All	quotations	from	the	Cratylus	are	taken	from	the	translation	of	C.D.C	Reeve	in	Plato:	The	Complete	Works,	Hackett,	1997,	pp.101-157	
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claim;	Hermogenes	doesn’t	accept	the	doctrine	and	this	is	the	message	his	character	means	to	convey.	Hence,	the	sense	of	‘οὐ	πἁνυ	τι’	in	this	passage	should	be	regarded	as	ambiguous.			The	case	of	the	other	two	passages	that	Sedley	cites	(Lysis	204d	and	Euthydemus	286e9)	is	the	same:	either	admissible	translation	will	make	sense	given	the	context.	Let	us	see	why,	starting	with	the	Lysis.				ὦτα	καὶ	ἐμπέπληκε	Λύσιδος	ἂν	μὲν	δὴ	καὶ	ὑποπίῃ	εὐμαρία	ἡμῑν	ἐστιν	καὶ	ἐξ	ὕπνου	ἐγρομένοις	Λύσιδος	οἴεσθαι	τοὔνομα	ἀκούειν.	καὶ	ᾶ	μὲν	καταλογάδην	διηγεῑται,	δεινὰ	ὄντα,	οὐ	πάνυ	τι	δεινά	ἐστιν,	ἀλλ'ἐπειδὰν	τὰ	ποιήματα	ἡμῶν	ἐπιχειρήσῃ	καταντλεῑν	καὶ	συγγράμματα.	καὶ	ὅ	ἐστιν	τούτων	δεινότερον,	ὅτι	καὶ	ᾁδει	εἰς	τὰ	παιδικὰ	ϕωνῇ	θαυμασίᾳ,	ῆν	ἡμᾶς	δεῑ	ἀκούοντας	ἀνέχεσθαι.		(Lys	204d4-8)		In	this	passage	Ctesippus’	is	complaining	about	Hippothales	constant	rhapsodizing	about	his	beloved,	Lysis.	As	part	of	this	complaint	Ctesippus	draws	a	comparison	between	how	irritating	it	is	to	hear	Hippothales	talk	about	Lysis	and	how	terrible	it	is	to	hear	Hippothales’	poems	about	his	lover	(Lys	204d).	What	Ctesippus	says	is	that	‘As	bad	as	all	this	is	in	normal	conversation,	it’s	nothing	compared	to	when	he	drowns	us	with	his	poems	and	prose	pieces.	And	worst	of	all,	he	actually	sings	odes	to	his	beloved	in	a	weird	voice,	which	we	have	to	put	up	with	listening	to’	(Lys	204d)	(trans.	Stanley	Lombardo).34	Here,	once	again	the	context	doesn’t	settle	whether	Ctesippus	is	claiming	that	it’s	‘not	entirely	bad’	to	hear	Hippothales	talk	about	Lysis	and	yet,	even	worse	to	hear	Hippothales	read	his	poems	about	him;	or	‘not	at	all’	bad	to	hear	Hippothales	talk	about	Lysis	but	bad	to	hear	the	poems.	The	sense	in	which	one	should	translate	‘οὐ	πἁνυ	τι’	in	this	passage	therefore	remains	ambiguous	because	the	extremity	of	the	comparison																																																									34	All	quotations	form	the	Lysis	are	taken	from	the	translation	of	the	Stanley	Lombardo	in	Plato:	Complete	Works,	Hackett,	1997,	pp.687-708	
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Ctesippus	is	supposed	to	be	drawing	is	not	clear.	One	can	either	choose	to	read	the	first	part	of	the	comparison	(Hippothales’	conversation	about	Lysis)	as	not	bad	at	all	viz.	in	no	way	bad,	whereas	the	poems	really	are	bad;	or,	the	conversation	as	not	entirely	bad,	viz.	bad	to	some	extent	but	not	as	bad	as	the	poems.	Either	translation	captures	the	idea	that	Ctesippus	dislikes	Hippothales	poems	(and	his	singing	the	most)	but	the	context	does	not	make	it	clear	the	extent	to	which	he	thinks	the	conversation	is	bad	compared	to	the	poetry.	Therefore	the	sense	of	the	phrase	should	be	regarded	as	ambiguous.		 Let	us	now	inspect	the	last	of	the	passages	Sedley	cites:		ἀλλὰ	σύ,	ἔϕη,	ἔλεγξον.		ἦ	καὶ	ἔστι	τοῡτο	κατὰ	τὸν	σὸν	λόγον,	ἐξελέγξαι	μηδενὸς	ψευδομένου;		οὐκ	ἔστιν,	ἔϕη	ὁ	Εὐθύδημος.		οὐδ'ἄρα	ἐκέλευεν,	ἔϕην	ἐγώ	νυνδὴ	Διονυσόδωρος	ἐξελέγξαι;		τὸ	γὰρ	μὴ	ὄν	πῶς	ἄν	τις	κελεύσαι;	οὺ	δὲ	κελεύεις;		ὅτι,	ἦν	δ'ἐγώ,	ὦ	Εὐθύδημε,	τὰ	σοϕὰ	ταῡτα	καὶ	τὰ	εὖ	ἔχοντα	οὐ	πάνυ	τι	μανθαάνω,	ἀλλὰ	παχέως	πως	ἐννοῶ.	ἴσως	μὲν	οὖν	ϕορτικώτερόν	τι	ἐρήσομαι,	ἀλλὰ	συγγίγνωσκε		(Euthd	286e)		At	the	opening	of	this	complex	passage	(Euthd	285d-286c),	the	sophist	Dionysodorus	makes	Ctesippus	fall	silent	(Euthd	286b)	by	having	him	commit	to	the	premises	of	an	argument	the	conclusion	of	which	entails	that	contradiction	is	impossible	(Euthd	286b).	At	this	point	Socrates	enters	the	discussion	(Euthd	286c)	to	try	and	refute	the	conclusion	(Euthd	286c-e)	and	is	apparently	disproven	himself	when	one	of	the	
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sophists	(the	text	does	not	make	it	clear	which)	points	out	that	Socrates’	argument	against	the	position	that	contradiction	is	impossible	depends	upon	the	claim	that	the	sophists	are	here	explicitly	denying	viz.	that	one	can	‘order	a	thing	[refutation]	that	doesn’t	exist’	(Euthd	286e).	In	reply	to	this	comment	Socrates	self-deprecatingly	rejoins	that	‘I’m	rather	thick-witted	and	don’t	understand	these	fine	clever	things’	(Euthd	286e).	In	the	translation	I	am	quoting	from	Sprague	chooses	to	leave	the	phrase	‘οὐ	πάνυ	τι’	un-translated,	presumably	to	retain	the	ambiguity	I	am	suggesting	pertains	to	the	use	of	the	phrase	in	this	context.	However	Socrates’	claim	could	be	translated	(including	‘οὐ	πάνυ	τι’):	‘I’m	rather	thick-witted	and	don’t	at	all	understand	these	fine	clever	things’	or	‘I’m	rather	thick-witted	and	don’t	entirely	understand	these	fine	clever	things’.	Hence,	once	again,	the	context	of	the	claim	doesn’t	make	the	extent	of	Socrates’	understanding	of	the	sophist’s	argument	obvious.	The	important	point	Socrates	is	making	is	that	he	doesn’t	understand	the	sophists,	the	extent	to	which	he	doesn’t	isn’t	clear.	Socrates	may	well	be	completely	confused	by	the	sophists	reasoning	and	not	understand	it	at	all,	or,	he	may	grasp	it	to	a	degree	but	not	entirely;	either	claim	seems	to	make	equally	good	sense	of	the	fact	that	Socrates	is	here	asserting	that	he	doesn’t	understand	the	sophist’s	argument.			On	the	basis	of	the	observations	I	have	just	made	I	think	one	should	be	suspicious	of	Sedley’s	rationale	for	claiming	that	his	translation	of	Theaet	150d1	is	‘linguistically	correct’	because	the	sense	of	the	phrase	in	these	passages	is	seemingly	unclear.35	Thus,	the	balance	cannot	be	tipped	in	favour	of	Sedley’s	translation	of	Theaet	150d1	by	the	evidence	he	offers.	This	cannot	establish,	of	course,	that	Levett’s	translation	of	the	text	should	be	preferred	to	Sedley’s.	Hence	we	are	left	in	the	position	that	either	translation	of	Theaet	150d1	is	equally	plausible.	I	will	now	show	that	there	is	a	reason	to	accept	Levett’s	translation	before	arguing	that	neither	Sedley’s	nor	Levett’s	interpretation	can	be	admitted	to	be	“correct”.																																																										35	Sedley,	David,	The	Midwife	of	Platonism,	p.31	fn.55	
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The	reason	one	might	give	for	endorsing	Levett’s	translation	is	that	it	seems	to	fit	the	context	better	than	Sedley’s.	If	one	replaces	Levett’s	translation	with	Sedley’s	and	looks	at	the	claim	in	context	one	can	see	this:		The	common	reproach	against	me	is	that	I	am	always	asking	questions	of	other	people	but	never	express	my	own	views	about	anything,	because	there	is	no	wisdom	in	me;	and	that	is	true	enough.	And	the	reason	of	it	is	that	God	compels	me	to	attend	to	the	travail	of	others	but	has	forbidden	me	to	procreate.	So	that	I	am	not	an	entirely	wise	[οὐ	πάνυ	τι	σοϕός]	man;	I	cannot	claim	as	the	child	of	my	own	soul	any	discovery	worthy	of	the	name	of	wisdom.	But	with	those	who	associate	with	me	it	is	different’.36	(Theaet	150c-d)	(emphasis	added)	(trans.	M.J.	Levett	rev.	Myles	Burnyeat	except	line	150d1	where	the	italicised	text	indicates	the	use	of	Sedley’s	preferred	translation)		So,	adopting	Sedley’s	translation	of	the	ambiguity	would	entail	that	Plato	intended	Socrates	to	claim	to	possess	some	wisdom	and	then	deny	that	he	has	made	any	wise	discoveries	of	his	own	soul	in	the	same	breath.	Although	using	Sedley’s	translation	of	Theaet	150d1	does	not	therefore	entail	that	Socrates	is	explicitly	contradicting	the	claim	he	makes	immediately	after	it,	using	Sedley’s	translation	certainly	introduces	a	degree	of	tension	into	Socrates’	claims	in	these	lines.37	Without	providing	a	reason	to	explain	why	Socrates	should	be	making	such	a	contrary	statement,	translating	the	claim	in	a	way	that	fits	the	apparent	message	of	the	text	(that	Socrates	has	no	wisdom)	is																																																									36	See	fn.23	for	the	Greek.	37	Having	made	no	discoveries	of	his	own	soul	worthy	of	being	called	wisdom	or	knowledge	(Theaet	150d1-2),	one	might	quite	reasonably	suppose,	should	be	taken	to	mean	that	Socrates	has	never	engendered	wisdom	or	knowledge	in	himself	viz.	that	none	of	the	epistemic	items	in	his	soul	have	ever	qualified	as	knowledge	or	wisdom	and	hence,	that	Socrates	has	no	wisdom.	Although	this	is	not	the	explicit	content	of	the	claim	I	think	it	must	be	agreed	to	be	the	natural	interpretation,	especially	given	the	context	(Socrates’	uncontroversial	claims	to	lack	all	wisdom	at	Theaet	150c4	and	c6).			
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preferable	and	this	is	something	that	Levett’s	translation	can	achieve.38	This	is	because	using	Levett’s	translation	(‘I	am	not	in	any	sense	a	wise	man’)	(Theaet	150d1)	makes	that	line	express	essentially	the	same	claim	as	Theaet	150c4,	c6	and	d1-2:	that	Socrates	has	no	wisdom.	Using	Levett’s	translation	therefore	makes	the	lines	read	in	a	way	that	avoids	importing	the	kind	of	tension	into	the	text	that	Sedley’s	translation	brings	with	it	(between	claims	to	lack	all	wisdom	at	Theaet	150c4,	c6	and	d1-2	and	a	claim	to	be	‘not	entirely’	wise	at	Theaet	150d1).		So	there	is	a	basis	for	approaching	Sedley’s	grounds	for	preferring	his	translation	of	Theaet	150d1	with	a	degree	of	scepticism	and,	additionally,	a	reason	to	suppose	that	Levett’s	translation	could	be	taken	to	be	the	correct	one.	However,	I	do	not	wish	to	endorse	either	translation.	The	reason	for	accepting	Levett’s	translation	falls	short	of	compelling	because	the	phrase	could	be	taken	to	express	either	sense.	Instead	I	would	like	to	propose	that	leaving	the	sense	of	the	phrase	at	
Theaet	150d1	ambiguous	captures	the	meaning	of	the	text	better	than	either	Sedley’s	or	Levett’s	translation.	There	are	two	good	grounds	for	this.	 The	first	is	that	the	sense	of	the	phrase	is	ambiguous.	Leaving	the	sense	unclear	therefore	captures	the	explicit	meaning	of	the	line.	The	second	reason	is	that	I	would	like	to	conjecture	that	there	is	some	purpose	behind	Plato	leaving	the	sense	of	the	phrase	at	Theaet	150d1	unclear.	This	is	that	Plato	may	have	wished,	by	using	the	ambiguity	in	the	claim	at	Theaet	150d1,	to	draw	his	reader’s	attention	to	the	fact	that	there	is	a	lack	of	clarity	surrounding	how	to	understand	Socrates’	disavowal	of	wisdom	in	the	Theaetetus.	Furthermore	what	may	have	motivated	Plato	to	do	this,	I	suppose,	is	a	desire	to	draw	his	reader’s	attention	to	the	existence	of	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.	The	ambiguous	claim	at	Theaet	150d1	can	achieve	this	by	forcing	the	reader	to	consider	the	debate	that	I	have	just	explored	surrounding	how	to																																																									38	I	would	argue	that	this	is	(at	least	part	of)	the	message	of	this	passage	based	on	Socrates’	complete	disavowals	of	wisdom	at	Theaet	150c4,	c6	and	d1-2.		
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understand	the	sense	of	Theaet	150d1.	For,	this	debate,	is,	in	a	way,	a	microcosm	of	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	itself;	the	discussion	I	have	just	explored	and	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	both	naturally	prompt	the	question:	does	Socrates	admit	of	possessing	knowledge	or	does	he	not	in	the	Theaetetus?39	In	this	way,	Socrates’	claim	at	Theaet	150d1	may	serve	the	purpose	of	drawing	the	reader’s	attention	to	the	broader	epistemic	question	at	issue	in	this	passage.	That	is,	does	Socrates	really	possess	a	technē	(that	consists	in	epistēmē)	or	rather	does	he	mean	it	when	he	claims	that	he	has	no	sophia	(which	also	consists	in	epistēmē)?		Endorsing	this	way	of	interpreting	and	translating	Theaet	150d1	henceforth	leaves	one	at	the	same	impasse	with	which	this	section	began.	If	one	is	to	disregard	Theaet	150d1	as	indicating	either	a	wholesale	or	a	partial	denial	of	possessing	knowledge	or	wisdom,	one	still	has	good	grounds	to	infer	contradictory	conclusions	regarding	Socrates’	epistemic	state	in	the	Theaetetus;	on	the	one	hand	from	his	claims	to	practice	a	technē	(Theaet	149a4,	a7,	150b6,	c1,	151a,	c)	and,	on	the	other,	from	his	(straightforward)	claims	to	lack	all	sophia	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2).	I	shall	now	turn	my	attention	to	one	further	interpretation	of	Socrates’	barrenness	and	examine	how	it	might	be	thought	to	solve	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	before	judging	whether	it	does	so	successfully.		Zina	Giannopoulou	in	her	Plato’s	Theaetetus	as	a	Second	Apology	has	produced	an	interpretation	of	Socrates’	disavowals	of	wisdom	that	dissolves	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.	To	see	how,	one	has	to	begin	with	Giannopoulou’s	central	interpretive	suggestion:	that	one	should	read	‘Socrates’	obstetric	infertility	[his	disavowals	of	wisdom	at	Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2]	as	the	suppression	of	beliefs	in	the	sense	of	definitions,	and	of	theories	for	and	against	other	people’s	definitions	and	their																																																									39	The	puzzle	is	generated	by	the	inferences	“Socrates	has	knowledge”	(from	his	claims	to	practice	a	technē	and	the	arguments	in	sections	1.1	and	1.2)	and	“Socrates	does	not	have	any	knowledge”	(from	Theaet	150c4,	c6	and	d1-2	when	considered	alongside	Theaet	145d-e).	The	question	that	therefore	requires	answering	to	dissolve	the	contradiction	is	the	one	in	the	text	above	which	could	be	phrased:	“which	of	the	foregoing	inferences	is	the	correct	one?”.	
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relevant	beliefs’.40	As	for	why	one	should	read	Socrates’	disavowals	as	restricted	in	the	sense	supposed,	Giannopoulou	claims	that	Socrates	is	committed	to	the	principle	of	the	‘epistemological	priority	of	definitions’	because	of	the	‘prominence	of	the	“what	is	F?”	question’	throughout	the	dialogue.41	The	formal	way	of	expressing	this	principle	that	Giannopoulou	offers	is:	‘in	order	to	know	anything	about	F-ness	or	about	whether	particular	things	or	particular	people	have	F-ness,	one	must	first	be	able	to	define	F-ness’.42	As	Socrates	does	not	know	what	knowledge	is	(from	Theaet	145e-146a),	Giannopoulou	reasonably	claims,	he	will	not	be	able	to	define	it.43	Therefore,	naturally	‘lacking	this	definition,	he	cannot	engender	beliefs	appropriately	related	to	and	internally	consistent	with	it	or	submit	theories	for	and	against	others’	definitions’.44	Hence,	Giannopoulou	concludes,	for	that	reason,	Socrates	claims	to	lack	wisdom	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2),	wisdom	that	depends	upon	one’s	ability	to	offer	definitions	which	he	cannot	offer.		Additionally	this	is	a	view	of	Socratic	barrenness	that	coheres	well	with	his	contention	that	he	offers	no	theories	and	makes	no	assertions	of	his	own	(Theaet	150c,	157c,	161b).	It	also	receives	a	degree	of	corroboration	from	the	fact	that	Socrates	links	the	views	that	Theaetetus	conceives	to	absent	wise	men,	especially	throughout	the	opening	of	the	text,	for	example	at	Theaet	152e;	for,	having	no	definitions	to	offer	of	his	own,	Socrates	offers	those	of	others.45		Now,	this	interpretation	of	Socratic	disavowals	provides	some	good	reasons	to	understand	Socrates’	barrenness	as	a	lack	of	a	very	particular	epistemic	item.	This	consequently	allows	the	possibility	that	Socrates	may	have	the	knowledge	involved	in	the	practice	of	midwifery	if	the	particular	epistemic	items	that	Giannopoulou	supposes	Socrates	disavows	are	not	in	any	way	related	to	the	knowledge	that	is	involved																																																									40	Giannopoulou,	Zina,	Plato’s	Theaetetus	as	a	Second	Apology,	p.41	41	Ibid,	p.42	42	Ibid	43	Ibid,	p.43	44	Ibid	45	Ibid,	pp.	43-46	
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in	practicing	midwifery.	Evidently,	the	knowledge	involved	in	intellectual	midwifery	does	not	appear	to	depend	upon	possessing	‘beliefs	in	the	sense	of	definitions,	and	of	theories	for	and	against	other	people’s	definitions	and	their	relevant	beliefs’.46	This	seems	to	be	Giannopoulou’s	reason	for	concluding	that	‘the	only	kind	of	knowledge	that	the	midwife	Socrates	has	is	the	craft-knowledge	of	eliciting	from	his	interlocutors	what	he	himself	lacks	and	submitting	it	to	scrutiny’.47	Giannopoulou’s	conclusion	here,	therefore,	appears	to	be	that	Socrates’	claim	to	practice	a	technē	(Theaet	149a4,	a7,	150b6,	c1,	151a)	is	sufficient	to	establish	that	he	has	the	epistēmē	associated	with	performing	midwifery.	If	Socrates’	technē	consists	in	(a	type	of)	
epistēmē	(as	I	argued	in	sections	1.1-1.2)	and	he	does	not	disavow	possession	of	any	types	of	knowledge	that	are	in	any	way	related	to	that	kind	of	epistēmē	when	he	claims	to	lack	any	wisdom	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2)	as	appears	to	follow	from	Giannopoulou’s	account,	then	one	might	suppose	he	does	have	the	epistēmē	involved	in	practicing	midwifery	when	he	claims	his	midwifery	is	a	technē	(Theaet	149a4,	a7,	150b6,	c1,	151a,	c).		Further	to	this	interpretation	of	Socrates’	barrenness,	Giannopoulou	also	makes	the	claim	that	Socrates’	‘awareness	[of	his	lack	of	wisdom]	is	compatible	with	the	specialized	knowledge	that	Socrates	possesses	as	a	practitioner	of	mental	midwifery’.48	This	Giannopoulou	supposes	is	the	case	for	the	same	reasons	as	Sedley,	citing	his	previously	discussed	book	in	her	footnotes.49	I	will	now	inspect	these	grounds	for	supposing	that	Socrates	does	possess	the	knowledge	involved	in	the	practice	of	midwifery	first	by	assessing	Giannopoulou’s	interpretation	of	Socratic	barrenness	and	then	by	investigating	the	grounds	that	she	too	endorses	from	Sedley’s	book	that	I	earlier	promised	I	would	return	to.		
																																																								46	Ibid,	p.41	47	Ibid,	p.43	48	Ibid,	p.47	49	Ibid,	p.47	fn.76	
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Unfortunately	there	is	one	issue	with	Giannopoulou’s	interpretation	of	Socratic	barrenness	that	is	so	problematic	for	her	view	that	it	compels	one	to	reject	it.	This	is	that	Socrates’	disavowals	in	the	
Theaetetus	are	disavowals	of	wisdom	that	we	know	consists,	for	Socrates,	in	knowledge	(from	his	claims	at	Theaet	145d-e).	Hence,	it	cannot	be	only	beliefs	that	Socrates	disavows	possession	of	in	the	
Theaetetus	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2)	as	Giannopoulou	argues.50	Perhaps	Socrates	does	mean	to	disavow	having	beliefs	of	the	type	that	Giannopoulou	supposes	(indeed	she	gives	good	reasons	for	thinking	he	does),	but	this	cannot,	on	any	reading,	be	the	lone	thing	he	means	to	claim	he	lacks	in	saying	that	he	lacks	all	sophia	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2).51	Observing	this	to	be	the	case	again	raises	the	puzzle	afresh.	Giannopoulou’s	interpretation	of	the	sense	in	which	Socrates	qualifies	his	disavowal	of	wisdom	is	ruled	out	by	the	text	and	so	Socrates’	claims	to	lack	all	wisdom	or	knowledge	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2)	will	resultantly	continue	to	entail	a	contradiction	alongside	his	claims	to	practice	a	technē	(Theaet	149a4,	a7,	150b6,	c1,	151a,	c).	Let	us	now	look	at	the	further	grounds	that	Sedley	offers	(and	Giannopoulou	endorses)	for	thinking	Socrates	possesses	the	knowledge	pertinent	to	practicing	midwifery.		At	Theaet	161b	the	salient	claim	Socrates	makes,	as	we	have	seen,	is	that	‘all	I	know,	such	as	it	is,	is	how	to	take	an	argument	from																																																									50	Ibid,	p.41	51	Although	this	is	not	obviously	true	because	Socrates	does	offer	definitions	in	the	Theaetetus.	For	example,	in	the	opening:	‘shoemaking’	(Theaet	146d),	carpentry	(Theaet	146e)	and	‘clay’	(Theaet	147c)	are	all	defined	by	Socrates.	If	Giannopoulou	were	to	reply	that	it	is	only	philosophical	subjects	about	which	Socrates	does	not	offer	definitions	I	would	reply	that	firstly	shoemaking	and	carpentry	are	philosophical	subjects	for	Socrates	(these	being	examples	of	technai	which,	we	saw	in	chapter	one,	Socrates	develops	a	rich	account	of	throughout	Plato’s	works).	Secondly	I	would	point	out	that	Socrates	does	offer	some	definitions	of	things	that	are	more	obviously	topics	of	philosophical	intrigue	in	the	Theaetetus.	For	instance,	perception	(Theaet	156c-157c)	and	thought	(Theaet	189e-190a)	are	both	defined	by	Socrates.	Although	the	former	of	these	is	denied	by	Socrates	to	be	his	own	theory	(Theaet	157c)	he	certainly	expresses	the	definition.			
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someone	–	someone	who	is	wise	–	and	give	it	a	fair	reception’	(Theaet	161b)	(emphasis	added).	Now,	although	Socrates	does,	as	I	have	so	far	been	careful	to	maintain,	appear	to	attribute	himself	with	knowledge	of	how	to	practice	midwifery	in	this	passage,	one	should,	in	the	absence	of	grounds	for	thinking	otherwise,	infer	only	that	Socrates	gives	the	impression	of	admitting	to	possessing	such	knowledge	here.	This	is	the	case	because	although	Socrates	seems	to	admit	at	Theaet	161b	that	he	has	knowledge	that	involves	taking	and	analysing	the	views	of	his	interlocutors	(the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	midwifery	as	we	saw	in	section	1.2)	he	can	only	be	taken	to	claim	this	is	the	case	‘such	as	it	is’	(Theaet	161b).	This	qualification	in	the	sense	in	which	Socrates	will	admit	to	possessing	knowledge	at	Theaet	161b	indicates	that	one	should	approach	the	claim	that	Socrates	straightforwardly	admits	to	possessing	the	knowledge	involved	in	midwifery	in	this	passage	with	skepticism.	As	neither	Sedley	nor	Giannopoulou	offer	an	explanation	as	to	the	sense	in	which	Socrates	means	to	qualify	his	claim	to	knowledge	at	Theaet	161b	this	passage	cannot	be	used	to	establish	that	Socrates	here	admits	to	possessing	the	knowledge	involved	in	midwifery	without	further	interpretive	work	being	done.	Although	Sedley	judiciously	observes	that	this	claim	only	makes	it	‘virtually	explicit’	that	Socrates	here	admits	to	possessing	the	salient	kind	of	knowledge,	neither	he	nor	Giannopoulou	account	for	the	sense	in	which	Socrates’	apparent	claim	to	knowledge	here	is	not	unequivocal.52	We	are	therefore	justified	in	inferring	only	that	Socrates	appears	to	attribute	himself	with	knowledge	in	this	passage,	not	that	he	does	so.			 The	second	of	the	grounds	Giannopoulou	adopts	from	Sedley’s	account	is	that	we	might	be	tempted	to	infer	that	Socrates	could	not	make	a	whole	series	of	assertions	about	his	midwifery	(which	he	certainly	does	do	between	Theaet	149a-151d)	without	possessing	any	knowledge	about	it.53	However,	the	fact	that	Socrates	makes	a	series	of	claims	about	his	midwifery	is	insufficient	to	establish	that	Socrates																																																									52	Sedley,	David,	The	Midwife	of	Platonism,	p.32	53	Ibid,	p.31	
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must	possess	the	knowledge	involved	in	the	practice	of	midwifery.	One	can	make	(completely	unfounded)	assertions	about	x	whilst	lacking	the	knowledge	involved	in	doing	x	where	x	=	any	action.	Hence	this	line	of	argument	cannot	establish	that	Socrates	has	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	midwifery	either.			 Lastly,	Sedley’s	point	that	Socrates	has	knowledge	because	he	asserts	that	his	midwifery	is	a	technē	can	hardly	be	thought	to	establish	that	he	really	does	possess	the	salient	kind	of	knowledge.	This	is	because	Socrates’	claims	to	lack	all	wisdom	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2)	entail	(because	of	his	comments	at	Theaet	145d-e)	that	Socrates	has	no	knowledge.	Thus	because	Socrates	lacks	all	wisdom	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2)	and	hence	knowledge	(from	Theaet	145d-e),	we	have	good	reason	to	think	that	he	cannot	have	the	knowledge	we	would	normally	attribute	to	him	on	the	basis	of	his	assertion	that	his	midwifery	is	a	
techne.		
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Chapter	2:		
2.1:	The	Epistemic	Puzzles	from	the	Early	Dialogues	and	the	
Theaetetus:	
	Having	seen	what	grounds	there	are	for	rejecting	two	recently	offered	solutions	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	I	shall,	in	this	chapter,	undertake	a	different	interpretive	strategy	to	attempt	to	dissolve	the	contradiction.	To	achieve	this	aim	this	section	explicates	the	structure	of	an	epistemic	puzzle	from	Plato’s	early	dialogues	and	explains	how	it	is	the	same	in	various	respects	as	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.	By	explaining	these	similarities	I	intend	to	motivate	the	interpretive	strategy	of	applying	solutions	that	have	been	offered	in	the	literature	to	the	former	puzzle	to	attempt	to	solve	the	latter.	This	method	of	unraveling	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	will	not	be	utilised	until	the	final	section	of	this	chapter	because	at	the	end	of	this	section	I	will	present	an	objection	to	undertaking	the	strategy	this	section	proposes	to	warrant	us	pursuing.	The	section	to	follow	this	is	resultantly	dedicated	to	refuting	the	challenge	raised	at	the	end	of	the	present	one.		To	justify	my	proposed	method	of	solving	the	puzzle	I	will	first	explain	that	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues	is	generated	by	two	kinds	of	claims.	These	two	types	of	claims	are,	on	the	one	hand,	assertions	that	we	have	compelling	reasons	to	think	imply	that	Socrates	has	knowledge	and,	on	the	other,	claims	that	we	have	equally	compelling	reasons	for	concluding	imply	that	Socrates	does	not	possesses	the	knowledge	that	the	former	type	of	claims	imply	that	he	does	have.	The	contradiction	formed	of	the	inferences	from	these	types	of	claims	is	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues.	I	will	go	on	to	show	that	this	contradiction	raises	a	question,	a	well-reasoned	answer	to	which	would	solve	it.	I	will	then	proceed	to	demonstrate	how	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	shares	all	of	the	foregoing	features	with	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues.	This	gives	one	a	good	reason	to	think	that	the	
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solutions	offered	to	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues	may	solve	the	puzzle	in	the	Theaetetus.		The	most	obvious	claims	that	Socrates	makes	in	the	early	dialogues	that	we	have	reasons	to	think	entail	that	he	has	knowledge	are	those	where	he	explicitly	claims	to	know	various	things.54	The	reason	that	one	should	think	these	claims	imply	that	Socrates	possesses	knowledge	is	that,	in	the	absence	of	grounds	for	thinking	that	Socrates	is	lying,	Socrates’	word	should	be	taken	at	face	value.	Thus,	if	the	foregoing	condition	is	not	fulfilled	and	if	Socrates’	says	that	he	knows	some	proposition	then	one	has	a	reason	to	infer	from	that	claim	that	he	possesses	knowledge	of	that	proposition.	For	instance,	in	the	following	cases	from	the	Apology:					 	‘I	do	know,	however,	that	it	is	wicked	and	shameful	to	do	wrong,	to	disobey	one’s	superior,	whether	he	be	god	or	man’	(Apol	29b)		and	also:		‘Am	I	then	to	choose	in	preference	to	this	[the	death	penalty]	something	that	I	know	very	well	to	be	an	evil’	(Apol	36b-c)		In	these	passages	we	have	few	reasons	to	think	that	Socrates	is	lying,	indeed,	we	have	especially	good	reason	to	conclude	the	opposite	as	Socrates	is	careful	to	emphasise	the	fact	that	he	is	telling	the	truth	throughout	the	Apology	(Apol	17b).	Consequently	we	have	compelling																																																									54	Some	commentators,	for	instance	Vlastos	“Socrates’	Disavowal	of	Knowledge”,	The	Philosophical	Quarterly	35:138,	pp.1-31,	1985,	find	non-explicit	claims	to	knowledge	that	they	nonetheless	argue	we	have	reasons	for	thinking	imply	that	Socrates	has	knowledge.	However,	these	reasons	often	fall	short	of	being	compelling	in	the	way	that	Socrates’	explicit	claims	to	knowledge	do	as	Socrates	does	not,	in	these	instances,	actually	claim	to	know	anything.	Indeed,	in	one	of	Vlastos’	favorite	examples	(Grg	508e-509a)	of	such	a	claim	(Vlastos,	Gregory,	“Socrates’	Disavowal	of	Knowledge”	pp.21-22),	Socrates	in	fact	explicitly	disavows	the	knowledge	Vlastos	thinks	we	have	a	warrant	for	concluding	he	has	(Grg	509a).		
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grounds	for	concluding	that	Apol	29b	and	Apol	36b-c	entail	that	Socrates	has	knowledge.	This	makes	them	instances	of	one	of	the	types	of	claims,	the	inferences	from	which	lead	to	the	acceptance	of	contradictory	conclusions	that	form	the	epistemic	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues.	In	addition	to	these	instances	from	the	Apology	one	can	find	more	passages	in	the	early	dialogues	where	Socrates	claims	explicitly	to	know	things.		A	prime	example	of	this	occurs	in	the	Euthydemus	where	Socrates	is	straightforwardly	asked:	‘Is	there	anything	you	know?’	(Euthd	293b)	to	which	he	replies	‘Oh	yes…many	things,	though	trivial	ones’	(Euthd	293b).55	Not	only	does	Socrates	here	profess	to	know	something	but	indeed,	‘many	things’	(Euthd	293b).	A	little	further	on	in	the	text	it	is	also	made	clear	that	Socrates	believes	himself	to	know	that	good	men	are	just;	for,	by	maintaining	the	opposite	to	Dionysodorus,	Socrates	trips	up	the	sophist	by	using	his	own	claim	that	Socrates	‘must	always	know	and,	at	the	same	time,	[know]	everything’	(Euthd	296c)	against	him	(Euthd	296d-297a).	Also	implicit	in	the	opening	to	this	interchange	is	a	claim	of	Socrates’	to	know	some	things	when	he	says	that	he	knows	them	‘by	means	of	my	soul’	(Euthd	295e).	In	the	
Protagoras	Socrates	confesses	to	having	‘especially	studied’	(Pr	339b)	an	ode	of	Simonides	and	claims	to	‘know	it’	(Pr	339b);	he	then	also	goes	on	to	claim	that	he	knows	the	second	quotation	that	Protagoras	offers	from	the	ode	is	indeed	part	of	the	same	poem	(Pr	339c).	Lastly	Socrates	also	claims	in	the	Protagoras	to	know	that	if	he	knew	what	virtue	consists	in	he	would	know	the	answer	to	the	question	of	whether	it	can	be	taught	(Pr	360e-361a).		These	claims	are	all	of	the	same	type	as	those	at	Apol	29b	and	
Apol	36b-c.	We	have	no	compelling	grounds	for	inferring	that	Socrates	is	lying	in	these	passages	and	therefore,	here	we	are	warranted	in	thinking	that	these	claims	entail	that	Socrates	has	knowledge.	This																																																									55	Whether	what	Socrates	here	admits	to	knowing	is	trivial	or	not,	the	important	point	is	that	he	should,	on	the	basis	of	this	claim,	be	attributed	with	some	knowledge.		
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makes	them	further	examples	of	one	of	the	types	of	claims	that	lead	to	the	generation	of	the	epistemic	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues.	Let	us	now	inspect	some	instances	of	claims	of	the	second	type	that	generate	that	puzzle.	One	can	find	some	instances	in	the	early	dialogues	where	Socrates	asserts	things	that	we	have	reasons	for	thinking	entail	that	he	does	not	possess	knowledge	with	regard	to	a	particular	topic	of	philosophical	investigation.56	However,	these	are	not	claims	of	the	type	that	generate	the	puzzle	under	consideration.	The	explanation	of	this	is	that	in	none	of	these	cases	do	we	have	reasons	to	suppose	that	the	claims	Socrates	is	making	imply	that	he	does	not	have	the	knowledge	we	elsewhere	have	grounds	for	concluding	that	he	has	(e.g.	Apol	29b,	
Euthd	293b,	Pr	360e-361a).	However,	in	the	Apology,	Socrates	makes	some	assertions	that	we	are	warranted	in	inferring	entail	that	Socrates	does	not	only	lack	knowledge	with	regard	to	a	particular	topic,	but	any	wisdom	or	knowledge	at	all.57	Consequently,	we	have	reasons	to	think	that	these	claims	in	the	Apology	entail	that	Socrates	does	not	have	the	knowledge	that	we	have	reason	to	conclude	other	claims	he	makes	imply	that	he	does	have	(e.g.	Apol	29b,	Euthd	293b,	Pr	360e-361a).	That	is,	any	knowledge	at	all.				In	the	Apology,	after	a	brief	preamble,	Socrates	begins	to	tell	the	gathered	citizens	of	Athens	a	story	where	he	attempts	to	explain	and	justify	his	philosophical	practice	(Apol	21b-24b).	During	the	course	of	this	tale	Socrates	tells	us	of	how	he	was	‘very	conscious	that	I	am	not	wise	at	all’	(Apol	21b).	He	claims	that	he	was,	likewise,	‘conscious	of	knowing	practically	nothing’	(Apol	22d).	Indeed,	it	might	appear,	from	this	passage	in	the	Apology	(Apol	21b-23d),	that	the	only	thing	that	Socrates	might	be	taken	to	claim	to	“know”	is	that	‘I	do	not	think	I	know																																																									56	E.g.	Euthphr	16a,	Charm	165b-c,	Lchs	186b-c,	Grg	509a,	Meno	71a,	Lys	212a	and	Rep	337e.	57	It	is	fairly	assumed	that	in	the	early	dialogues,	Socrates	uses	knowledge	(epistēmē)	and	wisdom	(sophia)	as	equivalent	terms.	I	will	continue	to	base	the	following	exegesis	on	this	assumption.	One	reason	to	accept	this	hypothesis	is	that	a	couple	of	passages	contain	a	Socrates	who	equivocates	these	terms	(Protagoras	330b	and	Apology	21c-d).	
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what	I	do	not	know’	(Apol	21d).	Now,	Apol	21b	especially,	I	would	like	to	argue,	expresses	the	claim	that	Socrates	has	no	wisdom	or	knowledge.	On	the	reasonable	supposition	that	being	wise	entails	having	knowledge	for	Socrates	in	the	early	dialogues,	being	‘not	at	all	wise’	(Apol	21b)	would	entail	that	Socrates	was	not	at	all	knowledgeable;	that	he	has	no	knowledge.58	From	this	we	are	warranted	in	further	deducing	that	what	Socrates	says	at	Apol	21b	entails	that	Socrates	does	not	know	the	things	we	elsewhere	have	grounds	for	thinking	his	claims	entail	that	he	does	know.	This	makes	
Apol	21b	an	instance	of	the	second	type	of	claim	that	generates	the	epistemic	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues.		Consider	then;	on	the	one	hand,	we	can	supply	compelling	reasons	to	think	that	Apol	29b,	Euthd	293b	and	Pr	339b	entail	that	Socrates	knows	certain	things,	on	the	other,	we	have	equally	compelling	reasons	to	suppose	that	Apol	21b	entails	that	Socrates	does	not	have	the	knowledge	we	have	reasons	for	thinking	Apol	29b,	Euthd	293b	and	
Pr	339b	entail	that	he	does	have.	We	therefore	have	equally	compelling	reasons	to	reach	conclusions	that	are	mutually	incompatible	from	these	types	of	claims;	conclusions	that	form	a	contradiction	if	both	accepted.	Namely,	from	the	first	type	of	claim	above,	that	Socrates	knows	some	particular	things,	from	the	second	that	he	does	not	know	anything	and	consequently,	any	particular	things.	This	contradiction	is	the	epistemic	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues.	Resultantly,	this	contradiction	prompts	a	question,	a	well	reasoned	answer	to	which	would	lead	to	its	dissolution,	namely:	‘In	Plato’s	earliest	dialogues,	when	Socrates	says	he	has	no	knowledge,	does	he	or	does	he	not	mean	what	he	says?’.59	A	well-reasoned	answer	to	this	question	would	dissolve	the	contradiction	by	giving	us	grounds	to	conclude	either	one	of	two	things.	These	two																																																									58	As	earlier	noted	(fn.57	above)	in	this	passage	(Apol	21c-d)	Socrates	clearly	equivocates	between	knowledge	and	wisdom;	especially	at	21d	where	he	tells	the	jurors	that	he	concluded	that	he	was	‘wiser’	(Apol	21d)	than	the	politician	he	interviewed	because	‘he	[the	politician]	thinks	he	knows	something	when	he	does	not’	(Apol	21d)	(emphasis	added).		59	Vlastos,	Gregory,	“Socrates’	Disavowal	of	Knowledge”,	p.1	
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things	are	either:	that	Socrates	doesn’t	mean	what	he	says	viz.	that	he	does	possess	knowledge	(contra	the	conclusion	we	have	reason	to	think	is	entailed	by	Apol	21b);	or,	that	he	does	mean	what	he	says	viz.	that	he	doesn’t	have	knowledge	(contra	the	conclusion	we	had	grounds	for	thinking	is	implied	by	Apol	29b,	Euthd	293b	and	Pr	339b).	By	providing	good	reasons	to	reject	either	of	the	conclusions	drawn	from	these	lines	(a	rational	answer	to	the	salient	question)	one	would	be	able	to	deny	one	of	the	inferences	that	form	the	contradiction	and	thus	dissolve	it.	Let	us	now	turn	our	attention	to	the	Theaetetus	to	see	how	the	Puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	is	the	same	as	that	from	the	early	dialogues	in	the	foregoing	respects.		In	the	Theaetetus	Socrates	asserts	explicitly	three	times	that	he	possesses	no	wisdom:60			‘there	is	no	wisdom	in	me;	and	that	is	true	enough’	(Theaet	150c6)		but	also	that:		‘I	myself	am	barren	of	wisdom’	(Theaet	150c4)		and	finally	that:		‘I	cannot	claim	as	the	child	of	my	own	soul	any	discovery	worthy	of	the	name	of	wisdom’	(Theaet	150d1-2)		We	know	from	section	1.3,	where	I	explained	the	logical	structure	of	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom,	that,	given	Socrates’	comments	at	Theaet	145d-e,	we	are	warranted	in	concluding	that	Theaet	150c4,	c6	and	d1-2	imply	that	Socrates	has	no	knowledge.	Thus	we	have	reason	for	thinking	that	Theaet	150c4,	c6	and	d1-2	entail	that	Socrates	does	not	have	knowledge	that	we	elsewhere	in	the	Theaetetus	may	have	reason																																																									60	In	the	passage	that	is	the	focus	of	this	thesis.	Socrates	also	reaffirms	his	disavowal	at	Theaet	179b.	
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to	conclude	that	he	does	have	viz.	any	knowledge	at	all.	Hence,	the	claims	at	Theaet	150c4,	c6	and	d1-2	are	of	the	same	type	as	one	of	the	kinds	that	lead	to	the	generation	of	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues.		In	the	Theaetetus,	as	we	have	seen,	Socrates	claims	to	practice	the	technē	of	midwifery	(Theaet	149a4,	a7	150b6,	c1,	151a).	In	section	1.1	I	argued	that	a	technē	consists	in	knowledge	for	Socrates	and	in	section	1.2	that	Socrates’	claims	to	practice	a	technē	(Theaet	149a4,	a7	150b6,	c1,	151a)	should	therefore	be	taken	to	imply	that	Socrates	possesses	a	specific	kind	of	knowledge.	These	arguments	offer	us	a	compelling	warrant	to	infer	that	Socrates’	claim	to	practice	a	technē	(Theaet	149a4,	a7	150b6,	c1,	151a)	entails	that	he	has	knowledge.	This	makes	Socrates’	claims	to	practice	the	art	of	midwifery	(Theaet	149a4,	a7	150b6,	c1,	151a)	the	same	in	kind	as	the	other	type	of	assertion	that	lead	to	the	formation	of	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues	viz.	the	type	not	looked	at	in	the	preceding	paragraph.			 So,	in	the	Theaetetus,	Socrates	makes	some	assertions	that	we	have	compelling	grounds	for	thinking	imply	that	he	has	knowledge	(Theaet	149a4,	a7,	150b6,	c1,	151a,	c).	By	contrast	Socrates	says	some	other	things	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2)	that	we	have	equally	compelling	reasons	to	conclude	entail	that	he	does	not	have	the	knowledge	we	have	reasons	to	think	Theaet	149a4,	a7,	150b6,	c1,	151a,	c	entail	that	he	has.	Hence,	the	inferences	one	draws	on	the	basis	of	these	types	of	claims	lead	one	to	accept	contradictory	conclusions	with	regard	to	Socrates’	epistemic	state	in	the	Theaetetus	viz.	the	inferences	that	1)	Socrates	does	have	some	knowledge	and	2)	that	he	does	not	have	any	knowledge.	What	should	also	be	apparent	is	that	this	contradiction	is	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.	This	is	because	the	inferences	and	the	reasons	given	for	drawing	them	are	exactly	the	same	as	those	inferences	and	grounds	for	drawing	them	that	we	previously	saw	lead	to	the	formation	of	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	in	section	1.3.	Now,	because	the	puzzle	is	a	contradiction	generated	by	accepting	the	conclusions	that	Socrates	both	does	and	does	not	have	knowledge,	the	puzzle	can	be	solved	by	offering	a	well	reasoned	response	to	the	
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question:	“in	the	Theaetetus	does	Socrates	mean	what	he	says	when	he	claims	to	lack	all	knowledge?”.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	providing	a	well-reasoned	answer	to	this	question	would	dissolve	the	contradiction	by	offering	grounds	to	conclude	one	of	two	things	with	regard	to	Socrates’	epistemic	state	in	the	Theaetetus.	These	conclusions	that	either:	Socrates	does	mean	what	he	says	viz.	that	he	has	no	knowledge	(contra	the	conclusion	we	have	reasons	to	think	is	implied	by	Theaet	149a4,	a7,	150b6,	c1,	151a,	c);	or,	that	Socrates	does	not	mean	what	he	says	viz.	that	he	does	have	some	knowledge	(contra	the	inference	we	have	reasons	to	draw	from	Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2).	If	either	of	these	answers	can	be	given	on	the	basis	of	a	sound	rationale	then	one	would	have	grounds	for	dismissing	one	of	the	two	inferences	that	form	the	contradiction,	which	would	solve	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.		 So	the	epistemic	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues	and	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	are	contradictions	formed	by	the	same	two	inferences	from	the	same	two	types	of	claims.	Answering	the	salient	question	that	is	therefore	raised	by	these	puzzles	could	dissolve	either	of	these	contradictions.	These	similarities	provide	a	basis	for	thinking	that	solutions	to	one	puzzle	may	help	to	solve	the	other.	Therefore,	I	hope	to	have	justified	the	strategy	of	applying	solutions	offered	to	the	epistemic	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	in	the	Theaetetus.	Before	we	pursue	this	strategy	I	shall	now	outline	and	proceed	to	respond	to	a	powerful	objection	against	following	it.	To	raise	this	objection,	one	would	have	to	endorse	two	claims.	The	first	of	these	is	that,	given	any	plausible	understanding	of	the	compositional	chronology	of	the	Platonic	dialogues,	the	Theaetetus	is	a	text	composed	in	the	middle	period	of	Plato’s	literary	career.	Secondly	one	would	have	to	endorse	the	view	that	‘Plato	gradually	transforms	his	speaker	Socrates	from	an	open	minded	critic	and	inquirer	[in	the	early	period	texts]	into	a	mouthpiece	for	his	own	Platonic	doctrines	and	a	committed	proponent	of	the	underlying	arguments	[in	the	middle	
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period	texts]’.61	From	this	it	follows	that,	in	the	Theaetetus,	Socrates’	voice	is	subsumed	within	Plato’s	own	whereas	this	is	not	the	case	in	the	early	dialogues.	This	entails	that	the	claims	made	by	Socrates	in	the	
Theaetetus	are	presentations	of	the	Plato’s	own	arguments	and	doctrinal	positions.	This	is	what	I	shall	call	the	“Platonised”	interpretation	of	the	Theaetetus.62	Now,	the	Platonised	interpretation	of	the	Theaetetus	implies	that	when	Socrates	declares	himself	the	practitioner	of	a	technē	(Theaet	149a4,	a7	150b6,	c1,	151a)	that	involves	him	lacking	sophia	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2),	it	is	Plato,	speaking	through	his	character	Socrates,	making	claims	that	apply	to	Plato	himself.	Hence,	on	this	Platonised	interpretation,	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	raises	the	challenge	of	how	to	make	sense	of	middle	period	doctrines	of	Plato’s	that	we	have	reasons	to	think	imply	contradictory	conclusions	with	regard	to	Socrates’	characters’	(hence	Plato’s)	epistemic	state.	This	would	make	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	stand	in	contrast	to	the	epistemic	puzzle	of	the	early	dialogues	in	that	respect.	For	if	Socrates’	character	in	the	early	dialogues	represents,	at	a	minimum,	the	views	of	his	character	and	not	those	of	Plato	himself,	then	the	epistemic	puzzle	raised	in	the	early	dialogues	would	present	a	problem	about	how	to	make	sense	of	the	views	of	that	character,	and	not	the	views	of	Plato	himself.	So,	granted	all	this,	the	consequence	for	my	proposed	interpretive	strategy	would	be	that	it	amounts	to	the	suggestion	that	one	should	try	to	dissolve	a	contradiction	generated	by	middle	period	views	of	Plato’s	own	by	using	solutions	that	have	been	offered	to	the	same	contradiction	that	is	generated	by	the	same	kinds	of	claims	made	by	a	character	in	the	early	dialogues.	This,	it	could	be	objected,	would	not	be	the	best	interpretive	strategy	to	pursue.	This	is	because,	one	might	argue,	it	is	more	propitious	to	try	and	understand	a																																																									61	Sedley,	David,	The	Midwife	of	Platonism,	p.9	62	One	commentator	who	pursues	such	a	“Platonised”	reading	of	the	
Theaetetus	is	F.M.	Cornford.	His	famous	commentary	Plato’s	Theory	of	
Knowledge,	abounds	with	claims	such	as	that	he	‘aims	at	discovering	what	Plato	really	means’	Plato’s	Theory	of	Knowledge,	Routledge,	1935	(repr.	1960),	p.viii.	Such	locutions	confirm	that	Cornford	accepted	the	Platonised	interpretation.	
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contradiction	generated	by	middle	period	doctrines	of	Plato’s	by	investigating	their	relation	to	the	views	expressed	in	the	texts	of	his	middle	period.63	Hence,	the	objection	amounts	to	this;	the	interpretive	strategy	I	propose	to	follow	is	unjustified	because	it	would	not	be	the	most	promising	strategy	one	could	potentially	adopt	to	solve	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.			 	
2.2:	The	Character	of	Socrates	in	the	Theaetetus:	
	In	this	section	I	wish	to	respond	to	the	objection	just	raised	by	first	presenting	and	endorsing	an	argument	of	David	Sedley’s	against	the	adoption	of	the	Platonised	interpretation	of	the	Theaetetus.	Once	this	is	done	I	will	turn	my	attention	to	articulating	Sedley’s	proposed	alternative	to	the	Platonised	interpretation	of	the	Theaetetus	that	I	also	advocate	accepting.	There	are	two	reasons	for	this.	Firstly	because	Sedley’s	own	view	is	a	proper	contrary	of	the	Platonised	interpretation	in	that	Sedley’s	view	is	that	there	is	no	identity	between	the	voices	of	Socrates	and	Plato	in	the	Theaetetus.64	Therefore	endorsing	Sedley’s	understanding	of	Socrates’	persona	in	the	text	provides	one	with	a	further	rationale	for	maintaining	that	the	Platonised	interpretation	is	false.	Secondly,	I	will	return	to	this	interpretation	in	the	final	chapter	where	it	plays	a	brief	but	important	argumentative	role	in	the	last	section	of	that	chapter.		 The	reason	Sedley	offers	to	reject	the	Platonised	interpretation	of	the	Theaetetus	is	an	argument	in	the	form	of	a	reductio	ad	absurdum.	Sedley’s	reductio	begins	with	the	observation	that	if	one	grants	the																																																									63	Cornford,	who	endorsed	a	Platonised	reading	(see	fn.	62)	of	the	
Theaetetus	obviously	thought	this.	He	is	famous	for	defending	the	view	that	Anamnesis	and	Socratic	midwifery	are	based	on	equivalent	conceptions	of	how	knowledge	is	acquired	(that	it	is	recollected)	and	that,	in	the	midwife	passage	in	the	Theaetetus,	Plato	is	indicating	that	‘Anamnesis	[the	theory	of	recollection	found	in	the	Meno	81a-86c]	was	a	theory	that	squared	the	profession	and	practice	of	Socrates	with	Plato’s	discovery	of	the	separately	existing	forms’	Plato’s	Theory	of	
Knowledge,	p.28.		64	Sedley,	David,	The	Midwife	of	Platonism,	p.8	
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Platonised	interpretation	of	the	Theaetetus	a	challenge	arises	for	the	interpreter.65	This	challenge	is	that	because	Plato’s	‘Socrates,	is	to	all	appearances	almost	entirely	innocent	of	that	Platonic	metaphysics	[of	the	middle	period]’	in	the	Theaetetus,	this	ignorance	requires	some	explanation.66	This	is	especially	so,	Sedley	argues,	because	many	of	Plato’s	middle	period	doctrines	are	of	direct	relevance	to	answering	the	question	that	is	the	subject	of	inquiry	in	the	Theaetetus	viz.	“what	is	knowledge?”	(Theaet	145e-146a).67	Now,	on	the	Platonised	reading,	the	most	preeminent	and	credible	explanation	of	the	absence	of	Platonic	doctrine	that,	I	agree	for	the	same	reasons	as	Sedley,	should	be	rejected,	is	the	‘hypothesis	that	Plato	has	abandoned	his	entire	metaphysics	of	transcendence	and	thrown	everything	back	into	the	melting	pot’.68	This	account	of	the	absence	of	Platonic	doctrine	in	the	Theaetetus	is	eloquently	outlined	by	Gregory	Vlastos,	who	endorses	a	version	of	this	view	when	he	claims	that:		‘in	the	Parmenides	Socrates'	two-world	metaphysical	theory	comes	in	for	a	furious	battering…old	Parmenides	hits	it	again	and	again	with	objections	to	which	its	young	spokesman	[Young	Socrates]	has	not	a	word	to	say	in	reply…Declining	to	meet	head-on	these	formidable	difficulties,	Plato	proceeds	in	the	Theaetetus	-	which	makes	at	183e	a	pointed	allusion	to	that	(fictional)	meeting	between	the	aged	Parmenides	and	the	youthful	Socrates	-	to	assay	a	new	beginning,	starting	with	a	clean	slate.’69																																																									65	Ibid	p.7.	Sedley’s	thought	here	does	not	presuppose	the	idea	that	Socrates	is	not	presenting	doctrines	Plato	accepts	in	the	Theaetetus.	Sedley’s	(correct)	observation	amounts	to	the	claim	that	Socrates	does	not	explicitly	allude	to	any	of	the	metaphysical	doctrines	of	Plato’s	middle	period	that	are	presented	in	other	texts	of	the	middle	period	in	the	Theaetetus	(e.g.	Forms,	Anamnesis,	transcendent	souls	etc.).		66	Ibid.		67	Sedley,	David,	The	Midwife	of	Platonism,	p.8	68	Ibid	p.7	69	Vlastos,	Gregory,	The	Evidence	of	Aristotle	and	Xenophon	in	Socrates:	
Ironist	and	Moral	Philosopher,	Cambridge	University	Press,	1991,	pp.81-106,	p.85	fn.11	
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	However,	Sedley	argues,	‘the	price	of	that	hypothesis	is	the	near-impossible	feat	of	re-dating	the	Timaeus	earlier	than	the	Theaetetus’.70	One	would	have	to	do	this	if	one	accepted	Vlastos’	view	because	the	
Timaeus	contains	a	number	of	allusions	to	or	reiterations	of	the	detailed	metaphysical	picture	that	Plato	develops	in	the	Republic	(a	middle	period	text).71	Hence,	if,	as	the	hypothesis	holds,	Plato	embarks	upon	a	re-examination	of	the	concept	of	knowledge	in	the	Theaetetus	(because	he	has	rejected	the	theories	presented	in	the	Republic	in	the	
Parmenides),	the	Timaeus	must	have	been	composed	before	both	the	
Theaetetus,	and,	on	Vlastos’	interpretation,	the	Parmenides	too.	The	view	that	the	Timaeus	is	a	middle	period	text	that	predates	the	composition	of	the	Theaetetus	cannot	be	accepted	due	to	the	manifest	stylistic	dissimilarities	between	the	Timaeus	and	the	other	middle	period	dialogues.72	This	therefore	provides	us	with	good	grounds	for	supposing	that	there	must	be	some	other	purpose	behind	a	lack	of	explicit	allusions	to	middle	period	doctrines	in	the	Theaetetus	than	hypothesising	that	it	represents	the	beginning	of	a	completely	new																																																									70	Sedley,	David,	The	Midwife	of	Platonism,	p.7	71	The	most	obvious	and	damning	example	of	this	is	the	“two	worlds”	theory	of	knowledge	that	is	expounded	in	the	argument	in	Republic	V	(Rep	476e-480a)	and	reiterated	at	the	opening	of	the	Timaeus	(Tim	27d-28a).	In	the	argument	from	the	Republic	V	the	relation	of	knowledge	and	belief	to	their	objects	distinguishes	them;	Plato	there	proposes	that	belief	grasps	‘what	is	not	and	what	purely	is’	(Rep	479d)	while	knowledge	grasps	‘things	themselves	that	are	always	the	same	in	every	respect’	(Rep	479e).	In	the	Timaeus	this	fundamental	epistemic	and	ontological	distinction	appears	in	the	form	of	a	rhetorical	question	at	the	opening	of	the	text:	‘What	is	that	which	always	is	and	has	no	becoming,	and	what	is	that	which	becomes	but	never	is?	The	former	is	grasped	by	understanding	which	involves	a	reasoned	account.	It	is	unchanging.	The	latter	is	grasped	by	opinion.’	(Tim	27d-28a)	72	One	obvious	stylistic	difference	is	the	reduction	of	the	role	that	Socrates	plays	in	the	Timaeus	compared	to	the	middle	period	dialogues.	In	the	Timaeus	Socrates	is	demoted	to	the	role	of	an	auditor	who	does	little	but	listen	to	and	absorb	the	information	presented	in	the	eponymous	character’s	monologue.	Another	later	period	text	that	follows	this	same	pattern	is	the	Sophist	where,	again,	Socrates	is	present	yet	says	very	little,	the	task	of	presenting	doctrine	being	instead	passed	on	to	the	mysterious	“Eleatic	Stranger”	(Soph	217d).	
	46	
mode	of	investigation	after	the	“rejection”	of	Plato’s	metaphysics	of	the	middle	period	in	the	Parmenides.	Therefore	one	should	not	identify	the	views	of	Socrates	with	those	of	Plato	in	the	Theaetetus;	if	one	does,	one	cannot	offer	a	plausible	explanation	of	the	fact	that	Socrates	presents	no	middle	period	doctrine	in	the	text.73		This	reductio	therefore	offers	one	a	convincing	basis	upon	which	to	reject	the	Platonised	interpretation	of	the	Theaetetus	and	hence	to	answer	the	objection	articulated	at	the	close	of	the	last	section.	If	the	Platonised	interpretation	is	false,	because	it	can	be	shown	to	imply	a	result	that	very	few	are	willing	to	accept,	then,	when	Socrates	makes	the	claims	that	we	have	reasons	to	infer	imply	a	contradiction	(the	claims	that	generate	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom)	these	are	not	claims	of	Plato’s	own.	If	they	are	not	Plato’s	own	views,	then	it	does	not	follow	that	the	challenge	that	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	raises	is	one	that	involves	trying	to	make	sense	of	middle	period	doctrines	that	imply	a	contradiction.	Therefore	it	would	not	follow	that	the	most	promising	interpretive	strategy	to	adopt	to	solve	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	would	be	to	try	and	understand	the	puzzle	in	the	context	of	Plato’s	other	middle	period	philosophy.	Now	let	us	look	at	what	justification	Sedley	offers	for	approaching	the	Theaetetus	as	a	text	wherein	Socrates’	voice	is	separated	from	Plato’s	own	(other	than	that	the	contrary	view	implies	an	interpretation	we	have	good	grounds	for	thinking	is	false).			 To	achieve	the	foregoing	aim	Sedley	begins	by	offering	the	central	interpretive	claim	of	his	book:			‘Socrates	fails	to	see	the	Platonic	implications	[of	the	arguments	he	and	Theaetetus	construct],	and	instead	it	is	we,	as	seasoned	readers	of	Plato	who	are	expected	to	recognise	and	exploit	them.	If	the	question	is	asked,	what	could	legitimize	such	a	division	between	of	the	roles	of	Plato	and	Socrates,	the	answer	is:	the	concept	of	midwifery.’74																																																									73	Sedley,	David,	The	Midwife	of	Platonism,	p.8	74	Ibid	
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	By	this	Sedley	means	that	he	thinks	Plato	has	not	abandoned	the	metaphysics	of	the	middle	period	but	has	chosen,	in	the	Theaetetus,	to	portray	a	non-doctrinal	Socrates	who	articulates	arguments	that	‘cry	out	for	Platonist	interpretations’	so	that	we,	who	are	by	this	time	aware	of	Plato’s	positions	in	epistemology,	ontology	and	metaphysics,	able	to	see	these	positions	‘Socratic	origins’.75	This	end	is	achieved,	Sedley	argues,	via	employment	of	the	image	of	Socrates	as	a	‘barren’	(Theaet	150c)	midwife	who,	he	argues,	in	the	dialogue	plays	the	role	of	‘the	
midwife	of	Platonism’.76	By	adopting	this	depiction	of	Socrates,	Sedley	claims,	‘Plato	aims	to	demonstrate,	if	not	the	identity,	at	any	rate	the	profound	continuity,	between,	on	the	one	hand,	his	revered	master’s	historic	contribution	and,	on	the	other,	the	Platonist	truth’.77		We	will	return	to	the	question	of	how	Sedley	thinks	Socrates’	method	brings	forth	Platonic	conclusions	and	how	this	achieves	the	end	of	demonstrating	the	intellectual	and	historical	continuity	of	Socrates’	and	Plato’s	thought	momentarily.	Firstly	we	should	notice	that	this	interpretation	offers	a	credible	explanation	of	why	there	is	no	middle	period	doctrine	in	the	claims	of	Socrates	in	the	dialogue.	This	is	because,	on	Sedley’s	view,	it	was	necessary	for	Plato	to	portray	Socrates	as	lacking	these	insights	to	show	how	Plato’s	own	philosophical	doctrines	arose	out	of	Socrates’	investigative	practices.	Secondly	we	should	look	briefly	at	what	grounds	there	are	for	accepting	this	initial	sketch	of	Sedley’s	view	before	returning	to	the	issue	of	how	Socrates	acts	as	the	midwife	of	Platonism	in	the	Theaetetus.		The	first	of	these	that	Sedley	offers	is	that	there	are	some	Platonic	texts	that	offer	a	precedent	for	thinking	that	one	of	Plato’s	aims	in	composing	them	is	to	demonstrate	the	interrelatedness	of	Socratic	and	Platonic	thought.78	For	instance,	in	the	Meno	and	Republic,	Sedley	argues,	the	sequence	of	the	arguments	and	the	shift	in	philosophical																																																									75	Ibid,	p.12	76	Ibid,	p.8	77	Ibid	78	Ibid,	pp.9-10	
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content	that	accompanies	them	draws	the	reader’s	attention	to	the	continuity	Plato	saw	between	the	semi-historical	Socrates	of	the	early	dialogues	and	the	Platonised,	doctrinal	Socrates	of	the	middle	period	texts.79	And	this	does	indeed	seem	to	be	the	case	because,	for	instance,	the	Meno	opens	with	a	perplexed	Socrates	who	asserts	that	he	knows	nothing	about	virtue	or	whether	it	can	be	taught	(Meno	71b)	and	who	refutes	all	Meno’s	definitions	of	what	virtue	could	consist	in	(Meno	70a-81a).	Only	once	this	phase	of	the	discussion	ends	and	the	next	begins	(Meno	81a-100b),	does	the	doctrinal,	Platonic	Socrates	expound	the	theory	of	Anamnesis	in	response	to	Meno’s	paradox	(Meno	80d).	The	
Republic	opens	with	a	Socrates	who	declares	his	ignorance	of	what	justice	consists	in	(Rep	336e-337a)	and	then	proceeds,	in	the	remaining	books	(Rep	II-X)	to	offer	a	detailed	and	complex	account	of	justice	that	is	full	of	(Platonic)	doctrine.	Both	of	these	examples	therefore	support	Sedley’s	contention	that	the	structure	of	these	texts	‘amounts	to	a	reassurance	that	the	early	Socratic	phase	was	a	necessary	preliminary	to	the	mature	Platonic	phase.’80	Another	interesting	case	that	Sedley	adduces	in	support	of	adopting	his	view	of	the	subtext	in	the	Theaetetus	begins	with	the	observation	that	one	of	the	results	of	Socrates’	midwifery	is	that	some	of	the	his	interlocutors	(those	who	are	pregnant)	‘discover	within	themselves	many	fine	things’	(Theaet	150d).81	This,	Sedley	suggests,	is	anomalous,	granted	what	we	know	about	Socrates’	inquiries	from	Plato’s	early	dialogues	where,	far	from	any	viable	brain	children	being	delivered,	Socrates	always	leaves	his	discussants	in	a	state	of	aporia.82	Thus,	if	Socrates	has	delivered	some	truths	from	interlocutors	(Theaet	150d)	whom	among	those	to	which	he	has	spoken	could	this	be?	Sedley	sees	that	there	is	‘only	one	plausible	answer:	Plato	himself’.83	The	result	is	that	‘if	this	last	suggestion	is	right,	we	have	here	the	single	clue																																																									79	Ibid,	p.10	80	Ibid,	p.9	81	Ibid,	p.36	82	Ibid,	p.37	83	Ibid	
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planted	by	Plato…as	to	the	meaning	of	the	dialogue’s	subtext:	Socrates	was	the	midwife	of	Plato’s	own	philosophy’.84	Which	again	confirms	Sedley’s	position	on	the	subtext.	If	what	Sedley	argues	here	is	correct,	Socrates	is	supposed	to	be	understood	as	drawing	out	ideas	that	suggest	Platonic	conclusions	from	Theaetetus;	acting	as	the	midwife	to	Plato’s	own	ideas.	Let	us	now	look	firstly	at	how	Socratic	midwifery	involves	presenting	arguments	that	suggest	Platonic	conclusions	and	how	this	demonstrates	the	historical	and	philosophical	continuity	of	Socratic	and	Platonic	thought.	Once	this	is	done	we	will	see	that	this	occurs	in	the	dialogue	by	examining	one	of	Sedley’s	examples	of	where	he	takes	this	to	happen.85	The	presentation	of	arguments	that	hint	at	Platonic	conclusions	and	which	resultantly	demonstrate	Socratic-Platonic	philosophical	continuity	is	achieved	by	midwifery,	Sedley	says,	by	first	entailing	a	distinction	‘between	the	cognitive	state	of	the	dialectical	questioner	and	that	of	the	pupil.	For	“dialectical	questioner”	read	Socrates	and	for	“pupil”	read	Plato’.86	This	distinction	then	entails	that	there	are	multiple	strata	of	midwifery	practiced	in	and	by	the	text,	respectively,	on	the	characters	of	the	dialogue,	and	upon	us	as	readers.87	Pointing	to	the	fact	that	the	midwifery	practiced	on	Theaetetus	‘fails’	(in	the	sense	that	none	of	Theaetetus’	definitions	of	knowledge	prove	viable),	Sedley	notes	that,	as	a	result	of	this	failure,	the	degrees	of	obstetric	practice	that	are	performed	on	Plato’s	readers	viz.	the	‘external	midwifery’	the	dialogue	engages	in,	should	be	taken	to	succeed,	in	different	ways,	depending	upon	our	prior	knowledge	of	Platonic	doctrine.88		If	one	is	unaccustomed	to	Plato’s	middle	period	thought,	Sedley	claims,	the	external	midwifery	can	bring	one	to	‘the	point	where	we	are	ready	to	abandon	the	written	text	and	continue	the	dialectic	for																																																									84	Ibid	85	I	do	not	have	the	space	to	review	more	than	one	such	example.	The	one	instance	I	do	look	at	intends	to	illustrate	the	point	that	Sedley’s	interpretation	at	least	has	a	basis	in	the	textual	evidence.		86	Sedley,	David,	The	Midwife	of	Platonism,	pp.10-11	87	Ibid,	p.11	88	Ibid,	pp.11-12	
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ourselves,	our	puzzlement	at	the	inquiry’s	failure	being	in	reality	our	birth	pangs	as	we	struggle	to	bring	forth	a	better	definition	of	knowledge’;	just	as,	historically,	we	might	reasonably	expect,	Socrates	did	with	Plato.89	The	next	layer	of	midwifery	then	brings	the	reader	to	the	point	of	having	Platonic	thoughts	instilled	in	them	by	seeing	the	implications	of	the	arguments	in	the	text	by	having	to	puzzle	again	about	the	dialogue’s	“failure”;	as	we	might	also	suppose	Socrates	did	historically	with	Plato.90	Finally,	if	one	is	an	initiate	into	the	fold	of	Platonic	doctrine,	the	final	stratum	of	midwifery	practiced	on	the	reader	places	them	in	the	position	of	coming	to	understand	that	‘Socrates	unconsciously	advanced	the	process	of	enlightenment	which	culminated	in	Plato’s	mature	thought’.91	The	final	stratum	achieves	this	because	the	dialectical	exercises	the	real	historical	Socrates	performed	on	Plato	himself	will	be	recognised	as	here	being	represented	by	the	text	of	the	dialogue,	the	midwifery	it	performs	on	our	souls	as	readers	bringing	us	to	accept	the	Platonic	conclusions	that	we	come	to	see	latently	in	that	representation.92	Now	let	us	look	at	one	example	that	confirms	that	midwifery	does	operate	in	this	way.		 One	apposite	example	that	substantiates	the	existence	of	the	final	(and	most	clearly	evinced	stratum)	of	midwifery	appears	in	the	infamous	and	controversial	second	refutation	of	the	absent	Protagoras,	the	so-called	“self-refutation”	argument	(Theaet	170a-171e).93	At	
Theaet	170c,	Sedley	points	out,	the	‘first	wave’	of	the	self-refutation	argument	closely	echoes	a	similar	argument	deployed	against	Dionysodorus	in	the	Euthydemus	(Euthd	287e-288a).94	In	the	self-refutation	argument	in	the	Theaetetus	Socrates	first	has	Theodorus	agree	that	many	people	judge	there	to	be	true	and	false	beliefs	(Theaet	169d-170c).	This	view,	taken	together	with	the	doctrine	that	‘things	are																																																									89	Ibid,	p.11	90	Ibid	91	Ibid	92	Ibid,	p.12	93	Ibid,	p.61	94	Ibid,	p.62	
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for	every	man	what	they	seem	to	him	to	be’	(Theaet	170a),	Socrates	concludes,	entails	the	following	dilemma:	‘Are	we	to	say	that	all	men,	on	every	occasion,	judge	what	is	true?	Or	that	they	judge	sometimes	truly,	sometimes	falsely?	Whichever	we	say,	it	comes	to	the	same	thing,	namely,	that	men	do	not	always	judge	what	is	true’	(Theaet	170c).	This	dilemma	is	almost	the	same,	Sedley	points	out,	as	that	which	Socrates	presents	to	the	sophists	in	the	Euthydemus	in	response	to	a	very	similar	doctrine,	again	apparently	of	Protagorean	progeny	(Euthd	286c),	that	no	one	can	speak	falsely	(Euthd	286c).	In	the	Euthydemus	Socrates	presents	essentially	the	same	dilemma	when	he	asks	‘are	you	[Dionysodorus]	saying	that	I	made	a	mistake	[in	making	the	claim	that	phrases	have	sense	-	Euthd	287c]	or	not?	Because	if	I	did	not	make	one	you	will	not	refute	me	no	matter	how	wise	you	are…And	if	I	did	make	one,	you	said	the	wrong	thing	when	you	claimed	it	was	impossible	to	make	mistakes’	(Euthd	287e-288a).	Therefore	Sedley	concludes	that	‘These	links	to	the	Euthydemus	should	be	enough	to	confirm	that	the	refutation	of	broad	Protagoreanism	in	the	Theaetetus	is	meant	to	be	read	as	displaying	to	us	an	authentic	Socratic	legacy’.95	That	is,	it	shows	how	Plato’s	freshly	constructed	dismissal	of	Protagoras’	doctrine	has	its	roots	in	Socratic	approaches	to	argumentative	technique.	This	argument	therefore	evinces	the	final	stratum	of	midwifery.			 	Sedley’s	view	that	Socrates	acts	as	the	midwife	of	Platonism	in	the	Theaetetus	establishes	that	the	best	strategy	to	pursue	to	understand	Socrates’	character	in	the	text	is	to	see	him	as	a	revision	to	‘the	historical	or	semi-historical	figure	of	that	name	made	famous	by	Plato’s	early	dialogues’	contra	the	Platonised	view.96	On	the	grounds	that	Sedley	offers	I	therefore	reject	the	possibility	that	the	best	interpretive	strategy	to	pursue	to	try	and	solve	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	would	be	to	try	and	understand	it	in	the	context	of	Plato’s	middle	period	philosophy.	Thus	I	take	it	that	the	strategy	I	will	
																																																								95	Ibid	96	Ibid,	p.8	
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momentarily	go	on	to	adopt	is	well	motivated	on	the	basis	of	the	similarities	of	the	puzzles	we	looked	at	previously.		
	
2.3:	Exploring	and	Applying	Solutions:		To	aid	in	making	this	section	easier	to	understand	I	have	set	out	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	in	the	most	formal	way	possible	below:			1)	If	Socrates	possesses	a	technē	then	Socrates	possesses	epistēmē	(conclusion	of	section	1.3)		2)	Socrates	possesses	a	technē	(Theaet	149a4,	a7	150b6,	c1,	151a)		3)	(from	1,	2):.	Socrates	possesses	epistēmē			4)	epistēmē	is	‘the	same’	as	sophia	(Theaet	145e)		5)	Socrates	has	no	sophia	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2)		6)	(from	4,	5):.	Socrates	has	no	epistēmē			C)	(from	3,	6):.	⊥			 The	solutions	that	have	been	offered	to	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues	that	I	will	be	investigating	in	this	section	all	provide	various	well-reasoned	answers	to	the	salient	question	that	the	puzzles	raise;	these	answers	in	turn	imply	various	solutions	to	the	puzzles	in	the	way	explained	in	section	2.1.	When	applying	these	solutions	to	the	
Theaetetus	I	will	adapt,	where	relevant,	the	reasons	offered	for	accepting	them	to	fit	the	available	evidence	from	that	dialogue.	The	result	shall	be	that	the	reasons	offer	various	grounds	for	either	dismissing	one	of	the	premises	of	the	schema	above	or	for	thinking	that	the	premises	(any	of	1-6)	do	not	entail	a	contradiction	(C).	There	are	a	
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number	of	other	ways	one	might	approach	answering	the	question	raised	by	these	puzzles	and	hence	dissolving	the	contradictory	schema,	but	the	three	that	I	shall	consider	in	this	section	are	those	of	Norman	Gulley,	Terence	Irwin	and	Gregory	Vlastos.97	
	
2.3.1:	Gulley’s	Solution:		Norman	Gulley	famously	argued	for	the	view	that	Socrates’	disavowals	were	ironic	in	his	book	The	Philosophy	of	Socrates.	As	the	title	of	Gulley’s	book	suggests,	he	is	interested	in	the	philosophy	of	Socrates	and	not	specifically	in	the	character	of	Socrates	as	represented	by	Plato.98	Despite	this,	particularly	when	reconstructing	what	he	takes	to	be	Socrates’	philosophical	methodology,	Gulley	chooses	to	draw	on	evidence	from	Plato’s	early	works	and,	in	so	doing,	presents	an	intriguing	interpretation	of	the	disavowals	of	wisdom	in	those	texts.		Gulley’s	interpretation	of	Socrates’	disavowals	is	that	they	should	be	taken	to	be	insincere	viz.	“ironic”.99	Gulley’s	reason	for	thinking	this,	in	‘the	main’	is	that,	in	Plato’s	portrayal	of	him,	Socrates’	disavowals	are			‘hardly	consistent	with	the	way	in	which	Socrates	manages	his	arguments…the	control	and	direction	of	Socrates’	arguments	bear	all	the	marks	of	conscious	manipulation	towards	just	those	positive	doctrines	in	ethics	which	we	find	ascribed	to	Socrates	by	Aristotle’.100			Further,	Gulley	takes	it	that	because	Socrates’	arguments	move	with	‘consistency	to	fundamentally	the	same	conclusions’	(usually																																																									97	Two	other	such	options	are	1)	to	distinguish	cases	where	Socrates	claims	truly	to	lack	wisdom	from	those	where	he	claims	this	falsely	and	2)	to	claim	that	there	is	a	hint	of	irony	in	Socrates’	disavowals	that	leaves	the	door	open	to	an	authorial	suspicion	that	Socrates,	in	reality,	knew	more	than	he	tended	to	let	on.		98	Gulley,	Norman,	The	Philosophy	of	Socrates,	MacMillan,	1968,	p.vii		99	Ibid,	p.64	100	Ibid	
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conclusions	that	are	inconsistent	with	the	first	premise	of	the	argument)	on	multiple	occasions,	it	seems	‘implausible’	to	believe	that	Socrates’	could	have	no	prior	knowledge	of	the	conclusion	that	his	argument	will	reach.101	For	these	reasons,	Gulley	concludes	that	Socrates’	disclamations	of	wisdom	are	mere	irony.	In	answer	to	the	very	natural	question	that	this	interpretation	raises,	namely:	“why,	then,	should	Socrates	claim	to	lack	wisdom	in	the	first	place?”,	Gulley	argues	that	Socrates,	as	portrayed	by	Plato,	‘might	be	professing	ignorance	merely	as	an	expedient	to	encourage	his	interlocutor	to	seek	out	the	truth’	in	conversation	with	him.102		Gulley’s	interpretation’s	offers	an	attractive	solution	to	the	epistemic	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues.	Thomas	C.	Brickhouse	and	Nicholas	D.	Smith’s	analysis	of	Gulley’s	view	is	that	‘if	accepted,	[it]	would	neatly	resolve	the	paradox’,	for	it	would	do	away	with	the	need	to	find	a	coherent	construal	of	Socrates’	disavowal	in	light	of	the	passages	in	the	early	dialogues	where	one	has	reasons	to	attribute	knowledge	to	Socrates.103	Gulley’s	solution	to	the	puzzle	thus	answers	the	salient	question	involved	in	unravelling	the	puzzle	with	the	confident	response:	Socrates	does	possess	some	knowledge	in	the	early	dialogues,	because	he	knows	in	advance	the	conclusions	his	arguments	will	reach.	The	reasons	Gulley	adduces	for	this	position,	based	on	Socrates’	portrayal	in	the	early	dialogues,	are	quite	convincing.	Gulley’s	claim	that	Socrates’	arguments	move	towards	establishing	doctrines	we	find	ascribed	to	him	by	Aristotle	certainly	has	some	truth.	One	obvious	example	is	Socrates’	contention	in	the	
Protagoras	that	incontinence	is	impossible	(Pr	358c)	which	Aristotle	ascribes	to	Socrates	in	the	Nicomachean	Ethics	(NE	1145b	21-27).	This	might	be	taken	to	suggest	that	Plato	intended	to	portray	Socrates’	character	as	having	prior	knowledge	of	the	fact	that	the	conclusion	of	the	brief	sub-argument	he	produces	in	the	Protagoras	(Pr	358a-c),																																																									101	Ibid	102	Ibid,	p.69	103	Smith,	Nicholas	D.	and	Brickhouse,	Thomas	C.,	Plato’s	Socrates,	Oxford	University	Press,	1996,	p.32	
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would	be	that	incontinence	is	impossible.	For,	if	this	were	a	doctrine	that	Socrates	was	thought	to	have	held	(by	inference	from	Aristotle’s	testimony),	this	fact	could	quite	reasonably	support	reading	the	
Protagoras	as	a	text	wherein	Socrates	is	supposed	to	be	portrayed	as	knowing	that	his	argument	will	establish	this	claim.		Furthermore,	Socrates’	notoriously	destructive	method	of	argument,	the	elenchus,	does	move	toward	the	establishment	of	the	same	kinds	of	conclusions	in	a	variety	of	dialogues.	The	kind	of	conclusion	that	it	reaches,	for	the	most	part,	is	a	claim	that	is	the	negation	of,	or	at	least	inconsistent	with,	a	definition	of	an	ethical	predicate	offered	by	Socrates’	interlocutor.	In	the	Euthyphro,	for	instance,	Euthyphro	defines	piety	as	‘what	is	dear	to	the	Gods’	(Euthphr	7a)	and	is	lead	by	Socrates’	use	of	the	elenchus	to	the	conclusion	that	‘the	same	things	would	be	both	pious	and	impious,	according	to	this	argument’	(Euthphr	8a)	by	his	unreflective	acceptance	of	the	common	view	that	‘different	gods	consider	different	things	to	be	just,	beautiful,	ugly,	good	and	bad’	(Euthphr	7e).		Further	examples	of	arguments	from	the	early	dialogues	that	follow	this	pattern	can	be	seen	at	Euthphr	9d-10e,	Charm	159a-160b	and	Lchs	192b-193e,	to	name	but	a	few	examples.	This	evidence	again	seems	to	support	Gulley’s	view	that	Socrates	controls	the	arguments	in	a	way	that	suggests	some	prior	knowledge	of	the	conclusion	that	will	be	reached,	for	how	else	would	he	accomplish	refutations	of	his	interlocutor’s	views	with	such	consistency?		Further	to	these	last	points,	the	motivation	that	Gulley	provides	for	Socrates	to	dissemble	when	declaring	his	lack	of	wisdom	is	supported	by	a	passage	from	the	Euthyphro.	At	Euthphr	5a-b	Socrates’	desire	to	become	a	pupil	of	the	learned	priest	(because	of	his	ignorance	of	divine	matters),	appears	to	encourage	the	self-aggrandising	Euthyphro	to	answer	Socrates’	question:	“what	is	piety?”	(Euthphr	5d).	The	disavowal	therefore	could	be	taken	to	operate	as	the	kind	of	expedient	Gulley	suggests	it	does	in	this	passage.	
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	 All	of	what	has	been	said	so	far	therefore	offers	us	some	grounds	for	thinking	that	Gulley’s	solution	to	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues	is	credible	but	what	about	the	case	of	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom?	How	would	Gulley’s	solution	solve	that	puzzle;	what	reasons	does	one	have	for	thinking	the	solution	might	be	correct?		Applying	Gulley’s	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	solves	it	in	the	same	way	it	solves	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues.	As	we	previously	saw,	by	understanding	Socrates’	disavowals	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2)	to	be	dissimulated	one	can	answer	the	salient	question	that	the	puzzles	raise	with	the	response:	Socrates	does	not	mean	what	he	says:	he	does	have	knowledge.	Hence,	Gulley’s	interpretation	could	solve	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	by	offering	reasons	for	denying	premise	5	of	the	contradiction	by	providing	grounds	for	thinking	Socrates	is	being	disingenuous	when	he	makes	these	claims.	This	would	then	entail	that	premise	6	is	false	and	dissolve	the	contradiction	(C).	The	basis	upon	which	one	might	suppose	that	this	solution	is	the	correct	one	can	also	be	extracted	from	Gulley’s	account	of	the	early	dialogues	and	applied	to	the	text	of	the	Theaetetus	in	the	following	way.		The	Theaetetus	appears	to	contain	a	passage	that	one	might	read	as	an	admission,	on	Socrates’	part,	that	he	is	involved	in	directing	the	arguments	in	ways	that	would	not	be	possible	if	he	had	no	prior	knowledge	of	the	conclusion	that	would	be	reached	or	how	to	reach	it,	just	as	Gulley	suggests	there	is	evidence	for	in	the	early	dialogues.104	At	
Theaet	185e	Socrates	admits	the	following:			‘you	have	saved	me	a	vast	amount	of	talk	if	it	seems	to	you	that,	while	the	soul	considers	some	things	through	the	bodily	powers,	there	are	others	which	it	considers	alone	and	through	itself.	This	is	what	I	thought	myself	but	I	wanted	you	to	think	it	too’	(Theaet	185e).			This	admission	that	Socrates	would	have	been	willing	to	direct	the	argument	towards	the	establishment	of	a	particular	conclusion																																																									104	Gulley,	Norman,	The	Philosophy	of	Socrates,	MacMillan,	1968,	p.64	
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arguably	suggests	that	Socrates	knows	that	the	premises	of	at	least	one	argument	entail	that	specific	result.	This	might	be	thought	to	open	the	door	to	the	suspicion	that	Socrates	has	in	fact	been	using	knowledge	of	how	to	reach	other	conclusions	throughout	the	rest	of	the	dialogue	and	influenced	Theaetetus’	reasoning	so	as	to	have	him	reach	them.	This	in	turn	would	suggest,	as	Gulley	thinks	is	the	case	in	the	early	dialogues,	that	Socrates	should	be	attributed	with	some	prior	knowledge	of	the	conclusions	that	his	arguments	will	reach	contra	his	assertions	that	he	has	no	wisdom	or	knowledge	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2).		More	convincing	still	is	Gulley’s	claim	that	Socrates	is	motivated	to	dissemble	about	his	possession	of	wisdom	so	as	to	encourage	his	interlocutors	into	discussion	with	him.	And	indeed,	ascribing	this	motivation	to	Socrates’	character	in	the	Theaetetus	has	a	precedent	that	goes	back	to	antiquity;	the	Anonymous	Commentator	supposes	the	same	motivation	as	Gulley	does	is	behind	Socrates’	disavowals	in	the	
Theaetetus	(47.11-14).	What	is	more,	this	motivation	makes	good	sense	in	the	context	of	this	dialogue.	In	the	Theaetetus,	Socrates	begins	his	explanation	of	the	Maieutic	Method	(Theaet	149a-151d),	of	which	the	disavowals	of	wisdom	are	a	significant	part,	in	response	to	Theaetetus’	reticence	(Theaet	148d)	to	answer	his	question	about	what	knowledge	is	(Theaet	145e-146a).	It	is	only	after	being	reassured	that	Socrates	practices	the	technē	of	the	‘barren’	(Theaet	150c)	midwife	that	he	has	been	offered	sufficient	‘encouragement’	(Theaet	151d)	to	be	able	to	try	and	provide	an	account	of	‘what	knowledge	really	is’	(Theaet	146a).	Hence,	the	motivation	that	Gulley	ascribes	to	Socrates	for	falsely	claiming	to	lack	wisdom	fits	well	with	the	text	of	the	Theaetetus.	Interpreting	Theaet	185e	in	the	way	that	I	suggest	and	showing	that	the	motivation	Gulley	provides	for	Socrates	to	dissemble	about	his	lack	of	wisdom	fits	the	evidence	from	the	dialogue	provides	a	basis	for	thinking	that	Gulley’s	solution	can	provide	a	credible	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.	Let	us	now	assess	the	reasons	for	accepting	this	solution	against	the	other	available	evidence	from	the	Theaetetus.	
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If	one	starts	with	the	motivation	that	Gulley	argues	stands	behind	Socrates’	(false)	claim	to	lack	wisdom	it	does	not	take	much	to	see	that	it	makes	little	sense	as	a	motivation	for	pretending	to	be	ignorant.	This	is	especially	so	when	one	first	considers	the	context	in	which	Socrates	disavows	knowledge	in	the	early	dialogues.	Brickhouse	and	Smith	note	that	‘Socrates	repeatedly	professes	his	ignorance	to	his	jurors	in	the	Apology,	none	of	whom,	under	the	circumstances,	is	in	a	position	to	be	seduced	into	arguing	with	Socrates’.105	A	good	example	that	supports	this	assertion	comes	at	Apol	23b	when	Socrates	makes	his	famous	declaration	that	his	wisdom	consists	in	recognising	the	worthlessness	of	wisdom.	At	Apol	23b	Socrates	is	not	trying	to	encourage	anyone	to	talk	to	him	but	quite	clearly,	as	he	says	at	the	beginning	of	the	speech,	trying	to	‘show…what	has	caused	this	reputation	and	slander’	(Apol	20d).	Another	good	example	of	when	Socrates	asserts	his	lack	of	wisdom	at	a	point	at	which	it	would	make	no	sense	for	him	to	be	encouraging	an	interlocutor	to	join	the	conversation	is	noticed	by	Vlastos	during	a	passage	from	the	Gorgias	(Grg	509a).106	There	the	conversation	has	almost	ended	and	yet	Socrates	again	asserts	his	ignorance	(Grg	509a).	Lastly,	Hugh	H.	Benson	makes	the	astute	point	that	a	significant	number	of	the	early	dialogues	finish	with	Socrates	asserting	his	lack	of	knowledge.107	Next,	it	is	important	to	take	note	of	the	fact	that	Socrates’	disavowals	sometimes	occur	after	an	interlocutor	has	already	begun	a	discussion	with	him.108	This	indicates																																																									105	Smith,	Nicholas	D.	and	Brickhouse,	Thomas	C.,	Plato’s	Socrates,	Oxford	University	Press,	1996,	p.32	106	Vlastos,	Gregory,	“Socrates’	Disavowal	of	Knowledge”,	The	Philosophical	Quarterly	35:138,	pp.1-31,	1985,	pp.	4-5	107	Benson,	Hugh	H.,	Socratic	Wisdom,	Oxford	University	Press,	2000,	p.178.	More	accurately,	these	dialogues	end	with	Socrates	admitting	that	he	has	not	found	the	object	of	his	inquiry.	I	reject	Benson’s	claim	that	the	Apology	ends	with	a	profession	of	ignorance	because	there	Socrates	does	not	admit	to	having	failed	to	find	the	object	of	his	inquiry:	in	the	Apology	there	is	no	object	of	inquiry	and	Socrates	only	asserts	that	he	has	no	knowledge	of	the	afterlife	(Apol	42a).	108	See,	for	example,	the	Laches,	Socrates	there	admits	to	having	had	no	teacher	with	regards	to	the	subject	of	courage	(Lchs	186b-c)	some	time	after	Lysimachus	requests	Socrates	to	join	the	conversation	(Lchs	181c).			
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that,	in	these	instances,	the	interlocutors	hardly	need	more	encouragement	for	they	have	already	begun	to	speak	to	Socrates.	Lastly,	in	the	Lysis	Socrates’	claim	to	not	know	what	friendship	is	(Lys	212a)	does	not	motivate	Menexenus	to	join	the	conversation,	instead	Ctesippus	butts	in	and	tells	Socrates	that	Menexenus	wishes	to	answer	Socrates’	questions	(Lys	211e),	the	disavowal	appearing	slightly	after	this	in	the	text	(Lys	212a).		What	one	can	infer	from	these	observations	that	is	of	relevance	to	Socrates’	disavowals	in	the	Theaetetus	is	that	the	motivation	Gulley	supposes	is	behind	Socrates’	disavowals	cannot	be	ascribed	to	him	in	
general.	If	such	a	motivation	cannot	be	attributed	to	Socrates	consistently	throughout	the	Platonic	corpus	then	this	forces	one	to	accept	the	conclusion	that	this	motivation	can	only	inform	a	false	claim	to	lack	wisdom	in	certain	instances.	This	then	further	entails	that	Socrates	sometimes	claims	truly,	and	on	other	occasions,	falsely,	to	lack	wisdom	or	knowledge.	However,	it	is	highly	implausible	to	claim	that	Socrates	may	have	been	genuinely	lacking	in	wisdom	in	the	Apology	23b	where,	as	we	just	saw,	he	cannot	have	the	motivation	Gulley	suggests	attributed	to	him,	and	yet	lying	about	this	in	the	Theaetetus	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2).	Supposing	this	would	reduce	Socrates’	
dramatis	persona	to	absurdity,	especially	given	the	chronology	of	the	events	depicted	in	the	dialogues.	How	could	Socrates	have	lost	all	of	his	knowledge	and	wisdom	from	the	time	it	takes	him	to	leave	Theaetetus,	speak	to	Euthyphro	(in	the	events	depicted	in	that	eponymous	dialogue),	hear	his	indictment	and	then	proceed	to	his	trial,	portrayed	as	happening	shortly	thereafter	in	the	Apology?	Surely	this	makes	little	sense.	Even	if	it	is	prima	facie	plausible	to	read	Socrates’	disavowals	in	the	Theaetetus	as	motivated	by	wanting	to	encourage	the	young	protégé	to	speak	with	him,	the	fact	that	this	motivation	cannot	be	ascribed	to	Socrates’	character	generally	casts	a	shadow	of	doubt	over	the	ascription	of	this	motivation	to	Socrates	in	the	Theaetetus.	There	may	of	course	be	other	reasons	for	Socrates	to	lie	about	his	lack	of	wisdom	in	
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the	Theaetetus	but	whatever	these	might	be,	Gulley	does	not	suggest	them,	nor	is	any	motivation	particularly	apparent	from	the	text	itself.		This	point	establishes	that	we	have	a	reason	to	doubt	the	idea	that	Socrates	speaks	falsely	when	he	disclaims	wisdom.	Without	being	able	to	provide	a	generalisable	answer	to	the	question:	“why	should	Socrates	lie	about	lacking	wisdom?”,	we	have	grounds	to	be	immediately	suspicious	of	Gulley’s	interpretation	of	the	disavowal.	Lacking	a	motivation	for	Socrates	to	lie	in	these	instances	makes	the	view	that	he	is	dissembling	rather	implausible.	For,	Gulley’s	interpretation	in	this	instance	would	amount	to	the	suggestion	that	we	should	take	a	character	to	be	lying	without	any	consistent	rationale	for	doing	so.	One	need	only	notice	that	Plato’s	Socrates	is	manifestly	obsessed	with	the	pursuit	of	truth	to	see	how	implausible	such	a	view	would	be	when	no	motivation	can	be	attributed	to	Socrates	to	lie	in	disclaiming	wisdom.109	What	is	more,	there	are	also	a	number	of	considerations	that	stand	in	the	way	of	accepting	Gulley’s	grounds	for	thinking	Socrates	falsely	claims	to	lack	wisdom.		The	first	of	these	is	the	authority	of	historical	authors	who	endorse	a	reading	of	Socrates’	disavowals	as	sincere.	Especially	the	evidence	of	Aristotle	in	this	regard	must	be	given	significant	weight	(as	the	literature	on	the	subject	is	right	to	do),	for	he	was	a	near	contemporary	of	the	historical	Socrates	and	an	associate	of	Plato.110	The	relevant	passage	comes	in	De	Sophisticis	Elenchis	where	Aristotle	claims	that	‘Socrates	used	to	ask	questions	but	never	answered	them,	
																																																								109	At	least	two	pieces	of	evidence	from	the	Theaetetus	support	this	view.	Firstly	recall	that	the	function	of	Socrates’	whole	methodological	procedure	in	the	text	is	to	distinguish	the	true	and	false	beliefs	of	his	interlocutors	(Theaet	150c).	Another	such	piece	of	evidence	occurs	in	the	digression	where	the	philosophical	life	is	distinguished	from	the	life	of	the	lawyer	by	the	philosopher’s	constant	inquiries	into	the	most	fundamental	nature	of	the	universe	(Theaet	173e).		110	Irwin,	Terence,	Plato’s	Moral	Theory,	Oxford	Clarendon,	1977	p.40;	Brickhouse	and	Smith,	Plato’s	Socrates,	p.31	fn	3;	Vlastos,	Gregory,	“Socrates’	Disavowal	of	Knowledge”,	p.3	
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because	he	confessed	ignorance’	(Sop	El	183b6-8).111	This	much	seems	to	make	it	clear	that	Aristotle	took	Socrates’	disavowal	(whether	from	Plato’s	explanation	of	the	texts	or	perhaps	from	first	hand	accounts	of	Socrates	that	corroborate	Plato’s	portrayal	of	him)	to	be	genuine.	Vlastos	notes	that	additionally	a	fragment	of	Aeschines	Socraticus’	
Alcibiades	(fr	10C)	further	supports	this	position.112		 The	second	of	the	reasons	to	reject	Gulley’s	view	when	applied	to	the	Theaetetus	is	that	despite	the	fact	that	Socrates	seems	to	admit	he	would	be	willing	to	direct	the	argument	towards	the	establishment	of	predetermined	conclusions	at	Theaet	185e,	this	does	not	support	the	idea	that	Socrates	has	prior	knowledge	of	the	conclusions	he	and	Theaetetus	will	reach.	This	is	because	Socrates’	claim	at	Theaet	185e	is	that	he	wanted	Theaetetus	to	endorse	a	particular	conclusion	and,	further,	that	he	would	be	willing	to	ask	the	questions	in	such	a	way	that	would	end	up	with	Theaetetus	doing	just	that.	However,	Socrates	here	indicates	that	this	will	not	be	necessary	in	Theaetetus’	case	(Theaet	185e).	Furthermore,	although,	as	I	earlier	said,	this	willingness	might	be	thought	to	open	the	door	to	the	suspicion	that	Socrates	might	be	doing	this	in	the	rest	of	arguments	in	the	Theaetetus,	it	can	only	open	to	door	to	that,	a	suspicion,	and	one	that	it	is	not	corroborated	by	any	further	claims	Socrates	makes	in	the	dialogue.	This	gives	us	good	reason	to	regard	Gulley’s	reasons	for	thinking	that	Socrates	is	lying	about	his	possession	of	wisdom	with	suspicion	when	adapted	to	the	evidence	available	in	the	Theaetetus.			 Bearing	in	mind	the	foregoing	considerations,	I	do	not	think	that	one	should	endorse	any	aspect	of	Gulley’s	interpretation	of	Socrates’	disavowal	of	wisdom	as	a	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.			
	
																																																									111	For	a	judicious	defense	of	the	translation	of	‘confessed’	as	bearing	the	sense	of	“sincerely	maintained”	as	opposed	to	“feigned”	see	Vlastos,	Gregory,	“Socrates’	Disavowal	of	Knowledge”,	p.3	fn.	7	112	Vlastos,	Gregory,	“Socrates’	Disavowal	of	Knowledge”,	p.3	
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2.3.2:	Irwin’s	Solution:		Irwin’s	solution	to	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues	in	Plato’s	Moral	
Theory	consists	in	the	claim	that	Socrates’	‘repeated	disclaimers	of	knowledge	are	too	frequent	and	emphatic	to	be	dismissed	as	ironical’.113	One	of	Irwin’s	reasons	that	support	his	concluding	this	is	Aristotle’s	testimony	from	De	Sophisticis	Elenchis	(Sop	El	183b6-8)	that	we	looked	at	when	offering	grounds	for	rejecting	Gulley’s	solution.114	Irwin	also	suggests	that	because	‘Socrates	observes	strict	conditions	for	knowledge’,	he	can	only	credit	himself	with	convictions	or	strongly	held	beliefs,	but	not	knowledge.115	Irwin	argues	that	for	Socrates,	someone	only	counts	as	having	knowledge	of	some	predicate	F	if	they	can	satisfactorily	answer	one	of	Socrates’	“what	is	F?”	questions	(on	the	basis	of	Euthphr	5c-d,	Lchs	190c	and	Hps	Maj	286c).116	Hence,	concludes	Irwin,	‘it	is	not	surprising	that	he	[Socrates]	claims	no	knowledge	for	himself’,	for	he	is	evidently	unable	to	answer	any	of	these	questions	to	his	own	satisfaction.117	Furthermore,	the	idea	that	Socrates	does	nonetheless	allow	himself	a	number	of	strongly	held	beliefs	is	supported	by	Grg	509a,	Irwin	supposes,	where	the	thesis	that	it	is	better	to	suffer	injustice	than	perpetrate	it	is	said	to	be	able	to	survive	the	elenchus.118	Irwin	claims	that	because	the	elenchus	shows	that	this	belief	of	Socrates’	conflicts	with	more	basic	beliefs	that	his	interlocutors	hold,	Socrates	has	some	reasons	for	believing	it.119	Irwin’s	solution	to	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues	therefore	dissolves	the	puzzle	over	the	sincerity	of	Socrates’	disclaimers	in	a	way	that	is	as	satisfyingly	simplistic	as	Gulley’s.	It	unravels	the	contradiction	by	providing	the	contrary	answer	to	that	which	Gulley	was	seen	to	offer	to	the	salient	question:	Socrates	has	no	knowledge	or	wisdom,	only																																																									113	Irwin,	Terence,	Plato’s	Moral	Theory,	Oxford	Clarendon,	1977	p.39	114	Ibid,	p.40	115	Ibid	116	Ibid	117	Ibid	118	Ibid	119	Ibid	
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conviction	or	strongly	held	belief.	Let	us	see	whether	the	grounds	Irwin’s	offers	for	accepting	his	solution	are	credible.		As	we	have	already	seen	when	discussing	Gulley’s	solution,	there	are	good	reasons	for	accepting	Aristotle’s	testimony	on	the	issue	of	how	to	interpret	Socrates’	disavowals	of	wisdom.	An	appeal	to	Aristotle’s	authority	on	the	issue	provides	a	reasonable	basis	for	Irwin’s	principal	interpretive	claim	that	the	disavowals	should	be	understood	as	sincere.		That	Socrates	observes	demanding	standards	for	knowledge	also	seems	correct	on	the	basis	of	the	passages	Irwin	adduces	as	evidence	for	this	claim.	That	Socrates	is	unable	to	meet	the	high	standards	Irwin	argues	he	adheres	to	also	seems	right	on	the	basis	of	the	passages	that	Irwin	offers.	For	instance	in	the	passage	from	the	Euthyphro	that	Irwin	cites	Socrates	implicitly	assumes	that	if	Euthyphro	has	the	knowledge	he	lays	claim	to	(Euthphr	5c)	(of	the	pious	and	impious)	he	will	be	able	to	answer	Socrates	question:	‘what	are	the	pious	and	impious?’	(Euthphr	5d).	This	is	certainly	an	extremely	difficult	question	to	answer	and	if	answering	it	is	the	only	sufficient	demonstration	of	our	knowledge	of	piety	and	impiety	as	the	passage	suggests,	we	might	infer	from	Socrates’	evident	inability	to	answer	the	question	(Euthphr	5c),	that	he	is	right	to	claim	he	has	no	knowledge	of	piety	and	impiety	(Euthphr	16a).	Further	to	this	Irwin’s	suggestion	that	Grg	508e-509a	could	be	taken	to	give	us	reason	to	suppose	that	Socrates	takes	himself	only	to	have	true	beliefs	also	seems	quite	reasonable.	For,	in	the	latter	half	of	that	passage	(Grg	509a)	Socrates	explicitly	claims	not	to	have	knowledge	of	the	claim	that	it	is	better	to	suffer	than	to	perpetrate	injustice	(first	maintained	at	Grg	469c).	This	does	provide	a	good	reason	for	thinking	that	whatever	cognitive	state	Socrates	is	in	with	regard	to	the	claim	that	it	is	better	to	suffer	than	to	perpetrate	injustice	(Grg	469c)	we	should	not	call	it	“knowledge”.	The	next	most	reasonable	candidate	for	the	epistemic	condition	that	Socrates	might	be	in	with	regard	to	this	proposition,	it	could	be	argued,	in	line	with	Irwin’s	claim,	is	a	strongly	held	belief.	One	might	suppose	this	on	a	variety	of	grounds,	
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for	example,	the	fact	that	in	that	passage	Socrates	claims	to	have	‘held	down	and	bound	by	arguments	of	iron	and	adamant’	(Grg	508e),	which	sounds	as	though	Socrates	takes	himself	to	have	very	convincing	reasons	to	think	the	claim	is	true.	Another	such	piece	of	evidence	that	lends	weight	to	the	view	is	the	number	of	times	Socrates	reiterates	the	claim	(Grg	470c,	473a,	479e)	suggesting,	as	Chaerephon’s	rather	pointed	comment	seems	to	practically	confirm,	that	Socrates	is	‘in	dead	earnest	about	this’	(Grg	481b).		Having	seen	that	Irwin’s	account	is	plausible,	let	us	now	apply	it	to	the	Theaetetus	and	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	and	see	what	reasons	we	have	to	accept	that	it	may	offer	the	best	solution	to	that	puzzle.		Irwin’s	solution	solves	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	by	answering	the	question	that	it	raises	with	the	response:	“Socrates	does	mean	what	he	says”;	he	does	not	have	knowledge.	It	does	so	because	Irwin’s	solution	provides	good	reasons	to	not	conclude	premise	3	from	premises	1	and	2.	This	reason	is	that	premise	3	would	flatly	contradict	Socrates’	assertions	that	he	lacks	wisdom	or	knowledge	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2)	(which	Irwin	argues,	for	the	reasons	just	looked	at)	must	be	accepted	as	genuine.	However,	granted	premises	1	and	2,	3	must	follow	of	necessity.	Is	there	any	way	that	one	might	understand	it	to	be	possible	that	Socrates	could	possess	the	technē	of	midwifery	(premise	2)	whilst	lacking	epistēmē	(contra	premise	1)?	Perhaps.	If	Socrates	really	only	admits	to	possessing	true	beliefs	then	this	might	be	taken	to	imply	that	rather	than	the	practice	of	his	technē	of	midwifery	being	guided	by	the	possession	of	epistēmē,	in	the	case	of	Socrates’	(on	this	view,	rather	exceptional)	technē	it	might	be	guided	by	nothing	but	a	set	of	true	beliefs.	Are	there	any	grounds	for	accepting	such	an	unusual	interpretation?	One	thought	occurs.	As	we	know	from	Plato	himself,	from	his	famous	comments	about	the	road	to	Larissa	(Meno	97a-d),	‘as	long	as	he	[anyone]	has	the	right	opinion…he	will	not	be	a	worse	guide	than	the	
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one	who	knows’	(Meno	97b).120	Allowing	this	claim	to	be	true	would	entail	that	Socrates	could	still	practice	the	art	of	midwifery	(in	line	with	premise	2)	but	that	he	would	do	so	in	such	a	way	that	he	lacks	the	
epistēmē	required	for	him	to	do	so	(contra	premise	1).	In	this	way,	like	the	convinced	but	ignorant	traveller	to	Larissa,	Socrates	might	be	a	sincerely	barren	midwife	of	the	intellect	who	possesses	something	that	has	the	practical	value	of	the	epistēmē	involved	in	practicing	his	technē	(viz.	true	belief)	without	actually	possessing	any	knowledge.	The	only	argument	that	I	can	think	of	that	might	lend	weight	to	this	position	when	applied	to	the	Theaetetus	is	that	it	has	a	great	amount	of	explanatory	value.	If	one	supposed	that	Socrates	practiced	his	technē	of	midwifery	by	being	guided	by	true	beliefs	and	not	knowledge	this	could	explain	nicely	how	Socrates	is	able	to	practice	the	art	and	yet	still	lack	knowledge	or	wisdom	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2).		What	of	Irwin’s	contention	that	one	should	take	Socrates’	disavowals	to	be	expressed	in	earnest	and	of	his	reasons	for	thinking	so	when	they	are	adapted	to	the	evidence	from	the	Theaetetus?	I	am	inclined	to	agree	with	Irwin	that	Socrates’	standards	for	knowledge	are	extremely	demanding	and	that	this	is	especially	the	case	in	the	
Theaetetus,	where	one	can	adduce	textual	evidence	that	supports	such	a	reading.	In	the	Theaetetus	Socrates	enumerates	two	conditions	for	what	counts	as	knowledge	(Theaet	152c).	Although	these	differ	from	the	condition	that	Irwin	identifies	from	the	early	dialogues	as	implying	a	difficult	standard	for	knowledge,	what	these	different	standards	give	us	reason	to	conclude	about	Socrates’	criteria	for	knowledge	is	the	same:	they	are	extremely	hard	to	fulfil.	What	‘befits	knowledge’	(Theaet	152c)	Socrates	claims,	is	for	it	to	be	‘of	what	is’	(Theaet	152c)	and	‘unerring’	(Theaet	152c).	The	latter	of	these	conditions	particularly	indicates	a	standard	for	knowledge	that	is	very	challenging	to	meet.	Hence,	Irwin’s	point	that	we	should	not	be	surprised	to	find	that	Socrates	disclaims	wisdom	or	knowledge,	given	the	criteria	he	thinks	must	be	fulfilled	for																																																									120	All	quotations	from	the	Meno	are	taken	from	the	translation	of	G.M.A	Grube	in	Plato:	The	Complete	Works,	Hackett,	1997,	pp.870-898	
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something	to	count	as	an	instance	of	such	a	cognitive	state,	receives	strong	textual	support	in	the	Theaetetus.	Let	us	now	assess	whether	Irwin’s	interpretation	should	be	accepted.	Firstly,	I	am	willing	to	endorse	the	claim,	along	with	Irwin,	that	Socrates’	disavowals	of	wisdom	as	entirely	truthful	and	I	do	so	for	some	of	the	same	reasons	he	does	when	these	are	adapted	to	the	evidence	available	from	the	Theaetetus.	It	seems	reasonable	to	suppose	that	Socrates	cannot	fulfil	the	fantastically	demanding	criteria	he	thinks	a	claim	must	fulfil	for	it	to	count	as	knowledge	(Theaet	152c)	and	Aristotle’s	testimony	on	the	issue	(Sop	El	183b6-8)	of	how	to	interpret	Socrates’	disavowal	corroborates	the	conclusion	that	we	should	take	the	disavowals	to	be	sincere.	Adding	to	this	the	fact	that	denying	that	the	disavowals	are	genuine	leads	to	a	serious	problem	regarding	how	to	understand	what	motivation	to	ascribe	to	Socrates	to	lie	when	he	claims	to	lack	wisdom	or	knowledge	and	one	has	yet	another	reason	to	accept	this	aspect	of	Irwin’s	view.	Accepting	the	disavowals	at	face	value	poses	no	such	interpretive	issue,	for,	if	Socrates	speaks	truthfully	in	claiming	to	lack	wisdom;	we	need	not	find	some	latent	motivation	for	him	to	lie	when	doing	so.	Given	these	points,	I	endorse	Irwin’s	reading	of	the	disavowal	of	wisdom,	and	some	of	his	reasons	for	doing	so.		The	same	cannot	be	said	when	applying	Irwin’s	claim	that	Socrates	only	admits	to	strongly	held	conviction	to	the	Theaetetus.	Despite	the	explanatory	value	of	Irwin’s	interpretative	solution	an	obvious	objection	stands	in	the	way	of	accepting	it.	This	is	that	there	is	simply	no	textual	evidence	to	support	the	claim	that	the	possession	of	a	set	of	true	beliefs	is	sufficient	for	practicing	the	technē	of	midwifery.	Indeed,	in	section	1.1	I	pointed	out	that	the	opposite	appears	to	be	the	case.	There,	I	argued,	Socrates	claims	that	all	technai	are	apparently	comprised	of	knowledge,	something	that	seems	to	entail	that	his	practice	cannot	be	guided	by	mere	conviction	(unless	Socrates’	midwifery	can	be	shown,	with	good	reason,	to	be	exceptional	in	this	respect).	The	lack	of	evidence	and	the	conclusions	of	section	1.1	therefore	offer	good	grounds	for	dismissing	the	idea	that	Socrates	
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practices	midwifery	on	the	basis	of	a	set	of	true	beliefs	and	thus,	for	thinking	that	Irwin’s	view	in	its	entirety	offers	the	correct	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.	This	is	because,	although	we	have	seen	that	Irwin	offers	a	convincing	rationale	to	take	Socrates’	disavowals	to	be	genuine,	this	simply	leaves	one	in	the	position	of	needing	to	account	for	how	this	is	possible	in	the	face	of	Socrates’	claims	that	we	have	reasons	to	think	imply	that	he	has	knowledge	(Theaet	149a4,	a7,	150b6,	c1,	151a,	c).	With	the	foregoing	views	examined	I	shall	now	turn	my	attention	to	assessment	of	Vlastos’	solution	to	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues	and	evaluate	whether	it	can	offer	a	plausible	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.	
	
2.3.3:	Vlastos’	Solution:	
	As	I	have	already	pointed	out,	Vlastos	argues	that	to	dissolve	the	puzzle	of	Socrates’	disavowals	in	the	early	dialogues	‘we	need	only	suppose	that	he	is	making	a	dual	use	of	his	words	for	knowing’.121	The	two	senses	in	which	Vlastos	supposes	Socrates	to	have	used	the	verb	“to	know”,	he	calls	‘knowledge-e’	and	‘knowledge-c’.122	These	senses	of	the	term	“knowledge”	Vlastos	characterised	as	follows.		Vlastos’	argument	for	supposing	that	Socrates	uses	the	word	“knowledge”	in	his	sense	of	“knowledge-e”	(viz.	elenctic	knowledge)	is	that	‘whatever	Socrates	might	be	willing	to	say	he	knows…would	have	to	be	knowledge	reached	and	tested	through	his	own	personal	method	of	inquiry,	the	elenchus’,	and	hence	that,	‘the	content	of	that	knowledge	must	be	propositions	he	thinks	elenctically	justifiable’.123	What	Vlastos	means	by	saying	that	the	propositions	Socrates	takes	himself	to	know	must	be	‘elenctically	justifiable’	is	that	Socrates	must	have	discovered	a	proposition,	“p”	such	that	p	‘can	be	maintained	in	elenctic	argument,																																																									121	Vlastos,	Gregory,	“Socrates’	Disavowal	of	Knowledge”,	p.12	122	Ibid,	p.18	123	Ibid	
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while	its	denial	cannot’.124	Thus	knowledge-e	is	“knowledge”	of	a	proposition,	p,	which	one	has	at	least	once	been	able	to	maintain	in	argument	without	one’s	interlocutor’s	arguments	demonstrating	that	one	is	committed	to	beliefs	that	entail	not-p.	The	textual	evidence	that	Vlastos	levies	in	support	of	attributing	this	conception	of	knowledge	to	Socrates	is	taken	from	the	Charmides.125		At	the	point	in	the	Charmides	where	Vlastos	supposes	Socrates	uses	the	word	“knowledge”	in	the	sense	of	knowledge-e,	Socrates	is	arguing	with	Critias	over	whether	temperance	is	‘to	know	oneself’	(Charm	165b).	In	response	to	Critias’	claim	that	Socrates	is	‘trying	to	refute	me	and	ignoring	the	real	question	at	issue’	(Charm	166c)	Socrates	addresses	Critias	by	saying:		‘how	could	you	possibly	think	that	even	if	I	were	to	refute	everything	you	say,	I	would	be	doing	it	for	any	other	reasons	than	the	one	I	would	give	for	a	thorough	investigation	of	my	own	statements	–	the	fear	of	unconsciously	thinking	I	know	when	I	do	not’	(Charm	166c-d)		Vlastos	comments	that	Socrates’s	use	of	“to	know”	in	this	piece	of	text	from	the	Charmides	must	be	‘referring	directly	to	what	he	[Socrates]	seeks	to	achieve	by	elenctic	inquiry	[viz.	knowledge-e],	the	fear	he	is	voicing	is	that	he	might	think	true	theses	which	have	fared	well	in	past	elenctic	inquiry	but	are	in	fact	false’.126	Vlastos’	idea	here,	I	take	it,	is	that	Socrates	is	claiming	that	refutation	of	Critias	would	be	sufficient	to	establish	that	Critias	does	not	“know”	(know-e)	the	claim	that	temperance	is	knowledge	of	oneself	(Charm	165b).	And	indeed,	this	does	appear	to	be	what	Socrates	is	claiming,	i.e.	that	if	Socrates	were	to	refute	Critias	it	would	demonstrate	that	Critias	did	not	‘know’	(Charm	166d)	the	proposition	that	temperance	is	self	knowledge	(call	this	p),	when	he	thought	he	did.	That	is,	in	refuting	Critias,	Socrates	would																																																									124	Ibid	125	Ibid,	p.19	126	Ibid	
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show	that	Critias	couldn’t	maintain	p	because	his	other	beliefs	entail	not-p,	which	would	be	sufficient	to	demonstrate	that	Critias	does	not	possess	knowledge-e	of	p.		The	other	sense	in	which	Vlastos	claims	Socrates	uses	the	word	“knowledge”	and	which	he	thinks	Socrates	denies	ever	having	possessed	Vlastos	calls	‘knowledge-c’.127	To	argue	that	this	sense	of	the	term	“knowledge”	is	one	that	Socrates	operates	with	when	he	claims	not	to	know	something,	Vlastos	traces	a	long	line	of	epistemological	thought	from	some	of	the	earliest	Presocratics	right	through	Plato’s	works	and	on	into	the	texts	of	Aristotle.	This	exegesis	therefore	establishes	that	the	majority	of	ancient	Greek	philosophers	share	an	understanding	of	the	sense	of	the	term	“knowledge”	that	is	the	same	as	the	sense	of	Vlastos’	knowledge-c.128	The	result	is	that	it	is	plausible,	on	these	grounds,	to	suppose	that	Socrates	would	have	shared	this	same	understanding	of	the	sense	of	the	term	“knowledge”.	This	sense	of	the	term	“knowledge”	is	knowledge	of	a	proposition,	p,	which	possesses	the	‘hallmark’	of	‘infallible	certainty’.129		Even	as	early	as	Parmenides,	Vlastos	notes,	the	notion	of	knowledge	as	being	supported	by	an	‘unshaken	heart	of	well-rounded	truth’	(DK	29	B1)	was	in	use.130	131	‘Unshaken’,	Vlastos	claims,	in	the	sense	that	it	is	‘indisturbable	by	objections’	and	‘well	rounded’	in	the	sense	of	being	‘systematically	compete’.132	That	is,	altogether,	infallible.	The	requirement	that	knowledge,	properly	understood,	is	required	to	be	infallible	also	appears	in	a	number	of	Plato’s	dialogues.	It	is	insisted	upon,	in	language	very	reminiscent	of	Parmenides,	in	the	Timaeus,	for	example,	where	knowledge	is	claimed	to	be	‘unmoved	by	persuasion’	
																																																								127	Vlastos	calls	this	knowledge	‘knowledge-c’	on	p.18	and	claims	that	Socrates	disavows	possession	of	it	on	p.22	128	Vlastos,	Gregory,	“Socrates’	Disavowal	of	Knowledge”,	pp.	14-18	129	Ibid,	p.18	130	Ibid,	p.17	131	I	here	quote	Vlastos’	own	translation	of	Parmenides,	p.17	132	Vlastos,	Gregory,	“Socrates’	Disavowal	of	Knowledge”,	p.17	
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(Tim	51e).133	More	explicitly	the	requirement	that	knowledge	should	be	infallible	also	occurs	in	the	Republic	(Rep	477d)	and,	as	we	previously	saw,	the	Theaetetus	(Theaet	152c).	Aristotle	goes	on	to	continue	to	assume	the	veracity	of	this	requirement	saying	very	generally	in	the	
Nicomachean	Ethics	that	‘we	all	believe	that	what	we	know	could	not	be	otherwise’	(NE	1139B19-21).	Besides	these	examples,	Vlastos	indicates	a	number	of	other	thinkers	who	also	endorse	this	especially	difficult	criterion	of	knowledge.134	This	evidence,	Vlastos	must	think,	although	he	does	not	explicitly	say	this,	is	sufficient	to	show	that	Socrates	understood	(at	least	one)	sense	of	the	term	“knowledge”	to	be	the	same	as	knowledge-c.		So,	Vlastos	thusly	builds	his	case	for	the	idea	that	Socrates	operates	with	two	distinct	notions	of	knowledge	in	Plato’s	texts.	But	
how	and	when	exactly	does	Vlastos	think	Socrates	uses	these	distinct	senses	of	the	term	“knowledge”?	Vlastos	claims	that:		‘when	he	[Socrates]	says	he	knows	something	he	is	referring	to	knowledge-e;	when	he	says	he	knows	nothing	–	absolutely	nothing…he	refers	to	knowledge-c;	when	he	says	he	has	no	knowledge	of	a	particular	topic	he	may	mean	either	that…he	has	no	knowledge-c…or	that	what	he	lacks	on	that	topic	is	knowledge-e’.135		Consequently,	in	Vlastos’	view,	both	Socrates’	disavowals	and	his	claims	to	know	various	things	will	always	turn	out	to	be	completely	sincere	because	the	sense	of	the	term	“knowledge”	utilised	by	Socrates	in	any	particular	instance	will	depend	upon	the	dialectical	context.136	Vlastos’	rationale	for	accepting	the	truth	of	this	hypothesis	is	that	it	has	unparalleled	explanatory	power	when	applied	in	this	way	to	Socrates’																																																									133	All	quotations	from	the	Timaeus	are	taken	from	the	translation	of	Donald	J.	Zeyl	in	Plato:	The	Complete	Works,	Hackett,	1997,	pp.1224-1292	134	Vlastos,	Gregory,	“Socrates’	Disavowal	of	Knowledge”	pp.14-18	135	Ibid	p.20	136	Ibid	
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comments	in	various	dialogues.137	For	example,	Vlastos	claims	that	it	can	make	sense	of	a	troublesome	passage	from	the	Gorgias	(Grg	508e-509a).138	The	hypothesis	can	explain	why	Socrates	is	portrayed	as	reiterating	his	claim	to	have	‘proved’	(Grg	479e)	the	proposition	that	it	is	better	to	suffer	than	perpetrate	injustice	(Grg	508e),	by	saying	that	he	has	tied	it	down	with	‘arguments	of	iron	and	adamant’	(Grg	508e)	before	claiming,	straight	away	afterwards,	that	‘yet…I	don’t	know	how	these	things	are’	(Grg	509a).	The	perplexity	over	Socrates’	claim	to	have	proven	(and	thus	know,	Vlastos	claims)	the	truth	of	the	proposition	he	is	defending,	and	yet	to	‘not	know	how	these	things	are’	(Grg	509a)	‘does	not	arise’	on	Vlastos’	hypothesis,	he	suggests.139	This	is	because,	by	disambiguating	the	terms	in	the	way	Vlastos	indicates,	one	can	see	Socrates’	assertion	that	he	does	not	know	how	these	things	are	(Grg	509a)	as	the	claim	that	he	does	not	know-c	how	these	things	are.140	Socrates	can	therefore	avoid	dissembling	about	his	reiteration	of	the	claim	to	have	proven	the	disputed	proposition	(Grg	508e)	by	implying	that	he	has	knowledge-e	of	it,	for	this	does	not	prove	that	he	knows-c	how	anything	is	(Grg	509a).	Hence,	through	a	project	of	disambiguation	of	Socrates’	use	of	the	term	“knowledge”	on	the	hypothesis	Vlastos	recommends,	one	can	achieve	a	reconciliation	between	the	passages	that	give	one	equally	compelling	reasons	to	maintain	or	deny	that	Socrates	has	knowledge	in	the	early	dialogues.141	Vlastos’	solution	to	the	puzzle	from	the	early	dialogues	hence	offers	an	answer	to	the	salient	question	that	the	puzzle	raises	with	the	response:	“it	depends	upon	the	context	of	the	claim”.	By	providing	reasons	to	think	that	when	Socrates	claims	to	know	something,	he	claims	to	know	it	in	a	different	sense	(knowledge-e)	to	when	he	claims	that	he	knows	nothing	(knowledge-c)	Socrates	turns	out	to	always	speak	truthfully	when	he	claims	to	know	things	and	when																																																									137	Ibid,	pp.20-23	138	Ibid,	p.21	139	Ibid	140	Ibid	141	Ibid,	p.22	
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he	claims	to	know	nothing	in	the	early	dialogues.	Hence,	Vlastos’	solution	is	that	the	types	of	claims	that	Socrates	makes	that	we	saw	we	had	reasons	to	think	imply	contradictory	conclusions	(that	formed	the	puzzle	of	the	early	dialogues)	simply	do	not	imply	these	contradictory	
conclusions.		To	fully	assess	the	explanatory	value	of	Vlastos’	hypothesis	would	take	far	too	much	space.	What	I	would	like	to	indicate	instead,	therefore,	is	that	the	perplexing	passage	from	the	Gorgias	(Grg	508e-509a)	that	Vlastos	argues	can	be	explained	best	on	his	interpretation	does	seem	to	support	his	view	that	the	notion	of	knowledge-e	is	all	that	Socrates	means	to	claim	for	himself	when	he	claims	to	have	‘bound’	(Grg	508e)	the	argument.	After	disclaiming	his	knowledge	of	‘how	these	things	are’	(Grg	509a),	Socrates	goes	on	to	claim	that	‘no	one	I’ve	ever	met,	as	in	this	case,	can	say	anything	else	[than	the	disputed	proposition]	without	being	ridiculous’	(Grg	509a).	This	sounds	rather	like	Socrates	is	claiming	that	throughout	all	of	his	elenctic	encounters,	whenever	the	disputed	thesis	comes	up,	no	one	has	been	able	to	refute	(show	that	other	epistemic	commitments	Socrates	has	entail	the	negation	of)	Socrates’	assertion	of	it,	which	is	just	the	notion	of	“knowledge”	(knowledge-e)	that	Vlastos	argues	Socrates	claims	for	himself	in	this	scenario.142	That	is,	knowledge-e.	Furthermore,	as	I	have	already	said,	and	given	some	reasons	for	thinking,	Socrates’s	disavowal	should	be	taken	to	be	true	and	one	of	the	reasons	that	we	should	think	so	is	because	he	clearly	observes	demanding	standards	for	what	counts	as	knowledge.	Hence,	I	am	happy	to	endorse	Vlastos’	view	that	when	Socrates	disavows	wisdom	or	knowledge	he	disavows	ever	being	in	a	cognitive	state	that	possesses	the	hallmark	of	infallibility.	If	we	now	apply	Vlastos’	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom,	we	can	see	that	the	way	it	would	achieve	a	solution	to	that	puzzle	would	not	be	by	denying	the	truth	of	any	of	the	premises	that	form	it.	Instead,	Vlastos’	solution	maintains	that	the	epistēmē	that																																																									142	Ibid,	p.21	
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Socrates	possesses	(premise	3)	is	knowledge-e	and	that	the	epistēmē	Socrates	lacks	(premise	6)	is	knowledge-c.	That	is,	Vlastos’	solution	would	be	to	deny	that	there	is	any	contradiction	generated	by	premises	3	and	6	when	we	disambiguate	the	use	of	the	term	“knowledge”	in	these	claims.	By	applying	Vlastos’	interpretation	to	the	Theaetetus	the	(disambiguated)	claims	that	form	the	“puzzle”	would	have	the	following	content:		1)	If	Socrates	possesses	a	technē	then	Socrates	possesses	knowledge-e			2)	Socrates	possesses	a	technē	(Theaet	149a4,	a7	150b6,	c1,	151a)		3)	(from	1,	2):.	Socrates	possesses	knowledge-e			4)	knowledge-c	is	‘the	same’	as	sophia	(Theaet	145e)		5)	Socrates	has	no	sophia	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2)		6)	(from	4,	5):.	Socrates	has	no	knowledge-c			This	solution	therefore	comes	with	the	unique	benefit	of	not	having	to	suppose	that	any	of	the	premises	that	form	the	puzzle	is	false;	which	means	one	does	not	have	to	offer	elaborate	accounts	of	why	one	of	the	claims	should	not	be	attributed	to	Socrates.	On	what	grounds	might	it	be	plausible	to	read	Socrates’	claims	in	the	Theaetetus	as	hinting	at	Vlastos’	distinction	between	knowledge-e	and	knowledge-c?			 Remembering	that	Socrates	claims	in	the	Theaetetus	that	what	‘befits	knowledge’	(Theaet	152c)	is	for	it	to	be	‘of	what	is’	(Theaet	152c)	and	to	be	‘unerring’	(Theaet	152c)	provides	direct	textual	evidence	for	Vlastos’	contention	that	one	of	the	senses	in	which	Socrates	uses	the	term	“knowledge”	is	a	sense	that	requires	it	to	be	infallible.	This	confirms	that	in	the	Theaetetus,	Socrates	takes	the	sense	of	the	term	
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“knowledge”	to	be	the	same	as	at	least	one	of	those	that	Vlastos	ascribes	to	him	viz.	knowledge-c.			 What	about	understanding	Socrates’	knowledge	of	how	to	form	a	judgement	regarding	the	truth	or	falsity	of	his	interlocutor’s	belief	(the	knowledge	involved	in	the	practice	of	his	midwifery	–	section	1.2)	as	knowledge-e?	Knowledge-e,	to	quote	Vlastos’	own	words	once	more,	is	a	cognitive	state	with	regard	to	a	proposition	“p”	that	counts	as	knowledge	when	p	‘can	be	maintained	in	elenctic	argument,	while	its	denial	cannot’.143	Now,	in	the	absence	of	being	able	to	determine	what	propositions	Socrates	might	have	to	know	in	order	to	practice	midwifery,	it	is	arguably	difficult	to	determine	whether,	based	on	the	text	of	the	Theaetetus,	we	have	reasons	to	attribute	knowledge-e	of	these	propositions	to	him.144	However,	there	is	one	proposition	that,	if	there	were	evidence	that	supported	the	claim	that	Socrates	had	knowledge-e	of	it,	would	be	sufficient	to	confirm	that	Socrates	possesses	the	knowledge	involved	in	the	practice	of	midwifery.	This	proposition	is	“I	(that	is,	Socrates)	know	how	to	form	a	judgement	as	to	the	truth	or	falsity	of	my	interlocutor’s	beliefs”.	If	Socrates	knew-e	this,	it	would	at	least	entail	that	he	knew-e	that	he	had	the	knowledge	involved	in	the	practice	of	midwifery.	So,	does	Socrates	ever	engage	in	an	elenctic	argument	with	either	of	the	dialogues’	other	participants	where	those	interlocutors	try	and	commit	Socrates	to	claims	that	contradict	this	claim	but	are	unable	to	do	so?		The	answer	is	a	flat	“no”.	Despite	this	manifestly	being	the	case	upon	reading	the	Theaetetus,	other	reasons	stand	in	the	way	of	accepting	this	view.	One	of	these	is	that	there	are	no	elenctic	arguments																																																									143	Ibid,	p.18	144	The	problem	that	arises	when	trying	to	understand	what	propositions	Socrates	must	know	in	order	to	practice	midwifery	is	that	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	a	technē	is	knowledge	of	how	to	perform	the	unique	ergon	of	the	technē	as	we	saw	in	sections	1.1	and	1.2.	Even	if	“knowledge	how”	is	reducible	to	propositional	knowledge	and	Socrates	understands	this	to	be	the	case,	to	demonstrate	this	would	require	a	lengthy	digression	which	I	do	not	have	space	to	embark	upon	at	this	juncture.		
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in	the	Theaetetus	because	midwifery	is	the	only	method	of	investigation	Socrates	adopts	in	the	text.	This	is	a	point	that	is	confirmed	by	one	of	Socrates’	statements	at	the	end	of	the	dialogue.	There	he	declares	that	‘our	art	of	midwifery	tells	us	that	that	all	of	these	offspring	are	wind-eggs	and	not	worth	bringing	up’	(Theaet	210b)	which	indicates	that	the	investigation	that	comprises	the	main	body	of	the	text	has	been	conducted	using	only	the	Maieutic	Method.	Furthermore	the	method	of	intellectual	midwifery	is	different	in	several	important	respects	to	the	elenctic	method	of	argumentation	that	Vlastos	thinks	Socrates	uses	to	establish	that	he	has	knowledge-e	of	various	propositions.145	Lastly,	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	is	generated	by	the	inference	from	Socrates’	claim	to	practice	a	technē	(Theaet	149a4,	a7,	150b6,	c1,	151a)	being	contradicted	by	the	inference	from	the	claim	that	Socrates	does	not	have	any	wisdom	(Theaet	150c4,	c6,	d1-2),	which	entails	that	he	has	no	knowledge	(Theaet	145d-e).	So,	even	if	Socrates	did	maintain	in	an	elenctic	argument	in	the	Theaetetus	that	he	possessed	the	knowledge	involved	in	midwifery,	it	would	take	almost	nothing	to	show	that	Socrates	does	not	have	knowledge-e	of	this	proposition.	Socrates’	interlocutor	would	need	only	to	point	to	premises	4	and	5	in	the	schema	at	the	opening	of	this	section	(which	are	paraphrases	of	Socrates’	actual	claims	in	the	Theaetetus)	to	show	that	he	has	beliefs	that	contradict	the	claim	that	he	knows	how	to	reach	a	judgement																																																									145	To	see	this	is	the	case	one	need	only	note	a	few	dissimilarities	between	the	elenchus	and	midwifery.	The	method	of	midwifery	is	declared	by	Socrates	to	be	a	collaborative	(Theaet	151e)	effort	to	investigate	topics	of	philosophical	interest	whereas	the	elenctic	method	is	(generally)	understood	to	be	a	combative	(Apol	30e,	Meno	80a)	practice	where	Socrates	riles	up	or	perplexes	his	interlocutors.	In	the	
Theaetetus	the	maieutic	method	is	only	practiced	on	special	initiates	(Theaet	151b);	those	who	are	‘pregnant’	(Theaet	148e),	whereas	in	the	
Apology	Socrates	tells	us	that	he	practices	the	elenchus	on	‘anyone,	citizen	or	stranger,	who	I	think	wise’	(Apol	23b).	Finally,	the	discovery	that	a	claim	of	an	interlocutor’s	is	false	as	part	of	the	practice	of	midwifery	is	declared	by	Socrates	(with	Theaetetus’	agreement)	to	be	‘progress’	(Theaet	187a);	by	contrast,	in	elenctic	inquiries,	the	discovery	that	an	interlocutor’s	claim	is	inconsistent	with	their	other	thoughts	is	generally	met	with,	if	not	outright	contempt	(Meno	94e),	at	least	a	degree	of	frustration	during	elenctic	inquiry	(Euthphr	11c-d).	
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regarding	the	truth	or	falsity	of	his	interlocutor’s	beliefs.	This	would	of	course	be	sufficient	to	show	that	Socrates	does	not	have	knowledge-e	of	the	proposition	“I	know	how	to	reach	a	judgement	regarding	the	truth	or	falsity	of	an	interlocutor’s	beliefs”.			
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Chapter	3:		
3.1:	The	Epistemic	Structure	of	Mental	Midwifery:		My	proposed	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	is	to	argue	for	the	view	that	premise	1	of	the	schema	in	section	2.3	viz.	“if	Socrates	possesses	a	technē	then	Socrates	possesses	epistēmē”	needs	to	be	rephrased.	I	shall	argue	that	it	needs	to	be	rephrased	in	a	way	such	that	the	antecedent,	“if	Socrates	possesses	a	technē”,	instead	reads	“if	Socrates	possesses	a	technē	other	than	intellectual	midwifery”.	This	would	make	the	whole	of	premise	1	read	“if	Socrates	possesses	a	technē	other	than	intellectual	midwifery	then	Socrates	possesses	epistēmē”.	My	argument	for	this	view	has	a	basis	in	the	textual	evidence	and	we	will	come	to	this	shortly.	Firstly	it	is	worth	seeing	how	an	argument	that	establishes	this	position	would	suffice	to	dissolve	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.			 If	premise	1	were	reworded	in	the	way	I	shall	soon	argue	it	should	be	then	the	antecedent	would	qualify	which	technai	imply	the	possession	of	epistēmē	in	such	a	way	that	Socrates’	practice	of	mental	obstetrics	does	not	fulfil	the	condition	of	the	antecedent.	If	this	were	the	case	then	Socrates’	technē	of	midwifery	would	be	the	sole	exception	to	the	rule	that	possessing	a	technē	entails	possessing	epistēmē;	the	rule	that	the	original	wording	of	premise	1	expressed.	Hence	the	result	of	this	would	be	that	Socrates	practices	the	technē	of	midwifery	(Theaet	149a4,	a7	150b6,	c1,	151a,	c)	whilst	not	necessarily	possessing	
epistēmē.	The	consequence	would	be	that	premise	3	(“Socrates	possesses	epistēmē”)	would	not	follow	from	premises	1	and	2.	If	premise	3	does	not	follow	from	premises	1	and	2	then	(C)	does	not	follow	from	premises	3	and	6.	If	(C)	cannot	be	established	then	there	is	no	contradiction	and	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	is	dissolved.	Before	we	can	look	at	the	rationale	for	rephrasing	premise	1	we	need	to	notice	something	about	Socrates’	practice	of	midwifery.	This	is	that,	his	
	78	
performance	of	his	technē	(his	performance	of	the	ergon	of	his	midwifery)	involves	asking	questions.146			 Evidence	of	the	view	that	performing	the	ergon	of	midwifery	involves	asking	questions,	firstly,	is	manifest	throughout	the	Theaetetus.	When	practicing	midwifery	on	his	young	protégé	it	is	evident	that	throughout	the	text	Socrates	does	nothing	but	ask	questions.147	There	is	further	evidence	that	corroborates	this	claim.	It	takes	the	form	of	Socrates’	explicit	allusions	to	the	fact	that	practicing	midwifery	(thus,	performing	the	ergon	of	midwifery)	involves	asking	questions	of	his	interlocutor.	Socrates	makes	the	first	of	these	comments	when	concluding	his	explanation	of	his	technē	of	midwifery;	there	he	says:	‘I	want	you	[Theaetetus]	to	come	to	me	as	one	who	is	both	the	son	of	a	midwife	and	himself	skilled	in	the	art;	and	try	to	answer	the	questions	I	shall	ask	you	as	well	as	you	can’	(Theaet	151c).	Next,	slightly	further	on	in	the	text,	just	after	Socrates	presents	Theaetetus	with	a	view	of	the	mechanics	underlying	perception	(Theaet	156a-157c),	Theaetetus	hesitates	to	accept	the	view	that	Socrates	presents	to	him	(Theaet	157c).	On	hearing	this	reticence	Socrates	explains	how	he	is	not	offering	his	own	theory	(because	he	is	practicing	midwifery	on	Theaetetus)	(Theaet	157c)	and	tells	his	young	interlocutor	to	therefore	‘answer	like	a	man	whatever	appears	to	you	about	the	things	I	ask	you’	(Theaet	157d).	To	this	Theaetetus	replies	‘All	right,	go	on	with	the	questions’	(Theaet	157d).	This	passage	therefore	confirms	that	it	is	not	only	Socrates	who	understands	performing	mental	obstetrics	to	involve	asking	questions.	Following	this,	during	another	interruption	in	the	conversation	where	Socrates	declares	that	Theaetetus’	first	born	has																																																									146	I	take	it	to	be	a	fairly	uncontroversial	claim	that	when	Socrates	is	claiming	to	practice	midwifery,	this	entails	that	he	his	performing	the	
ergon	of	that	technē.	It	seems	like	a	natural	inference	that	performing	some	action	or	set	of	actions	entails	performing	the	function	that	that	action	or	those	actions	serves	or	serve	respectively.		147	The	only	notable	exception	is	the	digression	(Theaet	172c-178c)	where	Socrates	explains	the	differences	between	the	life	of	the	philosopher	and	that	of	the	public	man	at	the	request	of	Theodorus	(Theaet	172c).		
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been	fully	delivered	(Theaet	161a)	Socrates	claims	that	it	is	now	time	to	perform	the	testing	of	Theaetetus’	first	born	(Theaet	161a-b).	What	he	claims	this	testing	will	involve	is	trying	‘to	get	our	answer	out	of	Theaetetus,	not	to	make	any	contribution	of	my	own’	(Theaet	161b).	In	all	of	the	forgoing	passages,	Socrates’	indication	that	he	will	be	questioning	Theaetetus	is	prefixed	with	a	reminder	that	he	is,	in	the	discussion	to	follow,	going	to	be	performing	the	function	of	the	philosophical	midwife	on	Theaetetus.	These	passages	taken	together	therefore	strongly	suggest	that	the	activity	the	intellectual	midwife	engages	in	(the	performance	of	the	ergon	of	that	technē)	involves	questioning	the	midwife’s	interlocutor.	With	this	in	mind	let	us	now	proceed	to	a	review	of	the	evidence	that	supports	my	proposed	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.			 Let	us	return	again	to	a	central	passage	from	Socrates’	explanation	of	his	Maieutic	Method:		‘the	most	important	thing	about	my	art	is	the	ability	to	apply	all	possible	tests	to	the	offspring,	to	determine	whether	the	young	mind	is	delivered	of	a	phantom,	that	is,	an	error,	or	a	fertile	truth.	For,	one	thing	which	I	have	in	common	with	the	ordinary	midwives	is	that	I	myself	am	barren	of	wisdom.	The	common	reproach	against	me	is	that	I	am	always	asking	questions	of	other	people	but	never	express	my	own	views	about	anything,	because	there	is	no	wisdom	in	me;	and	that	is	true	enough.	And	the	reason	of	it	is	this,	that	God	compels	me	to	attend	to	the	travail	of	others	but	has	forbidden	me	to	procreate.	So	that	I	am	not	in	any	sense	a	wise	man;	I	cannot	claim	as	the	child	of	my	own	soul	any	discovery	worthy	of	the	name	of	wisdom.’148	(Theaet	150c-d)		
																																																								148	μέγιστον	δὲ	τοῡτ'ἔνι	τῇ	ἡμετέρᾳ	τέχνῃ,	βασανίζειν	δυνατὸν	εἶναι	παντὶ	τρόπῳ	πότερον	εἴδωλον	καὶ	ψεῡδος	ἀποτίκτει	τοῡ	νέου	ἡ	διάνοια	ἢ	γόνιμόν	τε	καὶ	ἀληθές.	ἐπεὶ	τόδε	γε	καὶ	ἐμοὶ	ὑπάρχει	ὅπερ	ταῑς	μαίαις:	ἄγονός	εἰμι	σοϕίας,	καὶ	ὅπερ	ἤδη	πολλοί	μοι	ὠνείδισαν,	ὡς	τοὺς	μὲν	ἄλλους	ἐρωτῶ,	αὐτὸς	δὲ	οὐδὲν	ἀποϕαίνομαι	περὶ	οὐδενὸς	διὰ	τὸ	μηδὲν	ἔχειν	σοϕόν,	ἀληθὲς	ὀνειδίζουσιν.	τὸ	δὲ	αἴτιον	τούτου	τόδε:	μαιεύεσθαί	με	ὁ	θεὸς	ἀναγκάζει,	γεννᾱν	δὲ	ἀπεκώλυσεν.	εἰμὶ	δὴ	οὖν	
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	In	the	above	quotation,	as	I	argued	in	section	1.2,	the	first	sentence	spells	out	the	ergon	of	Socrates’	technē:	to	distinguish	his	interlocutor’s	beliefs	on	the	basis	of	their	truth	or	falsity.	More	than	this	though,	the	thought	this	sentence	expresses	is	that	Socrates	has	the	‘ability’	(Theaet	150c)	to	perform	this	ergon.	If	one	then	looks	carefully	at	the	claim	in	the	sentence	that	follows,	what	one	can	discover	is	that	the	reason	Socrates	has	this	‘ability’	(Theaet	150c)	is	because	he	is	barren	of	wisdom.149	This	entails	that	the	relation	between	Socrates’	capacity	to	practice	the	ergon	and	his	barrenness	is	minimally	one	of	compatibility;	however,	it	also	implies	that	there	is	an	explanatory	relation	between	them	where	the	latter	accounts	for	the	former.	Next,	in	the	third	sentence	in	the	above	quotation,	we	find	out	that	it	is	not	only	Socrates’	‘ability’	(Theaet	150c)	to	practice	the	ergon	of	midwifery	that	is	explained	by	his	lack	of	wisdom.	This	time	it	is	his	performance	of	that	
ergon	(his	asking	questions)	that	is	explained	by	his	lacking	wisdom	or	knowledge.	By	claiming	that	‘The	common	reproach	against	me	is	that	I	am	always	asking	questions	of	other	people	but	never	express	my	own	views	about	anything,	because	there	is	no	wisdom	in	me’	(Theaet	150c)	Socrates	attributes	his	asking	questions	of	his	interlocutor	(performing	the	ergon	of	midwifery,	as	we	just	saw)	to	his	barrenness.	So	far	then,	we	have	discovered	from	the	beginning	of	this	passage	that	Socrates’	‘ability’	(Theaet	150c)	to	practice	the	ergon	and	his	actually	performing	it	are	both	accounted	for	by	his	lack	of	wisdom.	These	claims	give	us	reason	to	conclude	that	Socrates’	practice	of	the	technē	of	midwifery	is	an	exception	to	the	rule	that	premise	1	states,	and	hence	to	qualify	the	antecedent	of	premise	1	in	the	way	I	suggested	at	the	opening	of	this	chapter.	Why?	
																																																																																																																																													αὐτὸς	μὲν	οὐ	τι	τι	σοϕός,	οὐδέ	τί	μοι	ἔστιν	εὕρημα	τοιοῡτον	γεγονὸς	τῆς	ἐμῆς	ψυχῆς	ἔκγονον	149	‘The	use	of	‘For’	(Theaet	150c)	here	seems	to	confirm	this	claim	(‘For,	one	thing	I	have	in	common	with	ordinary	midwives	is	that	I	myself	am	barren	of	wisdom’)	(Theaet	150c)	(emphasis	added).	
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It	is	because	Socrates	here	explicitly	claims	that	he	has	the	ability	to	practice	and	actually	perform	the	ergon	of	midwifery	both	in	
spite	of	the	fact	that	he	has	no	knowledge	and	indeed,	because	of	this	(Theaet	150c).	This	therefore	gives	us	grounds	for	thinking	that	Socrates’	lack	of	wisdom	is,	at	a	minimum,	compatible	with	his	capacity	for	practicing	and	actually	performing	the	ergon	of	his	technē	of	intellectual	midwifery.	Hence,	we	have	reason	to	suppose	that	Socrates’	
technē	constitutes	an	exception	to	the	rule	that	possessing	a	technē	entails	possessing	epistēmē.	This	provides	a	rationale	for	inferring	that	premise	1	should	be	reworded:	“if	Socrates	possesses	a	technē	other	than	intellectual	midwifery	then	Socrates	possesses	epistēmē”.	Doing	this,	as	we	saw	at	the	opening	of	this	chapter,	can	solve	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom.	It	implies	that	one	should	answer	the	question	that	the	puzzle	raises	with	the	response:	“Socrates	does	mean	what	he	says,	he	lacks	all	wisdom”.		However,	having	shown	that	there	is	a	case	to	be	made	for	the	idea	that	Socrates	practices	midwifery	without	any	knowledge,	one	must	recognise	that	this	makes	his	technē	extremely	atypical	in	this	respect.	Further	to	this	view	running	contrary	to	one	of	the	central	aspects	of	the	general	notion	of	a	technē	I	elucidated	at	the	opening	of	this	thesis,	it	also	runs	contrary	to	an	important	suggestion	that	I	made	as	part	of	that	exegesis.	This	was	the	hypothesis	that	I	offered	to	explain	one	of	Socrates’	claims	in	the	Gorgias	(Grg	465a).	It	consisted	in	the	idea	that	the	practitioners	of	technai	are	able	to	give	accounts	of	the	causes	of	their	performances	of	the	erga	of	their	technai.	In	section	1.1	I	argued	that	the	most	plausible	way	of	understanding	the	cause	of	a	practitioner’s	performance	of	the	ergon	of	their	technē	was	to	claim	that	it	consists	in	knowledge	of	how	to	perform	that	ergon.	My	basis	for	maintaining	this	was	the	principle	that	“knowledge	of	how	to	do	x,	in	this	case	how	to	perform	the	ergon	of	a	technē,	is	a	sufficient	explanation	of	one’s	doing	x	where	x	=	any	action”.150	Now,	the	view																																																									150	The	term	aītion	in	Greek	can	be	translated	either	cause	or	explanation.	In	the	Gorgias	passage	where	Socrates	claims	that	
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that	Socrates’	ability	to	practice	and	actually	perform	the	ergon	of	midwifery	is	explained	by	his	lacking	all	knowledge	(Theaet	150c)	contradicts	the	foregoing	hypothesis.	We	are	thus	left	with	the	task	of	explaining	how	it	is	that	Socrates’	barrenness	can	explain	his	ability	to	practice	and	actually	perform	the	ergon	satisfactorily.	That	is,	we	are	left	with	the	task	of	filling	the	explanatory	gap	left	by	the	fact	that	Socrates’	practice	of	the	ergon	of	midwifery	is	accounted	for	by	his	lack	of	knowledge	as	opposed	to	his	possession	of	it.	For,	if	knowledge	of	how	to	perform	the	ergon	normally	accounts	for	a	practitioner’s	ability	to	practice	it	and	actually	perform	it	(as	the	hypothesis	maintains)	then	Socrates’	barrenness	explaining	these	features	of	his	technē	seems	to	make	little	sense.		Usefully,	Socrates	tells	us	exactly	how	this	gap	is	filled	when	he	tells	us	of	the	relation	that	subsists	between	his	barrenness	and	his	practicing	midwifery	(Theaet	150c):			‘the	reason	of	it	[the	fact	that	Socrates’	barrenness	explains	his	ability	to	perform	and	actually	practice	midwifery]	is	this,	that	God	compels	me	to	
attend	to	the	travail	[μαιεύεσθαί	με	ὁ	θεὸς	ἀναγκάζει]	of	others	but	has	forbidden	me	to	procreate’	(Theaet	150c)	(emphasis	added)		Before	we	go	further,	it	is	important	to	note	here	that	in	the	italicised	section	in	the	preceding	quote	what	Socrates	explicitly	claims	is	that	‘God	compels	me	to	act	as	a	midwife’	(Theaet	150c).	The	result	of	this	is	that	God’s	impelling	Socrates	to	act	as	a	midwife	accounts	for	Socrates’	barrenness	explaining	his	capacity	to	practice	and	actually	perform	the	
ergon	of	midwifery.	So	this	can	explain	why	Socrates’	technē	is	atypical	in	the	way	his	comments	at	Theaet	150c	indicate.	However,	simply	deferring	the	explanation	of	this	to	God	only	raises	a	further	question.	Namely,	how	does	God’s	compelling	Socrates	to	perform	midwifery																																																																																																																																														practitioners	of	technai	can	give	accounts	of	the	causes	of	their	performing	the	erga	of	their	technai	the	term	‘cause’	(Grg	465a)	in	the	Greek	is	aītion.	
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account	for	the	fact	that	his	barrenness	explains	his	performing	midwifery	and	possessing	the	ability	to	do	so?	What	I	will	go	on	to	suggest	is	quite	speculative	but	hopefully	it	will	be	seen	to	illuminate	the	interpretation	so	far	advanced.			
3.2:	God’s	Role	in	the	Maieutic	Method:		Let	us	return,	firstly,	to	an	examination	of	the	features	of	Socrates’	
technē	that	God’s	compelling	Socrates’	to	act	as	midwife	explains	(Theaet	150c).	These	are,	as	we	saw	in	the	preceding	section,	the	fact	that	his	lack	of	knowledge	accounts	for	1)	his	performance	of	the	ergon	of	midwifery	and	2)	his	ability	to	practice	the	ergon	(Theaet	150c).	This	amounted	to	the	claim	that	one	should	understand	Socrates	to	practice	midwifery	without	the	knowledge	of	how	to	perform	the	ergon	(for	his	barrenness	implies	that	he	has	no	knowledge)	and	this	fact	implied	that	Socrates’	technē	was	exceptional	in	that	respect.	The	reason	for	this,	as,	likewise,	we	just	saw,	is	that	ordinarily	one	might	maintain	that	one’s	ability	to	practice	and	actually	perform	the	ergon	of	a	technē	is	explained	by	one’s	possessing	knowledge	of	how	to	perform	the	ergon	of	that	technē	(on	the	hypothesis	offered	in	section	1.1).	Hence,	the	epistemic	structure	of	Socrates’	technē	is	exceptional	because	it	seems	to	leave	an	explanatory	gap:	a	gap	that	must	be	filled	with	an	account	of	how	Socrates’	lack	of	knowledge	explains	his	performing	and	having	a	capacity	to	practice	the	ergon.	Hence,	what	follows	is	that	whatever	fills	this	explanatory	gap	must	play,	at	a	minimum,	the	same	explanatory	role	as	the	knowledge	that	ordinarily	accounts	for	a	practitioner’s	ability	to	perform	and	actually	practice	the	ergon	of	their	technē.	Now,	as	we	saw,	this	gap	is	filled	by	God’s	compelling	Socrates	to	act	as	a	midwife	(Theaet	150c).	So,	minimally,	God’s	divine	coercive	power	to	make	Socrates	act	as	a	midwife	must	play	the	same	explanatory	role	as	the	knowledge	of	how	to	perform	the	ergon	of	midwifery.	In	what	way	could	it	play	such	a	role?			
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	 The	answer	that	suggests	itself	is	that	God	possesses	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	the	ergon	of	midwifery	and	that	this	results	in	Socrates	being	compelled	to	perform	the	ergon.	One	possible	way	in	which	God’s	compelling	Socrates	to	perform	midwifery	could	explain	Socrates’	obstetric	practice	would	be	if	God’s	knowledge	of	midwifery	acts	as	the	basis	of	the	compelling	force	that	ensures	Socrates	performs	the	ergon.	If	this	is	so,	it	would	make	God’s	command	that	Socrates	perform	the	ergon	the	result	of	that	which	usually	plays	the	same	explanatory	role	of	an	(ordinary)	practitioner’s	performance	of	their	technē	(on	the	hypothesis	from	section	1.1).	That	is,	knowledge	of	performing	the	ergon	of	midwifery	in	God’s	mind	could	ensure	Socrates	is	forced	to	practice	midwifery.			 Putting	these	pieces	together	the	result	of	this	interpretation	is	that	Socrates’	barrenness	(Theaet	150c)	explains	1)	his	performance	of	the	ergon	(his	asking	questions)	(Theaet	150c)	and	2)	his	‘ability’	(Theaet	150c)	to	perform	the	ergon	(Theaet	150c).	This	is	explained	by	God’s	coercing	him	to	act	as	a	midwife	(Theaet	150c)	(performing	the	
ergon).	The	way	that	I	suggested	this	coercion	could	explain	this	is	if	God’s	compelling	Socrates	to	perform	the	ergon	were	in	turn	accounted	for	by	God	possessing	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	the	ergon.	This	would	entail	that	God’s	order	to	Socrates	was	grounded	in	God’s	being	in	the	same	epistemic	state	that	plays	the	explanatory	role	of	accounting	for	the	performance	of	the	ergon	of	any	technē	on	the	hypothesis	advanced	in	section	1.1.	This	would	hence	allow	God’s	coercion	to	be	explained	by	that	which	plays	the	same	explanatory	role	as	that	which	ordinarily	plays	it	in	the	performance	of	the	ergon	of	a	
technē.	This	interpretation	therefore	offers	some	kind	of	explanation	of	how	Socrates’	technē	can	be	so	atypical.	Ultimately	it	is	because	God	possesses	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	midwifery	that	Socrates	can	be	the	genuinely	barren	midwife	of	men’s	souls.	If	this	is	right	it	shows	that	Socrates’	practice	of	the	ergon	and	his	ability	to	perform	it	can	be	explained	whilst	he	himself	lacks	any	knowledge.		
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Before	we	go	further	it	should	be	noticed	that	the	view	I	am	presenting	appears	to	recommend	a	very	minimal	role	for	Socrates	in	the	practice	of	midwifery.	For,	if	God	possesses	the	knowledge	of	how	to	perform	the	ergon,	one	might	think	that	this	entails	that	God	knows	what	questions	Socrates	should	ask	Theaetetus	and	perhaps	delivers	these	questions	into	Socrates’	mind,	making	Socrates	act	as	a	mouthpiece	for	God’s	own	purposes.	This	would	make	Socrates	nothing	but	a	divine	puppet	that	contributes	little	personally	to	the	conversation	beyond	the	use	of	his	voice.	Thankfully	for	those	who	would	give	a	greater	intellectual	role	to	the	character	of	Socrates	himself	in	the	Theaetetus	there	is	some	strong	evidence	that	suggests	that	this	is	not	the	way	that	intellectual	midwifery	works.		The	most	compelling	piece	of	evidence	that	confirms	that	Socrates	and	God	collaborate	in	the	practice	of	midwifery	and	that	hence	confirms	the	view	that	Socrates	is	not	merely	God’s	mouthpiece	appears	in	his	claim	that	‘it	is	I	[Socrates],	with	God’s	help,	who	deliver[s]	them	[Socrates’	interlocutors]	of	this	offspring’	(Theaet	150d-e).	The	fact	that	Socrates	claims	that	it	is	with	‘God’s	help’	(Theaet	150d)	(emphasis	added)	that	he	delivers	the	brain-children	of	his	interlocutors	confirms	that	Socrates	should	be	understood	as	playing	a	greater	role	than	that	entailed	by	the	mouthpiece	model.	For,	on	the	mouthpiece	model,	Socrates	is	not	just	assisted	by	God	but	rather	is	directed	or	controlled	by	God.	Other	claims	about	the	role	of	the	divine	in	metal	obstetrics	also	seem	to	hint	at	the	conclusion	that	the	mouthpiece	model	cannot	be	correct.	For	instance	Socrates	tells	Theaetetus	that	he	will	be	able	to	answer	Socrates’	question	“what	is	knowledge”	‘if	God	is	willing,	and	you	play	the	man’	(Theaet	151d),	indicating	that	God	must	allow	Socrates’	questions	to	Theaetetus	to	be	answered	but	not	that	God	forces	certain	questions	to	be	asked.	Something	similar	also	seems	to	underlie	Socrates’	claim	that	‘all	whom	God	permits	are	seen	to	make	progress’	(Theaet	150d).	This	claim	seems	to	amount	to	the	proposal	that	God	does	not	use	Socrates	as	a	mouthpiece	but	that	he	must	allow	for	Socrates	to	reach	the	judgment	
	86	
that	it	is	the	function	of	his	midwifery	to	produce	contra	the	view	that	God	directs	Socrates	to	reach	his	judgement.151			 So,	this	evidence	disconfirms	the	mouthpiece	view	but	that	leaves	one	with	a	conundrum:	how	to	make	sense	of	the	fact	that	God	possesses	the	knowledge	involved	in	midwifery	while	allowing	that	the	practice	is	cooperative.	I	shall	not	now	attempt	to	make	sense	of	how	this	could	be	the	case	because	I	do	not	have	sufficient	space	to	conjecture	as	to	how	this	might	be	possible.	The	suggestion	that	God	possesses	the	knowledge	involved	with	midwifery	was	intended	only	to	further	explain	how	Socrates’	lack	of	knowledge	is	compatible	with	his	barrenness,	to	offer	this	view	some	further	credibility.	The	scope	of	this	essay	aims	at	trying	to	find	a	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	and	this	I	have	achieved	with	my	earlier	suggestion	that	Socrates’	barrenness	and	his	midwifery	are	compatible.	I	therefore	choose	to	leave	the	project	of	understanding	the	relationship	between	the	possession	of	the	knowledge	in	God’s	mind	and	Socrates’	practice	of	midwifery	to	another	time.	Before	I	conclude	however,	I	would	like	to	offer	some	comments	regarding	what	may	have	motivated	Plato	to	attribute	the	source	of	Socrates’	philosophical	practice	to	God.		
3.3:	Exonerating	Socrates	and	Divinising	the	Source	of	Platonic	
Doctrine:	
	First	of	all	I	will	argue	that	Plato’s	attribution	of	the	knowledge	involved	in	Socrates’	philosophical	method	to	God	serves	the	purpose	of	further	exonerating	Socrates	of	one	of	the	crimes	that	he	is	portrayed	as	defending	himself	against	in	the	Apology.	To	suggest	that	Plato	composed	the	Theaetetus	to	serve	the	purpose	of	further	absolving	Socrates	of	his	apparent	offences	is	not	a	new	interpretation.	However,	what	I	bring	to	this	eminently	plausible	view	of	the	Theaetetus	is	the	
																																																								151	This	is	what	the	‘progress’	(Theaet	150d)	Socrates	here	alludes	to	consists	in	as	I	argued	in	section	1.2.	
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suggestion	that	it	is	Plato’s	assignment	of	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	midwifery	to	God	that	can	serve	this	particular	purpose.	The	charge	that	Plato’s	ascription	of	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	midwifery	to	God	can	be	seen	to	exonerate	Socrates	of	is	not	among	those	that	Meletus	brings	against	him	(Apol	24b)	but	rather	those	brought	against	him	publicly	by	his	‘earlier	accusers’	(Apol	24b)	such	as,	Socrates	claims,	Aristophanes	(Apol	19c).	This	is	the	charge	that	‘Socrates	is	guilty	of	wrongdoing	in	that	he	busies	himself	studying	things	in	the	sky	and	below	the	earth;	he	makes	the	worse	argument	the	stronger	and	teaches	these	same	things	to	others’	(Apol	19b).	In	the	
Apology	Socrates	tells	a	story	so	as	to	explain	the	‘origin	of	this	slander’	(Apol	21b)	that	he	claims	will	‘suffice	as	a	defence’	(Apol	24b).	At	the	opening	of	this	story	Socrates	tells	the	gathered	demesmen	of	Athens	that	his	friend	Chaerephon	went	to	the	Delphic	Oracle	to	ask	if	any	man	was	wiser	than	Socrates,	at	which	the	reply	came	that	there	was	not	(Apol	21a).	After	explaining	that	Chaerephon	related	this	information	to	him	Socrates	then	tells	us	of	his	reaction	to	the	news,	saying:	‘When	I	heard	this	reply	I	asked	myself:	Whatever	does	the	god	mean?	What	is	his	riddle?	I	am	very	conscious	of	the	fact	that	I	am	not	wise	at	all;	what	does	he	then	mean	by	saying	that	I	am	the	wisest?’	(Apol	21b).	Socrates	then	proceeds	to	tell	of	how	he	interviewed	a	number	of	different	persons	to	try	and	understand	the	oracle’s	pronouncement	(Apol	21b-23b).	Socrates	tells	of	how	he	examined	‘the	politicians’	(Apol	22a);	‘the	poets,	the	writers	of	tragedies	and	dithyrambs’	(Apol	22a-b)	and	lastly	the	‘craftsmen’	(Apol	22d)	and	concluded	on	each	occasion	that	‘I	am	wiser	than	this	man…he	thinks	he	knows	something	when	he	does	not,	whereas	when	I	do	not	know,	neither	do	I	think	I	know’	(Apol	21d).	Hence,	as	a	result	of	these	investigations,	Socrates	says,	he	came	to	the	conclusion	that:		‘in	fact	the	God	is	wise	and	that	his	oracular	response	meant	that	human	wisdom	is	worth	little	or	nothing,	and	that	when	he	says	this	man,	Socrates,	he	is	using	my	name	as	an	example,	as	if	he	said	“This	
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man	among	you,	mortals,	is	wisest	who,	like	Socrates,	understands	that	his	wisdom	is	worthless.”	So	now	I	continue	this	investigation	as	the	God	bade	me’	(Apol	23a-b)		So,	by	explaining	that	whatever	wisdom	or	knowledge	he	possesses	is	‘worthless’	(Apol	23b),	Socrates	exonerates	himself	of	the	crime	of	gaining	knowledge	about	those	things	that	presumably	no	one	should;	the	‘things	in	the	sky	and	below	the	earth’	(Apol	19b).	Further,	lacking	any	knowledge	of	any	value,	of	being	aware	only	that	he	does	no	know	various	things	(Apol	21b),	Socrates	has	nothing	to	teach	anyone.	Hence,	by	explaining	that	the	cause	his	philosophical	practice	in	the	Apology	is	his	lack	of	knowledge	or	wisdom,	rather	than	his	possession	of	it,	something	he	was	moreover	made	to	realise	because	of	a	divine	fiat	(Apol	23b),	Socrates	absolves	himself	of	the	crimes	of	his	‘earlier	accusers’	(Apol	24b).			 In	the	Theaetetus	Plato	goes	one	step	further	than	this	and	not	only	makes	Socrates’	practice	of	philosophical	investigation,	which	is	the	upshot	of	his	lacking	any	wisdom	(Theaet	150c),	a	consequence	of	God’s	injunction	upon	him	to	pursue	a	life	of	inquisition,	as	in	the	
Apology,	but	a	result	of	God’s	direct	intervention	in	Socrates’	life	(Theaet	150c).	As	we	have	seen,	it	is	plausible	to	understand	God	to	possess	the	knowledge	involved	in	maieutic	practice	in	the	Theaetetus.	This	being	the	case	could	be	seen	to	serve	the	purpose	of	relieving	any	remaining	suspicions	in	the	minds	of	those	who	would	seek	to	slander	Socrates	for	possessing	and	disseminating	heretical	scientific	knowledge.	Those	who	were	not	convinced	of	Socrates’	tale	in	the	
Apology	(Apol	22b-24b)	would	be	further	rebutted	by	the	fact	that	in	the	Theaetetus,	Socrates’	practice	is	a	direct	result	of	divine	intervention	in	his	life,	for,	this	implies	that	whatever	knowledge	his	accusers	thought	could	be	attributed	to	Socrates	could	not	and,	furthermore,	that	whatever	knowledge	they	wished	to	infer	that	he	had,	was	in	fact	divine	in	nature,	being	possessed	by	God.			
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	 Secondly	I	would	like	to	suggest	that	divinising	the	source	of	Socrates’	philosophical	practice	serves	the	purpose	of	consecrating	the	origins	of	Plato’s	own	philosophical	doctrines.	To	see	why	this	could	be	the	case	one	needs	to	begin	by	endorsing	David	Sedley’s	interpretation	of	the	character	of	Socrates	in	the	Theaetetus,	as	I	did	in	section	2.2.	The	important	aspect	of	this	interpretation	for	present	purposes	is	Sedley’s	intriguing	suggestion	that	Socrates	in	the	Theaetetus	presents	arguments	that	‘cry	out	for	Platonist	interpretations’	so	that	the	practice	of	midwifery,	conducted	by	Socrates	in	the	text,	leads	Theaetetus,	and	hence,	the	reader,	to	accepting	conclusions	that	form	the	basis	of	Plato’s	middle	period	metaphysics	and	epistemology.152	By	combining	this	view	with	my	proposed	solution	to	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	one	can	trace	the	progress	of	philosophical	insight	in	the	opposite	direction.	By	supposing	that	God	possesses	the	knowledge	that	allows	Socrates	to	practice	as	a	midwife	and	that,	during	that	practice,	as	Sedley	supposes,	Socrates	presents	arguments	that	lead	to	the	acceptance	of	Platonist	conclusions,	Plato	not	only	sanctifies	his	esteemed	master’s	philosophical	practice	but	also	the	origins	of	his	own	thought.	This,	I	suggest,	may	have	motivated	Plato	to	attribute	the	knowledge	involved	in	Socrates’	midwifery	to	God.	By	offering	a	retrospective	look	at	the	philosophical	investigations	that	made	Socrates	so	famous	and	crediting	their	origins	to	divinity	Plato	likewise	credits	his	own	philosophy	to	God.			
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																									152	Sedley,	David,	The	Midwife	of	Platonism,	p.12	
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Conclusion:		In	this	thesis	I	wish	to	have	demonstrated	that	there	is	a	serious	case	to	be	made	for	understanding	Socrates’	character	in	the	Theaetetus	to	lack	all	wisdom	or	knowledge	including,	most	controversially,	that	which	is	pertinent	to	the	practice	of	his	technē	of	midwifery.	Further,	I	have	aimed	to	show	that	all	of	the	interpretations	I	have	discussed	do	not	offer	compelling	reasons	to	accept	previously	given	answers	to	the	question:	“does	Socrates	possess	knowledge	or	does	he	not?”.	Instead,	I	have	proposed	that	from	the	available	evidence,	the	most	plausible	answer	to	this	question	is	that	Socrates	does	not	possess	the	knowledge	involved	in	his	philosophical	practice	and	that	rather,	God	is	best	recognised	as	possessing	these	insights.	From	this	interpretation	two	interesting	results	can	be	derived.	Firstly,	my	interpretation	has	set	the	stage	for	a	further	investigation	into	the	nature	of	Socratic	methods	of	doing	philosophy	as	Plato	portrays	them	in	the	Theaetetus.	This	is	primarily	achieved	by	my	suggestion	that	God	is	best	understood	as	possessing	the	knowledge	involved	in	practicing	midwifery	rather	than	Socrates.	If	this	is	the	most	viable	way	of	solving	the	puzzle	of	Socratic	wisdom	given	the	textual	evidence,	more	interesting	interpretive	work	may	now	be	conducted	to	show	what	other	signs	exist	in	the	Theaetetus	that	point	towards	this	reading	being	the	correct	one.	Furthermore,	new	avenues	of	inquiry	that	may	lead	to	a	richer	appreciation	of	Plato’s	motivations	in	composing	the	Theaetetus	are	now	open	for	travel.	The	other	result	that	follows	is	a	consequence	of	the	fact	that,	like	two	recent	interpretations	of	the	Theaetetus	that	I	have	discussed	at	some	length	in	this	thesis,	my	interpretation	is	‘close	to	the	Academic	sceptics’	view’;	although	my	own	reading	is	closer	to	that	of	those	ancient	sceptics	than	either	Sedley’s	or	Giannopoulou’s.153	As	Sedley	points	out,	according	to	the	Academic’s	position,	Socrates	in	the	Theaetetus	‘admits	to	knowing	
																																																								153	Giannopoulou,	Zina,	Plato’s	Theaetetus	as	a	Second	Apology,	p.46	
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nothing	in	any	sense	of	“know”’.154	I	hope	to	have	shown	that	there	are	some	convincing	grounds	for	accepting	this	facet	of	the	academic	sceptic’s	interpretation	of	the	Theaetetus.	Therefore	I	submit	that	there	is	a	case	for	further	reevaluating	the	degree	to	which	the	portrayal	of	Socrates’	methodology	in	the	Theaetetus	is	a	“sceptical”	one.	That	is,	for	reassessing	Socrates’	investigative	procedure	in	the	text	as	being	conducted	from	a	position	of	having	no	prior	knowledge,	not	just	of	the	topics	under	discussion	in	the	dialogue,	but	of	anything	at	all.	My	proposed	interpretation	therefore	recommends	a	fresh	exploration	of	both	the	role	of	the	divine	in	Socrates’	philosophy	and	of	ancient	evaluations	of	Socrates’	philosophical	practices.			 	
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